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Any nation as a biological entity, requires
to protect against from foreign invasions. Its
well-defined foreign and security policy immunizes
and insulates it against any foreign invasion.
Every nation big or small, has the right to
protect itself and pursue an independent foreign
and security policy. But the case about Bhutan
is different. Its former rulers have pledged
its foreign and security policy in the hands
of India. In terms of Article 2 of Indo-Bhutan
Treaty of 1949, India claims suzerainty over
Bhutan in the conduct of its foreign and security
policy, unless it is amended by mutual consent.
So far, Bhutan has not asked for its amendment.
Bhutan's security contradictions have resurfaced
again in the last month.
Bhutan-China
Recently,
Jigmi Y. Thinlay, the Bhutanese head of the
cabinet and the foreign minister, was in Beijing
to negotiate the 13th bilateral border talks.
The entire northern borders of Bhutan with China
remains unsettled. It is also reported that
Thinlay has been given a free hand by King Jigme
in the conduct of foreign policy. Last week,
it was selectively leaked out to the dissident
political leaders in exile that Thinlay has
agreed with China to establish diplomatic relations
- ostensibly to assess the feelings of the dissidents.
As usual King Jigme remains the most unpredictable
ruler.
While
Bhutan must establish diplomatic relations not
just with China but all P-5 states, it cannot
do so at the cost of Indian sensitivity due
to the treaty obligations. Before opting for
independent security policy, it must take Indian
sensitivity into considerations especially in
the present reality of ULFA/Bodo taking shelter
inside Bhutan and stationing of the Indian army
along the Indo-Bhutan borders in the south.
The effort to establish the Chinese embassy
has been construed by many Bhutanese as Bhutan
seeking to pursue an independent foreign and
security policy. Bhutan is again committing
security blunder. Since, the timing of the establishment
of the diplomatic relations is not opportune
as Bhutan is facing menace from the ULFA/Bodo
militants and the subsequent Indian military
intervention. It should have established diplomatic
relations with China in the eighties or after
the leaving of ULFA/Bodo militants from Bhutan.
However, Bhutan's China initiatives seem to
have deliberately taken to offset the looming
danger of Indian military intervention to flush
out the Indian insurgents.
China
The
establishment of Chinese embassy will strengthen
the recently activated pro-China lobby in Thimphu,
seriously effecting the role of India House.
With the establishment of the Chinese Embassy,
Chinese development aid will pour into Bhutan,
thus reducing Bhutan's heavy economic dependence
on India. The eastern Bhutan is the least developed.
With the aid, comes the personnel, and the increased
espionage activities. The Chinese aid towards
eastern Bhutan will consternate India as it
borders Arunachal Pradesh state, which is still
claimed by China. Last year, Calcutta' newspaper
The Telegraph published a report that one of
the Chinese officials of President Ziang Zemin's
entourage to USA reiterated this claim.
China
in the past said that the border talk must be
solved through a package. It urged Bhutan to
agree for establishment of a bilateral trade.
China does not have bilateral trade relations
with Bhutan. It is also reported that China
also suggested to Bhutan that it should have
a road link to the Tibetan Autonomous Region
in the south-west China to facilitate the trade.
The road route could start from Ha district
in the western Bhutan through Chumbi valley
bordering sensitive Sikkim. India alleges that
China has deployed nuclear missiles in the Chumbi
valley. The 12th border talk held in August
1997 deadlocked on exchange of the land. In
July, 1997, King Jigme had agreed with China
for exchange of the land. China has offered
to exchange 495 sq km of its area near Pasamulung
and Jakarlung valleys in the northern borders
(which China claims) for a 269 sq km area of
Sinchulumpa, Dramana and Shaktoe in the north-west
Bhutan. The area proposed to be exchanged borders
with Sikkim in India. The border talk is yet
to be finally settled.
Indian
option
Despite
Bhutan harbouring India's ULFA and Bodo militants,
India has so long been magnanimously fulfilling
the demands of Bhutan in the name of preserving
its security in the north. It arrested R.K.
Dorji and deported several hundred Bhutanese
dissident peace marchers in the face of growing
world opinion to please the regime. In the same
strike, Bhutanese dissidents have been denied
any access to either the India House in Kathmandu
or the Ministry of External Affairs, Delhi.
If Bhutan failed to honour India's security
sensitivity, Indian options would far outweigh
Bhutan's.
If
Bhutan ever tries to bypass India in any matter
that jeopardize its security sensitivity, India
will have the following options to bring the
overzealous Druk regime under its grip. Firstly,
Bhutanese currency, Ngultrum is pegged at par
with Indian rupees. India guarantees Bhutanese
Ngultrum. If India withdraws its guarantee,
Bhutanese currency will not be worth 1 to 5.
It will be a serious blow to the growing economy
of Bhutan. This will completely bring the Bhutanese
economy into shambles. Secondly, India could
have Nepal-style trade embargo against Bhutan.
Nepal could survive for a year or so. But Bhutan
cannot survive even for six months. Again, India
can influence its traders along the borders
to hike the prices of commodities entering into
Bhutan. Thirdly, there will be serious impact
on food supplies to Bhutan. The Food Corporation
of India (FCI) supplies the staple food like
rice, flours or sugars at a very subsidized
rate to Bhutan. If FCI stops food supply, the
poor Bhutanese will starve. Fourthly, Bhutan
does not pay India in foreign currency - especially
for the supply of oil and oil-products. Bhutan
may be compelled to pay in foreign currency,
which she cannot afford. Fifthly, India funds
the entire expenditure of Bhutanese security
forces, which is not reflected in the national
budget of Bhutan. If India stops that subsidy,
Bhutan will have a huge fiscal and budget deficit,
which its resources could never meet. Sixthly,
India might cut back the huge plan budget of
Bhutan, thereby seriously effecting the establishment
cost of the government and the development projects.
Seventhly, Bhutan's third country exports are
mainly horticultural products. As perishable
products, the bureaucratic delay in the Indian
borders might damage them, thus making Bhutanese
farmers lose enormously. Eighthly, an irate
Indian security apparatus might help the dissidents
to create insurgency inside Bhutan to overthrow
King Jigme's autocratic rule. Lastly, India
could revive the Sikkim episode-though given
the above options, it seems not realist in the
present context.
Thus,
it will be very much in the interest of Bhutan
not to over-antagonize India. Establishment
of more diplomatic relations is certainly not
the denominator of the sovereignty of any nation.
Bhutan must be cautious not to commit political
harakiri. Before opting for independent foreign
and security policy, it must sanitize the country
of ULFA/Bodo militants. They must be asked to
leave the country voluntarily. It must also
take back all its refugee citizens to build
a strong united stand. Otherwise, it will not
be in a position to bargain with India.
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