The part of Iowa which is commonly called "the Missouri Slope," furnished the fighting materiel of the Twenty-ninth Infantry. It was organized in the latter part of 1862, under the auspices of Thomas H. Benton, Jr., who was appointed colonel August 10th. Long known throughout the State as a politician, more especially as an efficient friend of popular education, he had non of those dashing, flashing qualities which were so universally regarded during the earlier period of the war as the essentials of a successful soldier. He had no difficulty; however, in speedily raising a full regiment of ten companies, which were all mustered into the service by the 1st of December
Of the companies composing this regiment A was raised in Pottawattamie County, B in Mills County, C in Harrison County, D in Adams and Adair Counties, E in Fremont County, F in Taylor County, G in Ringgold County, H in Union County, I in Guthrie County, K was made up of men from all of these counties.
Company A-Pottawattamie county, was commanded by captain John P. Williams, Lieutenants George A. Wayne, R. R. Kirkpatrick. Company B-Mills county, captain M. L. Andrews; Lieutenants Lewis M. Deupree, Edward T. Sheldon. Company C -Harrison county, Captain William W. Fuller; Lieutenants George S. Bacon, Joseph n. Smith. Company D-Adams and Adair counties, captain Frank M. Davis; Lieutenants John w. Stewart, M. E. Black. Company E-Fremont county, captain Henry Owen; Lieutenants James L. Mitchell, Daniel G. Elifritz. Company F-Taylor county, Captain James Brooks; Lieutenants Lucius B. Nash, Isaac Damewood. Company G-Ringgold, captain Alexander B. Huggins; Lieutenants Andrew Johnston, John McFarland. Company H-Union county, Captain James L. Hafer; Lieutenants Lewis K. Myers, Amos C. Cooper. Company I-Guthrie, Captain Joseph Dyson; Lieutenants Wells C. McCool, Peter H. Lenon. Company K-from all the above named counties, Captain A R. Wright; Lieutenants Bonaparte Dale, Allen I. Chantry. The assistant surgeons of the regiment were William a. Nicholson and David F. Eakins.
It had been intended that this regiment should form a part of the command under General W. T. Sherman, which made the fruitless assault upon Vicksburg. Before the regiment had formally entered the service of the United States, navigation of the Missouri River was closed, and this design had to be abandoned. Proceeding by detachments between the 5th and 9th of December, the command marched to St. Joseph, Missouri, and reported to Major-General Samuel R. Curtis, then commanding the department. From here it went by rail to St. Louis, and entered Benton Barracks on the 20th, with over nine hundred men, every one in good health and spirits. The next morning it marched to Schofield Barracks in the city and was assigned the duty of guarding certain prisons.
It had hardly entered upon the performance of this service; however, when it was ordered to move to Helena, Arkansas. Accordingly, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson, the Colonel remaining at St. Louis on regimental business, it embarked for the South on Christmas day. Like all other regiments about that time passing down the river, it paid the tribute of a halt to Columbus, Kentucky, then daily frightened by imaginary butternut forces. It was assigned to the right wing, under command of Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, where it remained in camp till the 8th of January, 1863. On that day it embarked, under orders to proceed to Helena, with the brigade of General Fisk.
The brigade did not halt at Helena, but at once joined an expedition which had been organized by General Gorman, and which was now ready to proceed up White River. This expedition was entirely fruitless, and more than entirely comfortless. It went up the river a distance of one hundred and eighty miles to Duvall's Bluff, and then returned without disembarking the troops. No resistance from the enemy was met, but the sufferings of the men was intense. During the voyage the men never left their transports, but measles attacked the Twenty-ninth. When it reached Helena on the 26th, there were more than four hundred men on the sick list, and the command lost by the exposure of this voyage no less than three hundred, but after recovery from this shock, the health of the regiment was almost uniformly good. While at Helena, in March, Captain J. J. Hafer of Company was attacked with smallpox and died.
It formed an expedition through the Yazoo Pass to Fort Pemberton at the head of the Yazoo River. It left Helena on board the Steamer "Emma No. 2," but when that vessel reached the Cold Water, it was found to be so broken and smashed up by the poundings of the navigation through forests, as to be little better than a wreck. The regiment was transferred to the "Key West," aboard of which it made the voyage to the fort and back to Helena From this time until the Little Rock Expedition, the command remained at Helena on garrison duty, only leaving the town to participate in the ordinary scouts. It bore a glorious part in the Battle of Helena, on the national anniversary, whipping an entire brigade, and captured many prisoners.
