IMPERIAL POLICING
By
Major
General
Sir
Charles W. Gwynn
K.C.B, C.M.G, D.S.O.
MacMillan and Company, Limited
St.
Martin's Street,
1939
FOREWORD TO SECOND EDITION
SINCE this book was first published in 1934 the Army, and indeed all three fighting Services, have on many occasions been called on to exercise their police functions. The principles and doctrines which the book set out to define and illustrate, appear to have been confirmed by recent experiences; I have therefore not revised it, but in this edition have merely added two new chapters recording episodes of special interest. Chapter XIII deals with the first phase of the revolt which broke out in
Chapter XIV describes some of the more notable
events in Waziristan [
All I can hope for is that those who have
read it will, in such circumstances, find themselves on fairly familiar ground
and will instinctively take correct action.
C. W. G.
PREFACE
I HOPE it will be understood by my readers,
especially those in the Defence Services, that this book has no official
authority. The opinions expressed and the interpretation of
Regulations and of Service traditions are my own, though my intention
has been to follow the general trend of orthodox doctrine. In
commenting on specific events I have had to commit myself to a number of"
armchair" criticisms.
Not, however, with the intention of either
awarding blame or praise, but in order to suggest
reasons for consequences and to stimulate thought on the problems involved.
Without a much fuller knowledge of local circumstances than it was possible to
acquire, criticisms are necessarily to some extent guesswork.
The narratives given make no claim to
completeness, but aim at presenting salient features of the incidents and at
giving some idea of the setting and. atmosphere in which they took place.
I should like to take this opportunity of
expressing my thanks to those officers on whose experiences I have drawn, and
to those who have been good enough to read and criticise what I have written.
C. W. G.
CHAPTER I THE NATURE OF THE ARMY'S POLICE
DUTIES..... Page I
CHAPTER II PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINE..... Page 10
CHAPTER III AMRITSAR, 1919….. Page 34
CHAPTER IV EGYPT, 1919..... Page 65
CHAPTER V THE MOPLAH REBELLION, 1921..... Page 83
CHAPTER VI CHANAK, 1922..... Page 118
CHAPTER VII KHARTUM, 1924..... Page 150
CHAPTER VIII THE
CHAPTER IX PALESTINE, 1929..... Page 221
CHAPTER X PESHAWAR DISTRICT, 1930..... Page 253
CHAPTER XI THE
BURMESE REBELLION, 1930-32..... Page
299
CHAPTER XII
CYPRUS, 1931..... Page
331
CHAPTER XIII
PALESTINE, 1936..... Page
367
CHAPTER XIV
LIST OF MAPS
MOPLAH RISING, 1921 PAGE 84
CHANAK CRISIS, 1922 PAGE 121
KHARTUM PAGE 160
CHINA PAGE 182
SHANGHAI PAGE 188
PESHAWAR
DISTRICT PAGE 278
BURMA PAGE 302
CYPRUS PAGE 336
CHAPTER I
THE
NATURE OF THE ARMY'S POLICE DUTIES
MATERIAL for this book was originally collected
with the intention of giving to officers of the Army and of the other fighting
Services, often called on to cooperate with them or to carry out similar duties
independently, examples of the police work they may be required to carry out;
so as to provide some historical background to their study of a subject which
is of increasing importance and about which there is very little literature of
a permanent or easily accessible character. The subject, however, concerns a
much wider circle. Officials of the civil government in the exercise of their
duties, police, magisterial or political, have to work, when the Army is called
in, in the closest co-operation with it; on occasions even under the orders of
the military authority. A knowledge of the military
point of view, and in general of the military aspects of the problems to be
dealt with, would eliminate many possible sources of friction and facilitate
co-operation in such cases.
Moreover, the general public, so far as it is
interested in the maintenance of law and order in the outlying countries of the
Empire, should realise what an important part the Army plays as a reserve of
force in support of the civil administration. There is, unfortunately, an
element of prejudice against the employment of military force to maintain
order. A suspicion of ruthlessness in military methods exists, this is perhaps increased by the fact that as a rule much less attention is paid to the circumstances which have in various cases necessitated the intervention of the Army than to the controversy which occasionally arises over the action troops have taken.
I hope that the narratives I have compiled
will show that the Army can be trusted to act with good sense and restraint,
and will tend to allay prejudice. Fear of this has often led to the
intervention of the Army being postponed till a situation has developed which
called for the exercise of force on a scale greater than timely intervention
would have required. It should, I think, be widely recognised that the Army can
be employed to prevent a situation getting out of hand, and not merely to
restore one that has passed out of control. In drawing up the narratives, I
have attempted to give a picture of the circumstances which led to the crisis,
the reasons for military intervention, and the military action taken to restore
order and to reestablish normal conditions. I have been more concerned in
showing the general nature and purpose of military action than in describing
details of a tactical nature. As regards the latter indeed, practically no
records exist. Police operations, unless they attain the dignity of small wars,
are not recorded in despatches, and seldom even form the subject of military
reports. Official records are often confined to reports of commissions of
enquiry set up as a result of political controversy to ascertain how far the
use of force was abused or necessary. Press reports are apt to deal only with
the more acute stages of incidents; and furthermore, when an incident extends,
as it often does, over a long period, interest soon wanes and no
permanent impression as to how it arose or how it was dealt
with is left. Details of tactical methods used by troops in the small
encounters which may take place in the course of police operations can, as a
rule, only be obtained direct from those concerned in them.
I have said that the police duties of the
Army are of increasing importance, but they have to a large extent changed
their nature under modern conditions. They may be roughly grouped in three
categories, though in the course of events an incident may pass from one
category to another. In the first category are small wars: deliberate campaigns
with a definite military objective, but undertaken with the ultimate object of
establishing civil control. The conduct of such wars differs in no respect from
defensive or punitive wars undertaken to check external aggression. No
limitations are placed on the amount of force which can legitimately be
exercised, and the Army is free to employ all the weapons the nature of the
terrain permits. Such campaigns are clearly a purely military responsibility.
They involve operations of a military character for which the Army receives
training, and there is an extensive literature dealing with their conduct in all
its aspects. I have not, therefore, included any example of this type.
The second category, and it is this which I
have tried to illustrate in this book, includes cases when the normal civil
control does not exist, or has broken down to such an extent that the Army
becomes the main agent for the maintenance of or for the restoration of order.
To a greater or less degree it is then vested with responsibility for the
action to be taken. In certain cases, as when martial law is proclaimed, the
civil authority abdicates its position temporarily
and is superseded by military government in the area
proclaimed. More commonly, responsibility is shared between the two authorities
in giving effect to measures required to restore control. Special powers which
they do not ordinarily possess may be given to military officers; but in any
case they are required on their own responsibility to take such action as the
necessity of the situation demands.- To the third
category belong those occasions when the civil power continues to exercise
undivided control but finds the police forces on which it normally relies
insufficient.
In such cases the Army is employed "in
aid of the civil power" and its responsibility goes little further than
for the methods the troops adopt to give effect to the directions of the civil
magistrate.-In both these latter categories the Army is bound to exercise the
minimum force required to attain its object.
Of these three categories of police duties,
it is the second which has become of special importance in modern times. In the
Victorian era, when the Empire was in process of expansion, small wars were of
frequent occurrence and at that time might well have been considered the Army's
principal police task. Now that civil control has been established in
practically all parts of the Empire, small wars are of less frequent
occurrence, and when they do occur, are generally defensive or punitive
operations to protect our frontier regions from aggression. But the civil
control which has been established still rests on insecure foundations; the
edifice in some cases is liable to collapse and to require rebuilding. In
others where the structure appeared to be secure it has developed weaknesses.
The principal police task of the Army is no longer to prepare the way for civil
control,
take many forms and are of varying intensity; but even
when armed rebellion occurs, it presents a very different military problem from
that of a deliberate small-war campaign. There is an absence of a definite
objective, and conditions are those of guerrilla warfare, in which elusive
rebel bands must be hunted down, and protective measures are needed to deprive
them of opportunities. The admixture of rebels with a neutral or loyal element
of the population adds to the difficulties of the task. Excessive severity may
antagonise this element, add to the number of the rebels, and leave a lasting
feeling of resentment and bitterness.
