From “The
News”,
March 21, 2004
Jang Group
Madaris in
perspective
By Waleed Ziad
Chapter I
J ihad namaaz ki
tarah farz hai - Jaysh Mohammad (Jihad, like
Prayer, is a religious obligation) reads a message scrawled on a crumbling wall
in an outlying area of
In truth, it is
neither.
If we scratch the
surface of the fundamentalist phenomenon, it becomes all too clear that the
story of militant religious groups and 'Islamic politics' in
In these three
articles, we trace the process which forged a 'religious establishment' and
endowed it with the militant mentality we all know so well today. The first
article answers the question: Who are the modern 'ulema'
and what historical circumstances spawned the contemporary madaris
(plural of madrasa)?
The second covers
the process through which the self proclaimed 'ulema'
entered the realm of politics, and, over the course of the second half of the
century, constantly changed alliances and refashioned their ideologies to survive
in a hostile environment which had little need for them.
The third article
is an overview of the origins of modern militancy: how the Afghan war and the
'Islamic' veneer of the Zia regime brought the 'ulema'
into the spotlight, leading them to adopt militant 'jihad' as their raison d'etre for the first time.
The breed of Quran
reciter cum 'mujahid' that
is so familiar to us now was never an established norm. The term reciter rather than scholar is more accurate, because many
modern madaris are less concerned with exegesis and fiqh than with the rote learning of Quran and dogma. The
militant 'ulema' today claim that the madrasa institutions exist to wage a military jihad against
all forms of colonialism and injustice, and to teach 'religious studies', while
the 'Islamic' parties claim that it is their duty as leaders of the 'ulema' to guide the nation towards 'righteousness'.
How and why did
this ideology come about?
The story takes us
back to the eighteenth century, in the days when Mughal
power was waning and foreign incursions had ruptured the fabric of traditional
society.
The intellectual
leadership of Muslim India, in pre-colonial times, was provided through a
system of privately and publicly financed madaris,
each with a highly organized and sophisticated curriculum, which offered both
traditional religious and secular education. The curriculum included not only
the purely legal sciences rooted in scripture (hadith,
fiqh, and tafsir) but
mathematics, grammar, logic, philosophy, astronomy, and medicine, among others.
The madaris trained both the jurists as well as the
administrative cadre of the government.
British rule in
the subcontinent heralded the end of this institution. One of the stated goals
of the British colonialists was to break this indigenous center of power and
thus curtail the influence of the traditional intelligentsia. This is best
expressed in Macaulay's oft quoted Minute on Education in India written in
1835: "We must at present do our best to form a class who may be
interpreters between us and the millions we govern -- a class of persons Indian
in blood and colour but English in taste, in
opinions, in morals and intellect." He went on to say that although the
British ruled the Indians, they would not be able to rule their minds until their
culture had been devalued. One weapon of choice was altering the system of
instruction in the educational institutions.
Baron Thomas Macaulay
With the
establishment of colonial western-oriented institutions of learning, and as a
colonial mindset spread amongst a new indigenous elite, the madrasa
system was gradually sidelined. An intentional rift was thus created between
what was considered legitimate education, geared towards furthering colonial
designs, and the madrasa education, which was dubbed
antique and superfluous. State sponsored grants to ulema
institutions dried out, and the prominence and effectiveness of the madaris declined accordingly.
Naturally, all
seeking advancement under the colonial regime and with the financial resources
to do so, would choose the colonial institutions, while the poorer, more
isolated communities enrolled students in the madaris.
Following the 1857
War of Independence, the religious institutions in
At this time, a
number of schools of thought emerged among the ulema
which led to the establishment of madaris across the
subcontinent, in the hope of internally reviving the Indian Muslims through
education, while steering clear of politics and militancy. The more prominent
included Deoband (1867), which strove to create an independent
cadre of learned Muslims, Bareilli, which focused on
preserving a traditional form of rural Islam, and Ahl-i-Hadith,
which was Wahhabi in its ideology.
Deoband madrasa
Towards the end of
British rule, the traditional madrasa system had
virtually lost its place in modern society. The colonial institutions now
trained the administrators and leaders, while the madrasa
was confined to teaching purely religious subjects, particularly rote learning
of Quran and hadith. As British legal codes were
adopted by the state, the intricacies and the implications of the science of fiqh were gradually abandoned. The madrasa
of the mid 20th century produced only qaris and
imams, who were not regarded by the secular ruling elite as capable of
functioning outside their limited ritualistic spheres.
