Meles, in his interview conducted after the election, explained that the EPRDF had established two main objectives for this campaign:

1. Conduct an election that would achieve acceptance by the Ethiopian people, by local observers, and by the international community.

2. Win a majority of seats in Parliament

If anyone within the EPRDF had doubts about whether these two objectives were compatible with each other, they were resolved on May 16 when returns from polling stations nationwide became widely available to the observers, the EPRDF, and the opposition: the EPRDF was losing badly across the entire country.

This occurred despite certain precautions the EPRDF had put in place to handicap the opposition; The national election board (NEBE) was packed with EPRDF loyalists, several thousand poll watchers from local NGOs were prohibited from observing the elections, and the EPRDF employed routine harassment strategies to intimidate opposition supporters and drive-off opposition poll watchers. Still, it was not enough.

Thus, on May 16 the fateful decision was made at the Prime Minister’s office and carried out by EPRDF election chief Bereket Simon. The reporting of results should be stopped to allow time to fix the results (“assumed vote rigging’ was the phrase used by the EU Observer Mission). Meles also prohibited demonstrations in Addis Abeba in order to contain the inevitable public backlash.

One week after the election, the NEBE had received less than 20 of 524 results. Among the results made available were EPRDF victories from South Omo, one of the most remote regions in Ethiopia. Yet results from major towns were not available. It was not until May 31 that the number of results posted by the NEBE reached 500 out of the 524 seats contested.

What happened during the two-week delay while results dribbled in? Something similar happened in Zimbabwe in April.

The likely scenario is that EPRDF cadres under the direction of Bereket Simon expelled opposition observers from polling stations, opened sealed ballot boxes and removed ballots marked for the opposition, replacing them with ballots marked for the EPRDF. In some cases ballot boxes were destroyed and new numbers were simply made up.

Notable areas where widespread vote rigging almost certainly occurred include East Gojjam, Gonder, Harerge, Illubabor, Jimma, Gedeo, Sidama, and probably also Tigray.

The election gamble has resulted in Meles and the EPRDF being much worse-off now than before – a large degree of international legitimacy and local power has drained away from the EPRDF never to return. But why did Meles take this gamble?

THE DOUBLED AID SCENARIO

In the years prior to the election, Meles had carefully examined Ethiopia’s economic trends and concluded there was no hope of achieving substantial reductions in poverty in the foreseeable future.

His solution was not to try new policies. Instead he came up with the “double aid” scenario. Meles insisted that all foreign donors must double their aid to Ethiopia. This “double aid” scenario envisioned foreign aid growing from 11% of GDP to 22% of GDP and was presented to the IMF during the IMF’s regular consultations with Ethiopia.

under the doubled aid scenario, the authorities expect a marked acceleration of real GDP growth that is needed to achieve the income poverty goal of halving the number of people living in poverty by 2015.

- IMF January 2005

The IMF was skeptical of Ethiopia’s intention to mobilize such a large degree of additional aid, but Meles was undeterred. He offered the aid donors something in return – a new standard of good government in Ethiopia and a standard that would be promoted in Africa as a whole through the Blair Commission and through Meles’ active participation in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

One of the standards for good government in the 21st century is a government that is elected by the people and that can be removed by the people. Thus the May 15 election.

CONCLUSION

The objectives set by Meles for this election were fundamentally incompatible. Therefore Meles had to make a choice. Faced with a choice between achieving a historic milestone in Ethiopian history – the first largely free and fair election - and staying in power, Meles has chosen the latter.

OUTLOOK

The current student unrest is only the beginning of a period of popular struggle of undetermined length that will inevitably culminate in the capitulation of the ruling party.

Meles has adopted a strategy of demonizing the opposition (the Economist magazine dismissed his Interhamwe allusions as “ridiculous”) and appealing to extremism and fear. EPRDF policies will not be reviewed – only the implementation was faulty he says. He attacks civil society, a key arena of a democratic society, by saying “Ethiopians employed by NGOs are anti-development because they want to keep Ethiopia poor so that they may continue receiving a paycheck.”

This confrontational strategy, and the incessant provocations of Information Minister Bereket Simon will not help Ethiopia move to a new level of political maturity.

Instead, needless bloodshed and destruction can be avoided by implementing the suggestion of Sheikh Mohammed Al-Amoudi.

Rather, I suggest that we join forces to improve the lot of our country. Recrimination of one another leads nowhere and therefore should stop.

Meles, Bereket, Addisu Legese, and a few other top leaders are not willing to engage the opposition (and by extension, the public) in a mature discussion about the next steps for the country. But the EPRDF consists of more than Meles and Bereket Simon.

Any large organization that has achieved a measure of success will contain within it many honest, hardworking and principled individuals who joined because they truly believed the goals of the organization were good. Not all are cynical hacks.

Within the EPRDF there are many principled individuals with integrity who will have been shocked by the results. They will want a more thorough analysis of what happened than the glib assurances from Meles. They will want reform.

A major task/opportunity is for the opposition and any nascent reform elements of the EPRDF to dialogue, drive out fear, establish trust, and reach agreement on how to resolve the impasse created by the decisions taken by Meles and Bereket on May 16, 2005.

REFERENCES

PM Meles Interview – Parts I and II
http://www.waltainfo.com/Interview%20part%201.pdf
http://www.waltainfo.com/Interview%20part%202.pdf

To All My Friends In the United States of America
By Mohammed H. Al Amoudi, June 5, 2005
http://www.ethiopiafirst.com/news2005/Jan/To-All-My-Friends.html

EU Observer Statement
Assessment Of Vote Counting And Release Of Electoral Results
Mission Statement
Addis Ababa , May 24, 2005
http://www.et-eueom.org/press5.htm

Opposition Party Complaint
Request for Re-Election Due to Severe Election Irregularities
May 23, 2005
http://www.kestedemena.org/election05/electionproblemsdetailEng.pdf
http://www.kestedemena.org/election05/electionproblemdetail.pdf

IMF
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: 2004 Article IV Consultation and Sixth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility—Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Public Information Notice and Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=18009.0

NEPAD
http://www.nepad.org

Commission for Africa
http://www.commissionforafrica.org

The Zimbabwe vote-reporting delay - What happened on Thursday night:
An account of how ZANU PF rigged the Parliamentary Elections
Sokwanele Special Report: 5 April 2005
http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/whathappenedonthursnight_5april2005.html

Internationally Recognised Checklist for Election Assessment
http://www.zesn.org.zw/docs/pdf/Checklist%20for%20Free%20and%20Fair%20Elections_.pdf