On the other hand, the power and resolution
of the Government forces must be displayed. Anything which can be interpreted
as weakness encourages those who are sitting on the fence to keep on good terms
with the rebels. In less serious cases, where armed rebellion is not
encountered but disorder is of the nature of riots, communal or anti-Government,
which have passed out of civil control, there is the same necessity for
firmness but an even greater necessity for estimating correctly the degree of
force required. Responsibility is often thrown on quite junior officers for the
action necessary. Mistakes of judgment may have far-reaching results. Military
failure can be retrieved, but where a population is antagonised or the
authority of Government seriously upset, a long period may elapse before
confidence is restored and normal stable conditions are re-established.
The responsibility of officers engaged in
police duties is of a very different order from their responsi-
bility in military operations. In the latter case it is
mainly for the method with which they give effect to definite orders; for producing
the maximum effect with the force at their disposal; and for the extent of the
demands they make on their men.
In the former they are often confronted with
an unforeseen situation and must rely on their own judgment to reconcile
military action with the political conditions. They must be guided in most
cases by certain general principles rather than by definite orders, and, as a
rule, they have to decide what is the minimum force they must
employ rather than how they can develop the maximum power at their disposal.
How are the officers to be trained for such
duties?
It is hardly possible to draw up exercises in
which the work can be practised. One can formulate general principles, but the
difficulty lies in providing opportunities of learning to apply them. In the
absence of literature on the subject, tradition becomes the only means of
broadcasting experience, and tradition is apt to be based on experience limited
to a small number of cases. Tradition on the whole, as I think will be showri
in subsequent chapters, has produced remarkably satisfactory results, but it
has its dangers.
It may, on the one hand, lead to excessive
action; the traditions of the Indian Mutiny, for example, would hardly be a
safe guide for officers called on to deal with a modern revolutionary outbreak.
On the other hand, the experience of officers whose action has come under
criticism may lead to inaction of others through fear that they will not be
supported if they take measures obviously necessary. Failure through inaction
is the worst offence.
I have attempted in the next chapter to give
some of the principles and doctrines which have been laid down in official
manuals or are generally accepted by tradition. Subsequent chapters aim at
broadcasting experience of their application, and in some instances of the evil
results which have followed their neglect or misapplication.
The main object of military literature and
military instruction is to show how an army can develop the maximum of power
with the resources at its disposal under varying circumstances. This book, on
the other hand, is designed to illustrate military action achieving its result
with the minimum exercise of force.
Its imperfections may, I hope, show the
desirability of recording the experiences of the fighting Services when so
employed, and of publishing illustrative cases from time to time in a form
easily accessible.
To minds trained to think in terms of the
events - of the Great War, the police duties of the Army, even when they take
the form of small wars, may appear of insignificant importance. It is well,
however, to remember the emphasis laid on them when President Hoover suggested
to the Disarmament Conference in 1932 that the strength of armies should be considered as providing a police component and a defence component (though not, of course, separately organised bodies). His suggestion was, that in the armies of all nations a police component, bearing the same ratio to population as has the German Army under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, should be allowed. Numbers in excess of that ratio would be treated as a defence component, which alone would be reduced by disarmament agreements. This ac-
knowledgment of the vital importance of the police functions of an
army, even in the case of homogeneous nations, has still greater weight when
applied to the
The hypercritical may object to the inclusion
of the Chanak, and perhaps also the Shanghai, incidents among the examples I
have given, either on the grounds that they did not take place within the
Empire or (especially as regards the former) on the grounds that they were
cases in which the Army was employed to support diplomatic action rather than
as a police force. Both incidents, however, demanded much the same qualities of
restraint and patience as are required in police work, and they afford
interesting examples of the value of the Army for purposes other than war.
Their inclusion was certainly not due to lack of other material;
study irregular operations of a guerrilla character will,
however, do well to read books which have appeared giving the personal experiences
of some of our opponents. Such books, for example, as With the Dublin Brigade throw an instructive light on the
psychology of irregular forces and give an opportunity of seeing events from
the other side which is generally lacking. They reveal mistakes made by the
regular forces and also the measures taken by them which proved most effective.
CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES
AND DOCTRINE
WHEN the Army becomes temporarily the chief
agent for maintaining law and order and for the restoration of the authority of
the civil power, it requires to know: What principles
should guide its action? What methods can it legitimately and effectively
employ?
Certain principles are laid down in King's
Regulations dealing with the action of troops when called out in "aid of the civil power", but the situations which may confront the troops vary so
greatly in their nature and intensity that no hard and fast regulations would
cover every case. To a very large extent the Army must depend on traditional
doctrines, on discipline, and on its own common-sense.
In this chapter I shall attempt to discuss
some of the leading principles and doctrines which have become well established
and are illustrated in. their application, or misapplication, by the incidents
narrated in subsequent chapters.
Before doing so it may be well to consider
the nature of the forces of disorder which may have to be dealt with. There are
three main classes:
I. Revolutionary movements organised and
designed to upset established government.
2. Rioting or other forms of lawlessness
arising from local or widespread grievances.
3. Communal disturbances of a racial,
religious or political character not directed against Government, but which
Government must suppress.
Revolutionary movements, again, may be divided
into violent and, professedly, non-violent movements. The former may be on a
scale which amounts to fully organised rebellion, necessitating operations in
which the Government forces employ all the ordinary methods of warfare. More
commonly, however, they imply guerrilla warfare, carried on by armed bands
acting possibly under the instructions of a centralised organisation, but with
little cohesion. Such bands depend for effectiveness on the capacity of
individual leaders; they avoid collisions of a decisive character with
Government troops. Their aim is to show defiance of Government, to make its
machinery unworkable and to prove its impotence; hoping by a process of
attrition to wear down its determination. Their actions take the form of
sabotage, of ambushes in which they can inflict loss with a minimum of risk,
and attacks on small isolated detachments. By terrorising the loyal or neutral
elements of the population, they seek to prove the powerlessness of the
Government to give protection, and thus provide for their own security,
depriving the Government of sources of information and securing information
themselves.
The suppression of such movements, unless
nipped in the bud, is a slow business, generally necessitating the employment
of numbers out of all proportion to the actual fighting value of the rebels,
owing to the unavoidable dispersion of troops and the absence of a definite
objective. It becomes a battle of wits
in which the development of a well-organised intel-
ligence service, great mobility, rapid means of intercommunication and close co-operation between all sections of the
Government forces are essential.
Non-violent revolutionary movements which aim, by other methods, at making the
machinery of Government unworkable concern the Army little so long as they
retain their non-violent character. Such movements, however, almost inevitably
lead to rioting, often of a dangerous nature, due to the widespread character
of the agitation and. the difficulty of anticipating where or when violence may
occur.
Sometimes trouble may arise through an
excitable mob getting out of the control of its leaders; at others it may be in
consequence of the removal of their controlling influence. Government action
must sooner or later be taken against the leaders to break up the organisation
of the movement, and their arrest, causing simultaneously excitement and the
removal of control, is the frequent cause of an outbreak. News and rumour
travel quickly, and where a widespread agitation is concerned disorder will
seldom be confined to one locality. There is generally an extremist element
anxious for purposes of propaganda to bring about collisions with Government
forces, and in some cases the criminal element of the population will take
advantage of prevailing excitement to start riots which offer opportunities of
loot. Whenever a widespread agitation is on foot, reasonable precautions and
close co-operation between civil and military authorities are required to
ensure that if the assistance of troops is needed their intervention should be
timely. It is the duty of Army officers to keep in touch with the political
situation in order to be prepared to act intelligently in any situation which
may arise."
Rioting and disorders arising from grievances
may occur in all degrees of intensity. In such cases the Army is seldom called
in as a precautionary measure, but only when the situation has got out of hand
and the police require reinforcement. Stern measures may be required to restore
order and to protect life and property, but as a rule
violence is due to a small minority and the mere display of adequate force and
discipline will bring the more law-abiding elements, who are merely excited, to
their senses. Judgment as to the amount of force it is advisable to employ and
as to whom it should be directed against is particularly necessary, and troops
must rely to a great extent on the advice and directions of the civil
officials.