Deoband and the other madaris needed to assert themselves in a society which no
longer had a functional role for the ulema. An
increasing number of these schools of thought set up their own political
parties to represent their interests in the political arena. Thus, the history
of the madaris in the 20th century has been one of
constantly changing alliances and ideologies striving to assert influence on a
national scale. They became progressively less liberal and more dogmatic in
their views, with emphasis given to scriptural authority (naql)
rather than the use of critical thinking (aql).
By 1947, and to an
increasing degree thereafter, madaris catered mainly
to the lower and lower middle classes. Since funding was provided through
endowments and the general quality of education was low, madaris
could easily be established in remote areas and fees were minimal. The madaris therefore became the spokespersons of the silent
masses, and often set themselves up in opposition to the colonial educated
ruling elite.
As products of the
colonial experience, we often point to the madrasa
religious establishment as a vestige of the past, holding us back by keeping us
mired in religious conservatism. However, it is this very same colonial ideology, that, by sidelining the traditional educational
establishments, inadvertently succeeded in creating the concept of a 'religious
establishment' in Islam, akin to the Church of medieval
Waleed Ziad is a political analyst and Economic Consultant in
***
Ideologies for sale
Everything from 'ulema' alliances to
rhetoric to ideology is mutable if the political situation demands it
By Waleed Ziad
In 1880, Maulana Mohammad Qasim the
revered founder of the Deoband Madrasa,
had outlined principles governing the university, dedicated to reformed Islam.
A free exchange of opinions was deemed essential, and the institution was to
remain wholly apolitical, geared towards helping Muslims survive peacefully in
a changing environment. "If it gain fixed income,
like land holdings, trading interests, or pledges from nobles, then the madrasa will lose the fear and hope that inspired
submission to God... The participation of the government and the wealthy is
harmful."
Ironic indeed that by the 1980s, popular Deobandi
factions had founded political parties and were being financed by the
To many outsiders,
the 'Islamic' parties appear to be monolithic unwavering entities steeped in
dogma, holding steady to values which their forefathers had espoused. In this
article, a closer look at the history of 'Islamic' politics reveals a different
picture. The parties, like soldiers of fortune, have constantly shifted
alliances, and their ideology and rhetoric has followed, taking twists and
turns whenever politically (and financially) expedient.
As we have
discussed in the article titled Madaris in
perspective, by the mid 20th century the madrasa
curriculum had lost its general utility to society.
As early as 1919,
a group of Deobandi ulema
had entered the political arena and founded the Jamiat
Ulema-i-Hind (JUH) to represent the interests of its
constituents, deviating from the aversion to politics which the madrasa's founders had expressed. At
Sayyid
The political
parties representing the madaris strove to
incorporate their cadre of 'religious scholars' into the modern milieu. While
the elite and future bureaucracy were enrolled in the Colonial educational
institutions, the majority of madrasa students hailed
from rural NWFP, Kashmir, and poorer areas of the Punjab, sons of landless
peasants, laborers, artisans, or rural imams. It must be kept in mind that
these students were and still remain economically deprived and any means of
employment or empowerment is welcome.
Over the next 50
years, the religious parties latched on to a vast array of issues, altering
their ideology whenever they saw a niche for themselves as the 'divinely
ordained' lawmakers of
Everything from 'ulema' alliances to rhetoric to ideology was mutable if the
political situation demanded it. In fact, with each election, we can clearly
see that the JUI, the JUP, and the JUAH espoused whichever beliefs were in
vogue at the particular moment, and expressed these in traditional Islamic
terminology. To assert themselves as the true representatives of the 'Islamic
order', the JUI, for example, made supposedly 'heretic' elements (especially
the Shias and Ahmadis) the
main targets of their rhetoric. In fact, almost every political or religious
group that has not been allied with political Deoband
has been declared kafir by their political
leadership.
In an era of industrialisation, Ayub Khan
believed that the madaris ran counter to progress.
When he tried to curtail the independence of the madrasa
institutions, the JUI allied themselves with the
opposition, and 'the struggle for Islamic democracy' became the slogan. Ayub Khan's 'kufr' was evidenced
in his support of 'un-Islamic activities' such as allowing the sale of alcohol,
according to the JUI leadership.