By midnight the three Confederate columns were in motion, working their way through the tangled hills. The advancing soldiers had high hopes that their surprise attack on Helena, Arkansas, would be a turning point in the Civil War. To the south, they knew, the Unnion forces of Major General Ulysses S. Grant still encircled the starving garrison at Vicksburg, Mississippi. If the Confederates could capture Helena, they would cut Grant's supply line. The besieger would become the besieged, Vicksburg would be relieved, and Grant's army might even be destroyed. The confident Southerners marching in the sticky heat of a midsummer night believed that this July 4, 1863, would be an illustruous day for the Confederacy.
News had not yet reached Arkansas that for the last three days the Army of Northern Virginia under General Robert E. Lee had fought valiantly but in vain at Gettysburg, Pa. Nor did the advancing soldiers know that Vicksburg, the city they strove to save, would surrender to Grant within a few hours. This day would indeed be a turning point, a day of disaster fot the Confederacy, and the desperate battle they were about to fight would go scarcely noticed in the shadow of two greater struggles.
Helena was a busy river port nestled between the Mississippi and the southern foot of Crowley's Ridge, a densely wooded convoluted range of hills. From any one of several high points along the ridge, cannon could dominate both the roads approaching Helena from the landward side and the river traffic on the Mississippi.
The town had fallen with out a fight to Union forces in 1862. In the ensuing year, Helena had served as the base for Grant's campaign against Vicksburg. Commanding the Union forces at Helena was Major General Benjamin M. Prentiss. In the summer of 1863, the Helena garrison consisted of the 13th Division of the Federal XIII Corps. The brigader general commanding the division, Prussian born Frederick Salomon, was as inexperienced in battle as the troops he commanded. The only time he had led the men into combat had been as a captain at the Battle of Wilson's Creek in 1861. His two brigades of infantry, one brigade of cavalry and two small artillery batteries numbers 4,129 men.
Prentiss' opposite number was Confederate Lt. General Theophilus Hunter Holmes. The 58 year old West Point graduate, a classmate of Robert E. Lee, had performed poorly duing the early campaigns in Virginia. First put in command of all Confederate forces west of the Mississippi, Homles had later been demoted, and he now controlled only those troops in the state of Arkansas. His replacement as Trans-Mississippi commander was General Edmund Kirby Smith. For months Holmes had faced no serious threat in Arkansas, as the Union forces focused their attention instead on opening up the Mississippi River. Nonetheless, the obstinate Holmes had resisted calls by President Jefferson Davis and others to send reinforcements to Mississippi.
For weeks Prentiss had been strenghting his defenses and readying his troops to meet a Confederate attack. He had contructed four hilltop fortifications from which his artillery could dominate any of the six roads leading into the town. Named from north to south, Batteries A, B, C, and D, these emplacements were guarded by multiple lines of rifle pits on the slopes infront of them. The batteries were mutually supporting, as well; forces attacking any one of them would come under flanking fire from at least one other.
Behind the batteries, on the western edge of Helena itself, were the earthworks of Fort Curtis, whose heavy siege guns could sweep any of the neighboring hilltops should an enemy gain possession of them. Prentiss had ordered the trees felled on all the approaching ridges, both to provide a clear field of fire for the defending artillery and as an obstical to attacking forces. To ensure that those attaching forces would be without artillery support, the Union troops had obstructed all approaches to the town with roadblocks every few hundred yards.
On June 24, Confederate cavalry sealed off Helena, and accordingly, starting on June 27, Prentiss had the garrison awaken at 2:30 each morning and in its assigned positions by first light. On July 1, the gunboat Tyler was dispatched from Memphis to Helena, even though her boilers were in such a state of disrepair that a gang of workmen had to accompany the vessel.
On July 3, Holmes and his generals met to plan their attack. Thank's to Walkers cavalry scouts, Holmes had a fairly accurate picture of the strong Federal defenses. He remained ingnorant only of the thoroughness of Prentiss' preparations and of Tyler lying at anchor just beyond the town. He planned to approach Helena using five of six available roads. One column would be a feint, and another would be held in reserve while the three remaining forces each assulted one of the hilltop batteries.