Communal riots of all sorts are distinguished
by their bitterness and by the fanatical passions they arouse, with the
consequent danger to life. There is therefore no excuse for hesitation or
delay. The combatants must be separated at once and measures taken to prevent
the renewal of fights and to check rioting or destruction of property, a common
feature in these outbreaks. The impartiality and good temper of
. British troops is an invaluable asset on such
occasions.
Although the character of the outbreaks with
which the Army may have to deal in carrying out its police functions vary to
such a great degree, there are certain general principles which must be adhered
to common to them all. One is that questions of policy remain vested in the civil Government and, even when the military authorities are in full executive control, the policy of the Government must be loyally carried out. It is, however, the duty of the soldier to advise the Government and its subordinate officers as to the
effect of the policy, contemplated or pursued, on military
action. Attempts to force the hand of the Government, or silent acquiescence in
a mistaken employment of the troops, are equally blameworthy.
The duty of giving advice may often fall on
quite junior officers, as for example in the
Another equally important principle is that the amount of military force employed must
be the minimum the situation demands. It should always be borne in mind
that the hostile forces are fellow citizens of the Empire, and that the
military object is to re-establish the control of the civil power and secure
its acceptance without an aftermath of bitterness. When armed hostile bodies
are encountered troops can without hesitation use every method and weapon
necessary for their defeat or capture, but drastic punitive measures to induce
surrender, or in the nature of reprisals, may awaken sympathy with the
revolutionaries, and in the long run militate
against the re-establishment of normal conditions, although
at the moment they may prove effective. Such measures should never be initiated
by subordinate officers without due authority.
Allied
with the principle of the minimum use of force is that of firm and timely
action. Delay in the use of force,
and hesitation to accept responsibility for its employment when the situation
clearly demands it, will always be interpreted as weakness, encourage further
disorder and eventually necessitate measures more severe than those which would
suffice in the first instance. Subversive movements, or disorders of any
nature, do not break out fully organised. Leaders in the early stages are apt
to be more distinguished by their oratorical powers, and perhaps by capacity of
political organisation, than for military qualities. Given time, leaders who
are men of action will assert themselves, and a knowledge
of the best means of countering Government measures will be acquired.
A
further principle is that of co-operation. Even when martial law is in force
the task of restoring order does not rest on the Army alone. The machinery and forces of the civil power are then
at the disposal of the military authority and should be used to the utmost, not
only to increase its power but in order to initiate at an early stage the
process of re-establishing civil control and respect for it. When unity of
control, which is perhaps the most important result of proclaiming martial law,
is not provided, the necessity of close co-operation and of mutual
understanding is all the more important. Anything in the nature of jealousy or
competition to secure credit is certain to lead to lack of co-ordination in
courses of action.
These four are, I think, the general
principles to which the Army should adhere on all occasions when it is called
on for police duties; but the extent to which civil control of the situation
has been lost or is retained affects their application.
There are three different conditions under
which the Army may be required to act:
(a) When martial law is proclaimed or is in force, and the civil machinery is placed at the disposal of
the military commander.
(b) When the civil power retains its
independence but co-operates with the Army in giving effect to special
legislation, designed to meet an emergency and giving both Army and the civil authorities abnormal powers.
(c) When the Army reinforces the police in
giving effect to the ordinary law.
I do not propose to discuss the legal aspects
of these three cases, but to examine them from the military standpoint. The
sole justification of martial law is "necessity"; and the great
advantage of proclaiming martial law is that it recognises the continuity of
"necessity" and establishes unity of control. Unity of control makes
the military authority the sole responsible agent for carrying out the policy
of the Government. There is therefore less room for misunderstandings and
misinterpretation of that policy than when the civil and military authorities
are merely acting in co-operation. Decisions can be arrived at quickly and the
danger of plans being the result of compromise is reduced. Recognition of the
continuity of necessity is also an important factor in forming plans and in
framing orders for the con-
17
duct of the civil community. For although troops are at
all times justified in taking, and are bound to take, the action which the
immediate necessity of the situation confronting them demands, their right to
take action to prevent further outbreaks is very limited unless continuity of
necessity is officially recognised. They can do little more than adopt such
precautionary measures as would enable them to intervene again should necessity
recur. Other advantages of martial law are that actions not normally offences
can be made criminal, or the scale of punishment for crimes can be raised. This
particularly applies in the case of things done to hamper military action.
Similar advantages accrue from the fact that judicial machinery is under
military authority, and judicial procedure can be speeded up to ensure that a
maximum deterrent and moral effect will be produced by punishment. The
establishment of martial law, furthermore, greatly facilitates the
establishment of an efficient intelligent service. It places the police
intelligence organisation at the direct disposal of the military and also
enables pressure in many forms to be exercised which will elicit information or
check information reaching the hostile leaders.
The advantages conferred by martial law in
dealing with a serious situation are so great that they should be widely
appreciated. Hesitation to apply" it on account of political prejudice has
often led to a worsening of the situation. It is all the more important for the
Army to ensure that when martial law is applied no abuse of the powers
conferred by it should occur, likely to lead to an increase of prejudice. When
it is impracticable, owing to the small force available, or for other reasons
it is inexpedient to
proclaim martial law, it is incumbent on the civil authority
to see that the military commander is given the necessary powers to enable him
to work on a systematic plan. Emergency legislation often exists and can be
brought into force with this object, but it can seldom provide in anticipation
for all developments of the situation. Amendments should be made without delay,
and it is the duty of the military commander to make his requirements known.
Emergency legislation establishes the continuity of necessity, but it has the
grave disadvantage of involving dual control of the situation. As a result,
plans are too often based on compromises and sudden reversals of policy occur.
Not infrequently these reversals take the form of a lightening of repressive
measures in the hope of inducing submission. Such steps not only upset the
plans of the military commander but are generally interpreted as signs of
weakness, of lack of determination and of loss of confidence in military
action. The release of prisoners is particularly dangerous, as they, as a rule,
emerge more hostile than ever, and often with new plans conceived while in
confinement. Sudden drastic increase of repressive measures, unless consequent
upon accessions to the resources of the Government, or designed to meet new
forms of rebel activity, is also to be deprecated. It is indicative; of panic
and will generally be followed by a reaction towards excessive leniency. The
ideal to be aimed at is continuity of policy carried out with a firm hand, and
in attaining this ideal much depends on a good understanding between the civil
and military authorities, such as to ensure that measures are well conceived
from the first and sufficiently firm to give assurance of Government's
resolution. Some of the
points on which mutual understanding between the two
authorities is very necessary may be worth discussing. . I have said elsewhere
that civil and military views on the degree troops should be dispersed are
often at variance. The civil inclination tends towards dispersion in defensive
detachments, and the military towards a more offensive policy and
concentration. It may be readily admitted that a greater degree of dispersion
in police operations is justifiable than in ordinary operations of warfare. The
initiative in the first instance must in the nature of things rest with the
forces of disorder, and many vulnerable points are exposed to their attack. The
first business of the troops is to render secure such vulnerable points as are
essential to the conduct of Government and to the organisation of counter
measures. This in itself generally necessitates a considerable degree of
dispersion, and where the forces necessary to initiate counter measures are not
immediately available, dispersion may be increased by the necessity for
protecti9n of life. This is, however, a different matter from scattering
detachments to protect valuable property, or in the hope that the mere presence
of troops will prevent disorder. The military view is, that once essential
measures of security have been taken, further protection and the prevention of
disorder is best provided by taking positive measures against the hostile
elements. Anything that savours of passive defence encourages the other side
and wastes power. Isolated detachments are themselves vulnerable, and the
service by which communications are maintained with them and by which they are
supplied is even more so, and involves escorts and other wasteful defensive
measures. Concentration of effort to regain the initiative and
to eliminate the source of trouble should be the aim from the earliest possible
moment. This does not necessarily imply concentration of large numbers at any
particular spot. The weapons and power of Government forces are, as a rule, so
superior to those of their opponents that numbers required for offensive action
are dictated by the nature and extent of the area to be dealt with rather than
by the fighting value of the hostile elements in it. Excessive numbers may be
cumbrous and detrimental to mobility, which . is of primary importance. The co-ordination of all counter
offensive measures is the really important thing, and the sum total of the
troops required may reach a high figure in order to achieve simultaneous
action. To economise force, defensive measures must therefore always be
subordinated to and directly connected with those taken for the suppression of
resistance. When large areas are affected by disorder and the Government resources are insufficient to deal effectively with the whole at once, it is almost always advisable to concentrate effort in dealing with successive parts
systematically. Complete restoration of order and the re-establishment of civil
control in each successive part goes far towards
convincing the loyal and doubtful elements of the population in it of the power
of the Government, and renders them unwilling to do anything to cause a
recrudescence of disorder when troops are withdrawn to deal with other parts of
the area. .