Then, in the early
1970s, rallying behind Bhutto, the JUI blithely called for a 'Socialist Islamic
State', meanwhile denouncing Maudoodi and the Jamat Islami as kafirs. In fact, allied with the generally non-religious
Pakistan Labour Party, they even called for a 'ban on
capitalism'.
When the socialist
experiment failed and Bhutto established himself as dictator, the JUI once
again took up the slogan of 'Islamic democracy and constitutionalism'.
Socialism, Islamic or otherwise, was dubbed the great evil. It was considered
politically expedient for all the 'ulema' groups,
regardless of ideology, to unite against the Bhutto regime with the PML
opposition. Mufti Mahmud, head of the JUI, declared the alliance to be a 'jihad
against kufr' (this time Bhutto). Now allied with the
Jamat Islami, the JUP, and
other parties whom they had ruthlessly lambasted in earlier years, they formed
the Pakistan National Alliance. Political and ideological differences
conveniently faded away. At this time, much of Mawdoodi's
internationally oriented and politically activist ideology was adopted by the
other religious parties.
During the Zia
regime, democracy conveniently faded to the background when the 'ulema' realised they were able to
nominally share power with the military elite. At the onset of the Afghan war,
it was decided by the powers-that-be that the most effective means of organising resistance to the Soviets would be through
declaring the movement a religious war. The various religious groups leaped at
the opportunity for political and military prestige, and even the most benign
groups set up madaris as mujahideen
training camps in the NWFP, declaring 'Islamic Jihad' to be the new ideology.
The rest is history. The sequence of events leading to the adoption of the
Jihad ideology is covered in the article titled The
jihad industry.
Now, the MMA has
managed to bring together former arch rivals, Wahabis,
Sunni Hanafis, and even Shia
under a united Islamic banner. The nature of the rhetoric, while in substance
changing, has remained regressive, attributing the problems of the nation and
the Islamic world to obscure phenomenon, and rallying for reforms which are in
visible opposition to Western norms, (assumptions made through ignorance of
laws and methods of jurisprudence.) With the failure of socialism, democracy, industrialisation, and a host of other 'isms', these groups
offer a new patented solution in a neat package which includes a ban on music
and 'indecency', and all other 'ailments afflicting the society'.
The historically
dynamic and progressive nature of Islamic law was brought about through the use
of ijtihad and reason. This has been lost to us as
the self proclaimed 'religious' groups, more concerned with political survival,
have hijacked scriptural studies, and have found it more expedient to supplant
it with ignorance. We need to reclaim our heritage from them.
Waleed Ziad is a political analyst and Economic Consultant in
***
The jihad industry
Over time, the 'ulema' establishment
was indebted to the Zia regime. Zia received an Islamic legitimacy and
neutralized the 'ulema', while the 'ulema' aimed at 'escaping their perceived backwardness'
"Deoband and other madaris, as
well as the political parties which emerged from them, were originally created
for the purpose of waging jihad, and we are merely following in this
tradition," claims a leading Jaysh Mohammadi activist quite convincingly. A very basic reading
of history, however, reveals that the founders of Deoband
spoke out against violent resistance, and the doctrine of jihad al sayf (the struggle of the sword) only began to play a major
role as late as 1979, with the advent of the Afghan War.
The third chapter
of our story is one quite familiar to most of us, either because we witnessed
it first hand, or because we feel the repercussions of it in almost every day
of our lives.
July 1977,
'Operation Fair Play' was put into effect, the coup led by Zia ul Haq which overturned the
Bhutto regime. To co-opt and pacify the 'religious' opposition which now called
for a return to 'Islamic democracy', and to create a government which would act
as a foil to the PPP, Zia chose to portray his regime as truly 'pious'. For the
first time, the desperate 'Islamic' parties were directly brought into the
ruling class. The bond was engineered by the Jamat Islami's Mian Tufayl,
and referred to by Mawdoodi as the 'renewal of the
covenant' between state and Islam.