Price would command the largest force, consisting of the two brigades of infantry, Parsons' and McRae's, he had brought from Jacksonport. Price would approach Helena from due west and attack Battery C on Graveyard Hill, the approximate center of the Unions position. To Price's right, Fagan's brigade would attack Battery D on Hindman's Hill. Fagan detailed one of his four regiments, along with some cavalry and artillery, to approach Helena from the south and feign an attack along the Lower Little Rock Road.
To the north, Marmaduke was to assult Battery A on Rightor Hill with two brigades of dismounted cavalry. To his left, Walker's two regiments of cavalry were to stand ready on the Sterling Road to cut off any reinforcements that might oppose Marmaduke. Once Marmaduke secured his objective, Walker was to "enter the town and act against the enemy as circumstances may justify."
Marmaduke's forces, having the longest route, began moving toward the attack at 10 o'clock on the night of July 3. Fagan's brigade started forward at 11 p.m., Price's division at midnight. All three assault forces had to wind their way through and across the wrinkled face of Crowley's Ridge. The columns were still more than a mile from Helena when they encountered the first of Pretiss' roadblocks and were forced to leave behind their artillery, ammunition wagons and even some officers' horses.
Fagan pushed his three regiments forward on schedule dispite the obstacles and began encountering Union pickets at 3 a.m. He swept those before him until he was in his assigned attack position in front of Hindman's Hill an hour later. Though his men were already exhausted from clambering across three major lines of obstructions, he launched his attack, as ordered, at 4 a.m. when the first sign of daylight appeared.
Marmaduke's cavalry, meanwhile, had dismounted as planned about three miles from their objective and proceeded on foot. At the first roadblock, his guides declared themselves hopelessly lost. Having to feel his own way forward cost Marmaduke about half an hour. About 3 a.m., he confronted Union pickets while he was still three-fourths of a mile from his objective. The West Point graduate slowly pushed forward until he reached his attack position at 4:30 a.m.
Misundrestanding and misfortune delayed Price's center column. Holems' orders had called for the attack to begin at "daylight." fagan and Marmanduke took this to mean the first light of dawn. Price evidently understood Holmes to mean sunrise, over an hour later. While he was still 1 ½ miles from his goal, Price halted his column, thinking he was ahead of schedule. Holmes joined him at this point, and together they waited for daylight before proceeding. Neither general apparently realized at the time that Price's column was running a full hour behind the others. By the time Price moved forward again, Fagan's men were already engaged in a desperate battle on Hindman's Hill.
On the Union side, Prentiss was not aware of the oncoming Confederates. He had posted his troops as usual, at 2:30 a.m. When Fagan and Marmaduke simultaneously encountered his pickets at 3 a.m., Prentiss and his subordinates knew that this was the day of the expected attack. In the hour between the time when the first shots were fired and the Rebles under Fagan formed up for the first serious assualt the Union defensive lines needed few adjustments.
Two brigades, unequal in size, comprised Prentiss' infantry. The three regiments of Colonel William McLean's 1st Brigade manned the rifle pits in the center and left of the Union line. The larger 2nd Brigade, under Colonel Samuel Rice, was responcible for holding the right most portion of the line, providing the general reserve, and manning the guns at Fort Curtis and the four batteries themselves. The latter duty was entrusted to men of the 33rd Missouri, novice artillerists who would prove to be so effective that one Rebel surviver later said of them, "The way they handled the pieces made us wish we had met another kind." Prentiss posted a small force of cavalry and light artillery on either flank to guard the river approaches to the town.
When the first attacks materialized against Batteries A and D, reinforcements rushed to both locations. Part of the 33rd Iowa of Rice's brigade went to McLean's aid in front of Battery D. The rest of the regiment took up position near a Catholic convent west of town, covering the deep cut between Hindman Hill and Graveyard Hill.
To the north the 29th Iowa joined the 36th Iowa covering Battery A. The two Hawkeye regiments advanced, forcing Marmanduke's skirmishers back several hundred yards. They were supported by the 1st Indiana and 5th Kansas Cavalry regiments and part of the 3rd Iowa Battery, which was behind the Mississippi River levee north of Helena. From this location they were able to keep Marmanduke's division pinned down by a steady flanking fire.