In fact, in police work the ordinary military
principles of concentration and offensive action hold good, and only require
modification in the handling of the striking force provided by concentration.
Its ubiquity
and concerted action over a wide area have greater
importance than the concentration of superior power at a decisive point.
Mobility and continuous energetic exercise of pressure on a definite plan must
be developed, as there is often no target against which a decisive blow can be
delivered. Closely connected with the development of striking power is that of
reserves. Large concentrations of reserves, except as a preliminary step
towards the initiation of a new phase in a plan, are seldom necessary. On the
other hand, the elusive character of the enemy and their capacity for appearing
unexpectedly makes it necessary that every commander should retain a reserve to
meet unforeseen developments. The provision of reserves is especially important
in the opening phases of disorder, before the Government forces have by
positive action recovered the initiative. Since at this time there is, as a
rule, a shortage of troops, the difficulty of forming reserves is great, and
this is a further argument against dispersion and the multiplication of
protective detachments. Such detachments as must be formed should have a
reserve, however small.
I have already laid stress on the importance
of an efficient and well-organised intelligence service, especially in the case
where organised movements involve operations approximating to guerrilla
warfare. The intelligence service is highly specialised and" its
organisation lies outside the scope of this book.
There are some aspects of it, however, to
which attention may be drawn. In all
internal trouble the basis of the intelligence system must depend on police information. In the case of
ordinary rioting the military authority relies almost exclusively on it,
and a separate military organisation for procuring
information is seldom desirable and may lead to confusion. It is, however,
essential that the Army should maintain close touch with the police
organisation in order to form an intelligent anticipation of events and to
satisfy itself that the information the Army requires will be available, and
that the procedure for communicating it is satisfactory. When the situation
demands military operations, although information will probably still come
chiefly from police sources, it may be necessary to have a separate military
organisation working in close collaboration with the police; or military
personnel may be added to the police organisation. Such arrangements will vary
according to circumstances, but the main object to be attained is that there
should be no delay in communicating intelligence of military importance, and
that the police should have assistance in judging what information the military
commander requires. The police may have very full information but have
difficulty in judging how it correlates with military plans.
It may often therefore be advisable to allow
military officers, with a knowledge of the military
dispositions and plans, to cross-examine the police sources of information. It
is, however, of the utmost importance that secrecy as regards such sources
should be maintained as the police may still rely on them after military
operations have closed. Although the average officer may not be directly
concerned in intelligence work he will be greatly affected by its results, and
he can indirectly help by intelligent and loyal co-operation in maintaining
secrecy, and by not interfering in any way with intelligence agents.
Information will not always be accurate, and
reasonable judg-
ment must be exercised as to the extent it can be relied
on as a basis for action; excessive dependence on it, and complete rejection of
all information from intelligence sources because of previous failures, are
equally unwise. The extent to which the intelligence service can obtain
information depends greatly on the attitude adopted towards the loyal and
neutral population. These must be made to realise that concealment of
information is a punishable offence; but every precaution must be taken not to
expose to terrorism those from whom information is obtained. Communication of
information to the enemy requires to be severely and promptly dealt with.
Outbreaks of sabotage stand on much the same footing, and, owing to the
difficulty of fixing individual responsibility, it may frequently be necessary
to deal with them by collective punishments. It is in these matters
particularly that officers should be vested with special powers, but these must
at all times be clearly defined and used with discretion. In the absence of
special powers, officers may rely with confidence on receiving support if they
take such reasonable measures as are dictated by obvious necessity. Such
measures as the detention of suspects, forcing the inhabitants to repair
without payment damage caused by sabotage in their neighbourhood, or, at times,
infliction of fines to pay for labour brought from elsewhere, are typical of
reasonable measures which have often been justified. (When it can be avoided,
troops should not be employed to repair damage caused by sabotage.) On the
other hand, superior authority seldom
approves physical chastisement or destruction of property, except in the course
of quelling actual resistance. Individual officers are
forbidden to invent punishments; though at times punishments,
not normally recognised, are authorised by responsible authority. In that case
they are awarded and recorded in the same way as normal punishments. Punishments of a nature humiliating to a community, or which outrage religious susceptibilities, are contrary to the principle that no lasting feeling of bitterness should be caused. A policy of reprisals is always dangerous, as irregular forces are always likely to be more ruthless than those of an established Government. Defenceless loyalists are apt to become the chief sufferers, and the powerlessness of the Government to give protection has a bad effect. When reprisals are undertaken, the reasons for doing so should be publicly stated and the acts should be duly authorised. In the situation created by guerrilla warfare or by a widespread subversive movement the difficulty of codifying rules for the conduct of troops is obvious. The good sense of officers and a sense of discipline must be relied on, and martial law, which invests the Army with full responsibility, is perhaps the best guarantee that these qualities will be exercised and that all measures will be taken under the direction of proper authority.
As regards the conduct of actual military
operations there is little to be said. It is a question of adapting ordinary
military training to the circumstances. Mobility, surprise, co-ordinated
action, energy and relentless pressure are the factors which must be exploited
to the utmost, while the difficulty of anticipating the enemy's action makes
constant precautions against 'surprise essential. Neglect of these give the
enemy opportunities of achieving minor successes which have an encouraging
effect out of all
proportion to their magnitude. Certain operations, such as the
search of towns or areas in which rebel bands are concealing themselves,
present special features, but although they must be undertaken in a systematic
manner, the system may require modification, either from the characteristics of
the hunted or the nature of the area to be searched.
Rules for the conduct of troops when employed
merely to suppress riots or disorder can be much more clearly defined than in
the cases where something in the nature of military operation is involved; and
they are well recognised. Most of them are directly connected with the
principle of the minimum exercise of force, or its corollary that every effort
should be made to prevent rioters committing themselves more deeply. The
difficulty of applying rules and of deciding, in the noise and confusion of a
riot, on the amount of force necessary should, however, also receive recognition.
Troops may be called out as a precautionary
measure when trouble is anticipated; but often the situation has passed out of
hand before they appear on the scene. In the former case they should be moved
early, and unostentatiously, to positions of readiness in the background, and
if possible out of sight. Any marshalling of crowds that may be necessary is
better in the first instance left to the police.
To bring troops into contact with a crowd
before it is necessary exposes them to provocative usage and insults. Moreover,
the crowd becomes accustomed to their presence and is encouraged to think that
stronger measures will not be used. To keep troops too far away may, however,
make it difficult to produce them at the right moment, and those in charge of
them
will be without full knowledge of the situation and of the
ground. When military assistance is not summoned until police control has been
lost, immediate use of force may be necessary, but often the appearance of
disciplined armed bodies will produce the desired results. As excitement is
contagious in a crowd, so also a display of discipline has a steadying effect.
Unless, therefore, fire or other extreme measures to save life or valuables are
necessary, precipitate action should be avoided and should not be taken with
the object of inflicting punishment for what has occurred.