United under a
single banner, Deoband's Jamiat
Ulema-i-Islam, the originally anti traditionalist Jamat Islami, the Berelvi Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, and later the Wahhabi
Jamiat Ulema Ahl-i-Hadith put aside their irreconcilable differences in
the face of an opportunity to become entrenched once and for all in the ruling
establishment. As quickly as it had come, the call for Islamic democracy became
silent. Zia played to their demands, implementing a few cursory laws which were
considered 'Islamic' ie. superficially
opposed to Western norms, and establishing the odd official advisory committee
on religious affairs.
In late 1979, the
event was to take place which dramatically changed the nature and scope of the
'ulema' parties, the Soviet invasion of
This called for a
physical integration of the madaris into the public
sector, in the hopes of creating stronger links between the 'ulema' and the Zia regime. Official zakat
funds in 1980 were channeled into the madaris, and
the curriculum was reworked by a 'National Committee for Dini
Madaris' in 1979. A policy known as the 'Ittihad al Madaris' served to
co-opt the diverse ideologies into a singular force under the regime's umbrella
cum pocketbook. On the political front, the government nominally included the 'ulema' in policy making and organised
'ulema' conventions. Over time, the 'ulema' establishment, from both the
political and educational ends, were indebted to the Zia regime. Zia
received an 'Islamic' legitimacy and neutralized the 'ulema'
in one fell swoop, while the 'ulema' aimed at 'escaping
their perceived backwardness and winning social recognition'.
The ulema leaders and students brought under Zia's influence
produced an army of loyalists. The number of madrasa
students and madaris grew exponentially. While in
1974, they comprised 18 per cent of all registered educational institutions, by
1983 over 40 per cent were madaris -- 70 per cent in
the front line
In the early
1980s, numerous madaris, particularly those in the
NWFP were converted into mujahideen training camps.
Out of the four major parties came militant splinter organisations
which would further theirs and Zia's political designs, aimed either at
fighting jihad against the Soviets or against 'heretics' like the Shias and Ahmadis within
On the Afghan
front, JUI's Harkat al Mujahideen (formerly al Ansar)
and the Jaysh Mohammad are now household names. The
JUAH spawned the Lashkar-i-Tayyaba, another popular
favorite, and the JI had their own Al-Badr and Hizb al Mujahidin. Even the originally passive, traditionalist Barelvis formed the Lashkar-i-Islam
al Barq.
The largest of the
Frontier madrasas is the Haqqaniyah
of Akora Khattak, from
where, according to its director, Sami al Haq,
"groups of students leave to participate in the Holy War for a month or
two or more and when they come back, others leave." Between 1980 and 1981,
Haqqaniyah expenditures increased by an astonishing
107 per cent, most of which came from the Provincial Zakat
Council funds, and the number of enrolled Afghan students increased from 37 per
cent to 60 per cent.
This was about the
time that ideology and history was consciously rewritten.
'Al Haq', the monthly periodical of the Haqqaniyah
Madrasa, made barely any mention of jihad prior to
1979. The majority of articles dealt with various aspects of religious
practice, with the occasional diatribe against the Shias.
Come the Afghan War, and the magazine became a war reporting journal. Articles
abounded on the primacy and necessity of jihad, and on the noble exploits of
the mujahidin, often making allusions to the
victories of the early battles of Islam. It resurrected long forgotten heroes
of the struggle against colonialism, tying their struggles with the jihad in
Haqqaniyya Madrasa
They all looked
alike, dressed in the same brilliant uniform, as if they had been molded in
this fashion, willing to give their lives for God, sustained by the Divine
Writ, intoxicated with the spirit of jihad, consumed in worship; it seemed
almost as if Sayyad Ahmad Shahid's
caravan had just returned from fighting against its enemies. (A
reference to the 18th century religious reformer cum freedom fighter who had
fought against the Marathas.) The Afghan War was declared to be part of
an ulema-led tehrik of
jihads spanning 300 years of Indo-Pak history.
Now that the madaris had a fixed a source of income and an established
role in society, they were kept in place even after the retreat of the Soviets
from
In an effort to
further their influence and generate 'employment' for the students and former mujahideen,
The transformation
was complete. Factions of initially peaceful and morally upstanding schools for
religious revival through education shifted their attentions towards an often
reckless militancy. We can search through the annals of history to determine
the sources of this 'jihadi' mindset, but the truth
is, it was just another ideology adopted for short term political gains, and
fueled with the frustrations of a disenfranchised and impoverished lower class.
-- Waleed Ziad
Waleed Ziad is a political analyst and Economic Consultant in
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