Troops employed in the suppression of riots
are often required to stand much provocation, and even casualties, before they
themselves use force; but extreme risk of their being overwhelmed by numbers,
or of indiscriminate firing occurring through loss of control, should not be
accepted. Certain occasions in which troops should employ fire may be
specified, though all are governed by conditions. Fire should be directed
against leaders or dangerous individuals. It should never be opened except
under the orders or authority of a responsible commander, if possible an
officer. It must be strictly controlled and not continued a moment longer than
necessary. The use of blank cartridge is forbidden, and to fire over the heads
of assailants may endanger harmless people. Warning must, if practicable, be
given before fire is opened. Subject to such conditions, it is clear that
troops are justified in firing when property which they are posted to protect
cannot otherwise be saved, also to prevent the rescue of prisoners in their
charge, or to prevent individuals falling into the hands of a mob. Similarly,
when other means have proved
insufficient or cannot be applied in time, fire may be necessary
to disperse rioters who have evidently become a danger to life and valuable
property. Moreover, troops have the same right as other people to use weapons
in self-protection when their lives are seriously endangered by attack. As a rule when rioters have to be dispersed the civil official in charge of the situation advises the military officer when he considers it necessary to open fire and gives warning. The military officer is not, however, compelled to accede to a request for fire, but must exercise his own judgment. He may, too, on occasions fire to disperse a mob entirely on his own
responsibility, but he should rarely do so without the concurrence of a
responsible civil official if one is present. The amount of fire to be used and
the method of using it is always the responsibility of the Soldier.
The military officer is the best judge of the
necessity of opening fire when there is serious risk of troops being
overwhelmed or being seriously weakened by exhaustion or minor casualties. He
should, however, if possible without further endangering the situation, obtain
the concurrence of the civil officer before adopting extreme measures. Another
well established rule is that a crowd should
never be allowed to come into close physical contact with troops, involving
a hand-to-hand struggle. If it were permitted there would not only be danger of
troops being overwhelmed by numbers, but it would also become impossible to
control men in the use of their weapons. For somewhat similar reasons troops
should not, when it can be avoided, be required to effect arrests. Although
they can be used to support the
police and prevent attempts at escape, the actual arrests
should if possible be carried out by the latter, even when the plans for arrest
are made by the military authority.
It will be readily understood how great is
the responsibility of the Soldier in every case in which he may be called on to
use his weapons in support of the civil power. The presence of the civil
official does not relieve him of responsibility; in some cases, as when it is
necessary to override advice, it may add to it. Cool judgment, patience and a knowledge of the difficulties and point of view of his
civil colleague are essential, but to have thought over all aspects of the
problem beforehand will prove of assistance. In any case the soldier cannot
afford to be intimidated by the responsibilities of his position, or by the
fear that his actions will not be supported. He will rarely fail to receive
support if he has acted with reasonable moderation. and
in accordance with what he conscientiously considered necessary. On the other
hand, inaction and refusal to accept responsibility is likely to shake
confidence in him even when he is not directly censured.
Before closing this chapter my non-military
readers may wish me to say a little about the use of modern weapons and
equipment in connection with police duties. When armed rebellion is
encountered, the only limitations to their use, as I have said, are those
imposed by the nature of the terrain and the characteristics of the enemy. What
has been gained is perhaps the increased mobility that modern weapons directly
or indirectly confer. Increased firepower of rifles and automatic weapons
enables columns to be kept smaller and less encumbered with trans-
port. Defensive detachments of all sorts can be reduced in
size, releasing more men for offensive duties and simplifying the supply
question. Motor conveyance where it can be used is of inestimable value, not
only in speeding up movement but by bringing men fresh to the ground where they
have to operate. Wireless has added immensely to the possibilities of
co-ordinated action. The Air Service, even when the nature of the ground and of
the enemy reduce its potentialities for offensive action or for reconnaissance,
removes some of the danger which arises where ground communications with
detached posts are interrupted. Both as a rapid means of conveying troops to a
critical point and in co-ordinating movements of Army troops it has frequently
been of great value. All thesefactors tend towards mobility and increase
possibilities of rapid offensive operation, but infantry still remains the
chief offensive agent; and it is the one which has gained most by increased
mobility. Armoured fighting vehicles require special and favourable conditions
to enable their full potentialities to be exploited, though they may often
prove a useful adjunct to an infantry or mounted force.
[EDITOR: No limitations exist today in 2004
for tracked AFVs, in the 30s they were speed limited to less than 20 mph, they
can exceed 50 mph and with hybrid-electric drive and band tracks
are more stealthy than armored cars/trucks]
Armoured cars, with their speed, silence and
protection, given, can be put
to many uses, and when infantry are moving by motor transport they become
almost an essential addition. Acting alone, the limitations to their power of
taking prisoners and to their cross-country capacity are obvious disadvantages.
The tank in its present [1930s] form has, I think, few advantages over armoured
cars for police operations, unless there are sufficient track
vehicles available to enable a composite mobile column to be formed possessing
cross-country capacity. Much, of course, depends on
the nature of the country and character of
the opposition expected; but, speaking generally, the tank is an unnecessarily powerful
weapon for police work and has the disadvantage of
noisiness; and in many areas the use of heavy
armoured vehicles is restricted by the nature of bridges which exist or
could be constructed with limited resources. In most cases of internal risings
artillery can play little part, though a few light howitzers to deal with
resistance in houses or fortified strongholds may be necessary. The problem for
the military commander in the circumstances we are considering is, however,
seldom what resources he would wish to have, but how he can make the best use
of what is actually available.
When it is a matter of suppressing rioting
some of the advantages conferred by modern weapons and their limitations should
be understood. The rifle and bayonet are still
the weapons chiefly to be relied on. The sight of cold steel has a calming
effect, and the steady advance of a line of bayonets has often sufficed to
disperse a mob without resort to firing. When the temper of the rioters is very
violent or the detachment of troops small, the risk of these becoming engaged
in actual bayonet-fighting must, however, not be taken.
The effect of fire is generally not due to
the casualties it causes, but to the fact that it demonstrates the
determination of the authorities. Unless the use of fire is too long delayed, a
single round often is all that is necessary to carry conviction. Rifle fire,
again if used in time, is easily controlled and can be directed against
dangerous individuals, whereas, though single shots can be fired from machine
guns, being fewer in number it is less easy to ensure that the
selected individual can be picked out by them. A certain
prejudice exists against the employment of machine guns in dealing with
internal disturbances, due perhaps to the fact that in other countries they
have on occasion been ruthlessly used and on account of their potential
destructive effect. This prejudice is, I think, mistaken and due to
misapprehension. Machine guns can be usefully employed without any suspicion of
ruthlessness. Their volume of fire can be easily controlled, and they have the
great advantage of firing from a steady mounting. They can be laid to deny
access to a street which has been cleared, to cover parties forcing entrance to
houses, and for many other special occasions when rifle fire of excited men is
insufficiently accurate. Moreover, the intimidating effect of machine-gun fire
is so great that some relaxation of the rule that fire should never be directed
over the heads of the crowd is, I think, permissible; as the steadiness of the
weapon makes it easy to find a stop butt which eliminates the danger of
casualties to unoffending people. Machine guns are also of value, especially in
their deterrent effect, when there is a question of protecting Government
buildings or other vulnerable points.
The question of the employment of armoured fighting vehicles will be discussed in the chapter describing riots in
able. Great destructive power is seldom required, and the
more powerful the weapon the greater the necessity for preventing a crowd
closing on it. Artillery fire for obvious reasons practically never comes into
the picture, but it is well to remember that cavalry may still be used with
great moral effect. The slipperiness of modern streets, the ease with which
wire obstacles can be constructed, and the probability that
some of the crowd will possess automatic pistols tend, however, to
restrict their use.
It is sometimes advocated that troops called
out in aid of the civil power should be specially armed with non-lethal
weapons, such as batons. This has occasionally been done in view of particular
circumstances-the streets of
There are many other reasons which can be
advanced against the adoption of such a course, and it should never be followed
without the sanction of the highest responsible military authority.
This does not, however, preclude relieving a
certain number of men of a party of their more cumbrous weapons when engaged on
a particular duty, such as carrying out arrests, though fully armed men should,
be in close support. Similarly in certain circumstances it may be better to
post a sentry without his rifle, but covered by a second man fully armed in a
less exposed position. That is a common-sense measure which may be
advisable" when attempts to rush: sentries in order to secure their
weapons are possible and it has the further advantage of reducing the risk of
innocent persons being shot by a "jumpy" man. It is not a matter of
policy. When, as a matter of policy, troops with non-lethal weapons are
employed, a reserve of fully armed men should always be at hand.
The weapons the
enemy employs in modern conditions also requires some consideration. Automatic
pistols, or grenades, used by a small number of extremists in a crowd may
greatly increase the difficulties of the situation. It is, however, the weapon
of propaganda which has made the task of the Army harder, encouraged as it is
by the trend of modern sentiment and the growth of the power of the press.
The increased part taken by women in
subversive movements is an additional complication which requires careful
handling or it will be used to strengthen the propaganda weapon. The Army
cannot afford to ignore propaganda, but it requires the support of public
opinion to reduce the effectiveness of that weapon.
CHAPTER
III
FEW incidents connected with the employment
of troops to restore order have given rise to so much bitter controversy or
have left such a lasting impression as General Dyer's action at
A study of the facts enables one to see why
the Government and military authorities could not support the extreme action
taken by General Dyer and to realise how far his judgment was at fault and his
competent judges that General Dyer prevented an extremely
serious and dangerous situation from developing into something far worse, and
that the casualties he inflicted were insignificant in comparison to those
which a spread of disorder would have entailed. That is a conclusion which
there is no means of verifying and does not affect the question whether General
Dyer was within his rights. Whether his action was justifiable or no, thus
remains a matter of opinion; whether he was within his rights as a matter of
principle can be tested and lessons deduced accordingly.
General Dyer's action dominates the whole of
the
The beginning of 1919 found
increased degree of freedom lent themselves to attack.
The passing of the Rowlatt Acts, which were considered to confer power on the executive
uncontrolled by the judiciary, and therefore to be a check to constitutional
reform, gave agitators an opportunity of exciting opposition to the Government.
Wild misrepresentation of the effect of these Acts was indulged in, the press
was full of bitter abuse, and as a protest against them Mr. Gandhi inaugurated
his civil disobedience movement, calling a general hartal which led to fierce
rioting at various centres. As a consequence the Government ordered his arrest
and that of other leaders who had committed clear breach of the laws. Gandhi
was actually arrested on 9th April following on his disobedience of an order
not to proceed to
The original hartal called by him had taken
place in some cases on 30th March, in others on the 6th April, and not, as had
been intended, on one day. It had been planned that the hartal' should take
place on the Sunday immediately following the passing of the Act, but as it was
found that this did not give sufficient time to broadcast the order, an attempt
was made to postpone the demonstration for a week. The consequent confusion had
the unfortunate result of spreading the disturbances which occurred in
connection with the hartals over a longer period, and news of events which took
place on the first date increased hostility of crowds on the second. Gandhi's
arrest was the signal for fresh hartals and fresh disturbances, and large parts
of
ties which had been committed in the course of the
rioting, but by the possible development of such widespread disorder. When rioting results from an organised movement, the Mutiny
becomes present to all European minds.
In the prevailing conditions
Sikhs also have special interest in it from
its position and because the
Doubts, however, arose as to whether the
hartal had taken place on the right date, and it was decided that a second
hartal was necessary on the 6th to comply with Gandhi's amended instruction. This hartal again went off quietly, though again all business was stopped. Drs.
Kitchlew and Satya pal were probably responsible for the decision to hold it
against the views of more moderate leaders, as previously the Deputy
Commissioner (Mr. Irving)
had been informed by leading citizens, who were alarmed
by riots which occurred at
Although the two leaders do not appear to
have openly disobeyed orders which they had received prohibiting them from
speaking in public, yet Mr. Irving was disturbed by signs that they were able
to override the more moderate members of the local Congress Committee, and he
looked on the hartals as a mere step to test their influence and organisation
with a view to more extreme methods..
On the 8th of April he wrote to the Punjab
Government expressing his views and pressing urgently for an increase of the
garrison. He stated that resolute action could not be taken in the city without
leaving the civil lines undefended, and that in any case, in the event of a
riot, nine-tenths of the city must be abandoned; even to defend' the civil
lines and railway station while maintaining communication open with the police
station would be difficult. He had given up hopes, which he had formerly held,
that he could by personal communication restrain Dr. Kitchlew.
The garrison at the time consisted of some
180 men of the Somerset Light Infantry pnd""fo40
,0mounted men of a Royal Field artillery column stationed in the
cantonment north of the city. This and the civil lines are separated from it by
the main line of the North Western Railway. The chief police station (Kotwali),
the Town Hall and the Post Office are situated together in the centre of the
northern half of the city and the main road connecting them with the civil
lines runs along Hall Bazaar, through Hall Gate and across the railway by
the west of this route and between it and the railway
station is an iron footbridge. Other crossings, off the direct route, are shown
on the sketch map. In consequence of Mr. Irving's letter the Punjab Government
on the 9th April ordered the deportation and internment of the two suspect
leaders under the provisions of the Defence of India Act, and at the same time
agreed to the necessity of early reinforcement of the garrison. On that day,
too, further indications of the abnormal state of the
political atmosphere was given as it happened to be the date of a Hindu
festival. Under ordinary conditions Moslems take no part, other than hostile,
in the festival, but on this occasion it was seized on as an opportunity of
demonstrating and promoting the Hindu-Moslem unity which Dr. Kitchlew had been
active in encouraging for political motives. Again, however, no untoward events
occurred and the procession actually halted while the band played God Save the
King in front of the Deputy Commissioner, who was watching from a verandah.
The orders for the arrest of the two leaders
were received on the night of the 9th, and at a conference held by Mr. Irving,
which Captain Massey commanding the station attended, it was decided to
instruct them to come to Mr. Irving's own house at 10 o'clock the following
morning, where they would be quietly arrested and removed by motor-car under
police escort. The hope was that this plan would enable the arrest to be
carried out quietly and without interference. Arrangements were made, however,
to prevent attempts at a rescue; and as a precautionary measure, in the event
of trouble when the news of the
arrest became known, troops and police were to take up
positions prescribed by the internal security scheme. That these precautions
were treated seriously I is shown by the fact that the
officer left in command at the fort received definite orders not to hesitate to
fire in case of an attack on the railway station, or to secure the safety of
women and children.
The disposition of the forces were: British
infantry in reserve at Rambagh Gardens; a police reserve of 75 men in the city
at the Kotwali; mounted pickets on the railway at the Rego Bridge, Hall Bridge
and the Hospital level crossing; and a police picket at the Police Barracks
level crossing. Three European magistrates were detailed to watch these
crossings and to prevent a crowd attempting to approach the district Court
House. Peaceful persuasion was to be used as far as possible, but military
force if necessary. No body of persons exceeding five were to be allowed to
cross the railway, though under the circumstances it was not practicable to
promulgate this order in advance.
Arrangements were also made for the removal
of women and children to the fort by ambulance if there were danger.
These arrangements, provided that the
constituent elements understood what was expected from them, were probably as
good as the size of the force available permitted, except in certain details
which will be commented on later. The question obviously arises whether the
arrests should have been postponed till the reinforcement of the garrison,
asked for and approved, had been carried out. It was admitted that nine-tenths
of the city must pass out of control in the event of serious rioting, and the
measures taken
were nearly all defensive in their nature for the
protection of the cantonments and civil lines.
The majority report of the Hunter Committee
considered that the opportunity of effecting the
arrests quickly and quietly was rightly taken and that the extent and nature of
the disturbances which followed could not have been foreseen. It is legitimate
to doubt whether in arriving at this conclusion the Committee attached
sufficient weight to the defensive nature of the precautions and to the danger
lest a mob, deprived of its most influential leaders, should get out of control
of moderate influences to a degree necessitating control by force. In this
connection it should be noted that the British infantry were practically tied
to the protection of the European quarter and its inhabitants. The police
reserve of 75 armed men was the sole and inadequate force to maintain control
within the city in support of about 100 unarmed constables employed there as
usual.
An omission to warn Europeans not to enter
the city is presumably partly accounted for by the necessity of secrecy; but it
may also have been due to the fact that hitherto no strong anti-European
feeling had been shown and to the theoretically non-violent nature of the
political movement. The omission is inconsistent with the arrangements made for
the security of women and children, but it must be remembered that the latter
arrangements were to some extent automatically made under the prearranged plan.
The arrests were duly carried out at about 10
A.M., and half an hour later the prisoners were on their way to Dharamsala,
where they were to be interned. A few friends of the prisoners who had
accompanied
them to Mr. Irving's house were detained for a short time to give the car a fair start.
About 11:30 A.M. news of the deportation
spread in the city; shops began to close and crowds to collect. A large crowd
made its way to
At
railway station, with orders to keep the crowd south of the railway line. Captain Massey had himself been up and, seeing the situation at the bridge, had given instructions for the protection of the station. Lieut.
Dickie's picket, on arrival in the neighbourhood of the bridge, attempted to
stop the crowd but fell back on being stoned. Mr. Irving had before this gone
away to arrange with Captain Massey for further assistance, and when he left,
the original picket appears to have withdrawn under a misunderstanding. While
withdrawing, Dickie's picket was met by Mr. Connor, an assistant Commissioner,
who was endeavouring to make his way to the police station in the city. Mr.
Connor told Lieut. Dickie that he must stop the mob from reaching the civil
lines at all costs, and should fire on it. Consequently two British soldiers
dismounted and fired three or four shots, inflicting that number of casualties.
The shots brought the crowd to a standstill
at once, but did not disperse it. About I P.M., however, a body of some 24 foot
police and 7 Sowars arrived under a British police officer and advanced towards
the rioters with muskets, loaded with buckshot, at the ready. On seeing this,
some local lawyers came forward and volunteered to take the crowd away. An
opportunity to exert their influence was given to them and they succeeded in
getting the crowd back across the railway. Infantry arriving at the same time
reestablished the defence of the railway line, although by this time huge
crowds, estimated at over 30,000 people, had collected in the neighbourhood of
the station, coming out of all the gates on that side of the city.
After an interval, probably less than an
hour, the mob again began to press the infantry pickets now established on the
railway line. All efforts of the civil officers, although they were assisted by
a few of the moderate leaders, failed, and as the rioters threatened to rush
the crossings, warning was given that fire would be opened.
Finally a rush, accompanied by stoning, was
made and it was met by fire, with a result that some 20 more casualties were
inflicted. The crowd by this time had become more violent and determined, and
there is no doubt that the use of fire was absolutely essential.
While these events were in progress an even
more serious situation had developed within the city, where, it will be
remembered, there was only the police reserve of 75 men stationed at the
Kotwali.
The outrages which were perpetrated need only
be recorded in the light of their influence on British public opinion and on
General Dyer's subsequent action and his estimate of dangers threatening. The
exact course of events has never been quite clear, but it is certain that they
occurred synchronously with, and not in consequence of, the rioting outside the
city.
Briefly, the mob took charge of the city and
the police remained completely passive till most of the mischief had been done.
As a consequence three British bank officials
were murdered in their offices and their bodies burnt in the street about two
hundred yards from where the police were stationed. Another bank, still nearer
and in full sight of the Police station, was attacked, though fortunately its
two British officials were able to take
refuge in the top of the building till the police ultimately
made an effort to prevent it being burnt. The Hunter Committee commented very
severely on the extraordinary inaction and lack of initiative of the police,
who were under the command of two senior Indian officers.
There were other outrages which the police
could not, however, have prevented. Miss Sherwood, a lady missionary, was
bicycling into a school in the city when she was set on by a crowd, knocked
down several times, beaten when on the ground and left for dead; subsequently
she was picked up and her life saved by some Hindus, though others had refused her refuge in their houses when she was trying to escape. The crowd also broke into the
Fortunately, reinforcements soon began to
appear.
The first was a windfall in the shape of 260
men of the 1/9th Gurkhas, who arrived at the railway station between 1 and 2
P.M. on their way to
It was not till late at night that
reinforcements provided by definite orders arrived; but by early on the lIth,
225 British and 375 Indian troops drawn from
Prior to this, about 5 P.M., a message was
received from the city that all European survivors were safe in the Kotwali.
This message came in time to cause the postponement of a proposal to send a
party to fight their way in to ascertain the situation and rescue Europeans.
When, however, Major Macdonald assumed
command, he was asked by the Commissioner to send a party into the city to get
further information and to bring out the Europeans. It was expected this party
would have to fight, but in fact they found the streets
empty and had no difficulty in carrying out their mission. Four Europeans were
brought out. On the 11th the situation had quietened down, although wild
rumours of mutinies of troops elsewhere began to circulate. The chief cause of
anxiety lay in connection with the burial of the ten Indians who had been
killed in the firing on the previous day, and a deputation saw the Commissioner
in the civil lines to arrange for the funerals. Restrictions imposed by the
Commissioner to prevent large processions and to settle the hours and places of
the funerals were not accepted by the emissaries, but they were eventually
obeyed. Burials took place outside the city and processions formed within the
city did not pass the gates. The emissaries, mostly truculent young lawyers,
had been given a notice for general circulation that troops had been ordered to
restore order, using all force necessary, that processions and gatherings were
prohibited, and that gatherings would be fired on, as would also persons
leaving the city in groups of more than four. Respectable people were advised
to stay indoors. During the 11th, 100 Rifles were sent to hold the Kotwali and
to picket the approaches to it. Measures were also taken to prevent innocent
strangers from outside entering the city while it was in a disturbed state.
In the evening the Commissioner returned to
As subsequent events were affected almost
entirely
by General Dyer's decision, it may be well at this point
to form some estimate of his characteristics.
An officer with an admirable record as a
fighting Soldier, a leader of men with determination and initiative, he was in
addition what is sometimes termed an educated Soldier and a Staff College
graduate. Possessing a personality marked and excitable almost to the extent of
eccentricity, he was apt to hold very positive views based on opinions which he
had formed for himself. He was in short one from whom energetic action might be
expected and who would not often seek advice. With great confidence in his own
judgment, he was prepared to act on it.
The 12th of April, the first day of General
Dyer's command, passed off fairly quietly though vigorous action was initiated.
Police, escorted by small parties of troops, were sent into the city and
successfully carried out important arrests in connection with the riots of the
10th. Also, as crowds were collecting outside the city, General Dyer marched a
strong column round it and induced the people to disperse quietly.
At one point some opposition was encountered,
but though the advisability of opening fire was considered, the General decided
that warning by proclamation should be given before extreme action was taken. A
proclamation was accordingly drawn up announcing that violence would be
punished by martial law and prohibiting all meetings and gatherings. The
proclamation was duly signed by a staff officer, but the records did not show
the Hunter Committee what steps were taken to ensure its publication. Although
ing the day in its neighbourhood, and the police had
difficulty-in dispersing a crowd in an outlying village.
These events helped to confirm the view
General Dyer was forming that a widespread conspiracy existed endangering
British lives and rule, not only locally but throughout
On the morning of the 13th April he took
further measures to warn people and to strengthen his control. Accompanied by
the district magistrate, he went through the city and, collecting people by
beat of drum at a number of points, had the following proclamation read out:
"It is hereby proclaimed, to all whom it
may concern, that no person residing in the city is permitted or allowed to
leave the city in his own or hired conveyance or on foot without a pass. No
person residing in
It would appear that many people did not
treat the proclamation seriously, and remarks were made that "it was all
bluff, that the General would not fire, and not to be afraid".
At the time this proclamation was being read,
a counter proclamation was made announcing that a meeting would be held in the
afternoon at the Jallianwala Bagh, an enclosed open space within the city which
was frequently used for large gatherings. The decision to hold this meeting had
been arrived at the evening before.
Unfortunately, General Dyer's proclamation
was read only at points all within the western half of the city, as he decided
that the heat had become too trying to the escort to allow a complete circuit
to be made. Still there can be little doubt that it was widely known that the
proposed meeting was illegal and liable to lead to a clash with the Government
authority.
After perambulating the city General Dyer
returned to his headquarters and abo~t 1 P.M. heard of the intention to hold a
big meeting at the J allianwala Bagh at 4.30 P.M. According to his own
evidence, he then took some time to think out his course of action and the
dispositions he should make. By 4 o'clock, having received definite information
as regards the meeting, he took personal command of the troops designed to
disperse it. Marching through the city he dropped pickets at various points,
retaining a special force of 65 Gurkhas, 25 Baluchis and two armoured cars to
deal with the meeting. Forty of the Gurkhas were armed only with kukris.
On arrival at the Bagh he found a large
gathering; he himself estimated it at 6000 people, but other estimates ranged
from 10,000 to 20,000.
The Bagh was in no sense a public garden as
its name might imply, but was simply a piece of waste ground, the greater part
of whose surface lay some four feet below the normal ground level-possibly it
was the remains of an old tank. The sides of the depression formed a
considerable obstacle and in many parts the backs and enclosures of houses made
the obstacle complete. The whole enclosure formed a cul-de-sac to which ways of
access were few and narrow. At the end where the troops entered the
ground level was for a short distance normal, providing a
sort of platform commanding the rest of the area. Leaving his armouted cars in
a street outside as the approaches were too narrow to allow them to get
farther, General Dyer at once deployed the 50 men of his party who were armed
with rifles at each side of the entrance on the higher ground and opened fire
on the crowd without warning or calling on it to disperse. The people were on
the lower ground listening to an address delivered from a staging some 100
yards from the troops. Probably some of the crowd had sticks, but they made no
hostile movement.
Firing, independent but controlled for
direction from time to time, was continued for about ten minutes and in all
1650 rounds were fired, almost exhausting the supply carried by the men. The
tragic feature of the whole affair lay in the fact that the crowd
were unable to disperse rapidly when fire was opened. Panic added to
the. difficulties of escape which the nature of the
enclosure created. Consequently the number of casualties was greatly increased
and it is believed 380 is a fairly accurate estimate of the killed. When fire
ceased the troops were marched away without attending to the wounded or making
arrangements for their treatment.
General Dyer's explanation of his reasons for
omitting to give specific warning before opening fire or allowing the gathering
an opportunity to disperse was that he had already given warning by
proclamation and that the meeting had been held in defiance of his orders. He
claimed too that the safety of his troops called for immediate withdrawal when
fire ceased. Why fire was continued for so long is still open to
doubt. General Dyer in his evidence claimed that it was to
produce an unforgettable moral effect and was deliberate. But there is reason
to believe that by the time his evidence was given he had unconsciously become
confused as to his motives and some of the facts. Those in close touch with the
affair incline to believe that in the prevailing noise and confusion his men
for a time were out of hand, and also that he considered there was some danger
of attack. The truth can now never be known, but as it was on his own evidence that General Dyer was judged and as it
might have established a precedent, his account will be accepted as correct.
Subsequent to these events no further
collisions with Government forces occurred at
The news of General Dyer's action, however,
created a wide impression and soon gave rise to controversy the echoes of which
have not yet died down. On the one side he was condemned as a murderer and a
brutal soldier, and on the other he was hailed as the saviour of
how far, if at all, General Dyer violated the
principles which should guide officers in similar circumstances but it is of
interest and instructive to attempt to analyse the motives of his action and
mental processes.
Before the Committee of Investigation General
Dyer gave his evidence frankly and made no attempt to excuse his action. He
made it quite clear that he considered that the meeting was held at the
Jallinawala Bagh in deliberate defiance of Government, and after due warning of
the consequences of such defiance had been given. Moreover, that he had formed
the opinion from events in other parts of
There can be little doubt that General Dyer
had formed an extreme and positive opinion on the general situation and that
his action was the result of his views on the general rather than the
necessities of the immediate local situation. It is characteristic of the man
that his action appears to have been guided
by his individual views, and it would seem that he
consulted no other opinion. It is fair to admit, however, that large parts of
India were actually in a highly inflammable condition and that many well
qualified to judge shared his views on the dangers of the situation and held
that repetition of atrocities such as those that had been committed at Amritsar
could be checked only by mass punishment of the most drastic nature.
Although his general intention is clear, it
is open to doubt how far he meant to carry his action to the extremes he
actually did. It did not come out in his evidence, but it has since been stated
on good authority that General Dyer was horrified when he discovered
subsequently that the crowd were practically unable to disperse when he opened
fire. If this is so it is quite possible that at the moment he may have thought
the failure of the crowd to disperse rapidly was due to a continued attitude of
defiance.
There is general agreement that General
Dyer's evidence was given perfectly honestly, but it must be remembered that it
was given after a considerable lapse of time during which his attitude must
have been subconsciously influenced by the controversy which raged. The support
given to him, coupled with the attacks made by extremists on the other side,
tended to exalt General Dyer into a heroic position which cannot have been
without its effect on the latent element of vanity which exists in everyone.
There is some reason to think that in
consequence his evidence may have exaggerated the ruthlessness of his attitude
and the deliberateness of his action. It must always be a matter of regret that
the whole incident was not investigated by an impartial tribunal.
The Hunter Committee contained members
avowedly hostile, and in many respects the investigation degenerated into the
trial of a prisoner unprotected by the safeguards of formal legal procedure.
Many of the questions put to him would hardly have been allowed in a court of
law. For example, the hypothetical question put to General Dyer whether, if he
had been able to bring his armoured cars into the enclosure, he would have
used' machine-gun fire was evidently designed to induce him to further
incriminate himself. Unfortunately, he did not refuse to answer the question
and his reply in the affirmative strengthened the hostility to him.
Characteristically, General Dyer, although permitted and pressed to employ
legal assistance, refused to take this obviously desirable precaution.
Before commenting on the lessons to be drawn,
from the whole episode at
Police escorting prisoners through the
streets made them go down on "all fours". More unluckily still,
certain houses opening on to the prohibited section of the street had no back
entrance and the occupants had to undergo the indignity when they went out on
their ordinary business, although they were not suspected of being concerned in
the outrages or of taking part in the rioting. When the order had' been in
effect for about a week it was brought to notice, and cancelled by order of the
Punjab Government.
In
It is clear from his letter to the Punjab
Government that Mr. Irving had an accurate appreciation of the situation at
Amritsar, not only of the danger of disturbances but also of the fact that in
the event of a serious outbreak the forces at his disposal would necessarily
have to adopt a purely defensive attitude and that the greater part of the city
must pass out of control. The problem he had to deal with was threefold:
(a) To effect the
arrests of the leaders with the minimum chance of interference, and to provide,
in case of subsequent disturbances, for:
(b) The safety of the European lines.
(c) The maintenance of control within the
city and
protection of the Government offices in it and the railway
station.
In view of the acceptance of his appreciation
by the Punjab Government, there appears to have been some lack of co-ordination
between the decision to arrest the leaders and the decision to reinforce the
garrison. To arrest the leaders before the arrangements for reinforcement had
been fully matured was like poking a stick into a wasps' nest before taking
steps to stupefy the insects. Riot is at all times endemic in
the railway crossings? Surely a task
for infantry.
Mounted troops of any nature as a mobile
reserve and to disperse a mob would have been valuable, but to expect a few
horses, untrained to the police work, to face a mob passively is asking much
from them and they not unnaturally became encumbrances rather than of
assistance. A few mounted orderlies attached to infantry pickets might also
have saved the necessity of the civil officials having to leave threatened
points at critical moments in order to obtain assistance.
The inaction of the police reserve inside the
city has been ascribed to the age and lack of initiative of its Indian
commanders. The unarmed police seem to have vanished at an early stage, but
that seventy armed men should have made no attempt to control rioting
immediately under their eyes or to have prevented the burning of the Town Half
and Post Office buildings, which actually abutted on to the police station,
exalts lack of initiative to an incredible pitch. No disloyalty was insinuated
in the report of the Hunter Committee, and when the police finally took action
they behaved well. In view of the. commonly
alleged lack of initiative among Indian officers in a crisis, it is somewhat
surprising that no British official was placed with them, though three were in
charge of the situation on the railway. Mr. Connor's attempt to get into the
city was obviously belated.
It is not clear what instructions had been
issued to this body of police; they are termed a police reserve-presumably a
reserve to support the unarmed police; but the term rather implies the
intention of issuing orders according to the development of the situation and
may have been a reason for inaction. It would have been easy to fritter away
the small force in an
attempt to maintain control over the whole city, and Mr.
Irving evidently hoped only to maintain order and keep communication open in
the northern part of the city. This may have been well understood, but the
impression left is of an absence of clear instructions.
Th