The eastern horizon was only faintly lit, and the Union forces had barely settled down in their lines, when Fagan launched his assualt up the steep slopes of Hindman's Hill. Without stopping to rest, the 35 year old veteran rushed his three Arkansas regiments against the enemy rifle pits as soon as each emerged from the tangle of the last obstructions. Fagan later described the attack: "Over the heavy timber, the deep gorges, and the precipitous banks they moved. Over opposite to them ran the long line of fortifications, toward which they moved with eager, anxious steps. Cowering behind their strong works, the enemy beheld their advance with consternation. Still, on they moved, unhesitantingly, amid the leaden rain and iron hail. The gorge is passed, the ascent of the steep acclivity is nearly gained, and the red line of rilfe-pits looms up clearly amid the uncertian light and haze of dawn. With a shout of triumph they rush towards it, and the enemy are driven pell-mell from one row of rifle pits to another."
Five lines of rifle pits protected Battery D. It took three hours for the regiments of Fagan's brigade to take the first four lines. They did so under fire, not only from the Federal troops on Hindman's Hill,but from those posted on Graveyard Hill as well. Price's attack on Battery C had still not materialized, leaving Fagan to face three Federal regiments and two artillery batteries. The Confederates were aided, however, by a concealing ground fog that rose from between the hills at 5 a.m. and did not dissipate fully until 8 a.m. By the time the Arkansans had taken the fourth line of rifle pits, they were exhausted. Gasping for breath in the tepid soup of fog and smoke, some fainted under the heat of the rising July sun. Fagan had no choice but to call a temporary halt to his attack.
Fagan had ordered his fourth regiment, the 34th Arkansas under Colonel W. H. Brooks, to feint toward the town along the river from the south. Brooks had with him a section of artillery and three companies of cavalry. Meeting enemy pickets at daybreak, the colonel pushed his small force forward. until it was within artillery range of the southward-facing Federal rifle pits manned by the 35th Missouri. Here his guns dueled at long range with the rifled fieldpieces of the Federal 1st Missouri Battery.
Brooks' advance attracted the attention of Lt. Cmdr. James M. Pritchett, commanding officer of Tyler. At 5:50 a.m., the timberclad weighed anchor and steamed south to a point below Helena, where Pritchett opened fire against Brooks' detachment. The Confederate artillerymen returned fire, but their 6- pounders were no match for Tyler's two 30-pounder Parrott rifles and broadsies of 8-inch cannons. Brooks retired behind a small hill and remained there for the rest of the morning, occasionally exposing a single cannon for a harassing shot at the Federal lines.
From 4 until 7 a.m., Fagan and his troops had listened in vain for Sterling Price's expected assualt on Battery C. Delayed initially over the confusion concering the timing of the attack, Price's two brigades were slowed further by the terrain, by Federal obstacles, and by misconmmunications. At 4 a.m., Price resumed his advance, sending Parson's Missouri brigade to the right and McRae's Arkansas brigade to the left. Within an hour the Confederates encountered Union pickets, shot were fired, and three guides escorting Parsons' brigade disappeared. McRae stopped to send one of his guides to Parsons, but McRae was soon lost as well when his remaining guide deserted.
When the division finally reached its attack positions, the men were so tired from toiling up and down the forested ridges in the dark that Price allowed them a brief rest. At this point Holmes arrived, demanding to know why the division was standing idle. Price explained that the attack would begin any moment. Parsons' brigade on the right, was to start the charge as soon as McRae's brigade was in supporting position on the left. McRae was to start up the hill as soon as he saw Parsons move.
Long minutes passed and still nothing happened. Price sent one of his staff to Parsons to learn why he had not attacked. Parsons replied that he was still waiting for McRae to get into position on his left. A messenger sent to McRae found his brigade already in position and impatiently awaiting Parsons' advance. McRae's brigade had strayed slightly to the left and was seperated from Parsons by a high ridge. In the dark and fog, niether brigade commander could tell that the other was on his flank. When Price finally got both brigades moving it was 8 a.m. The fog was dissipating, and daylight exposed the attacking regiments to fire from their front and both sides.
Prentiss had abundant warning of Price's sluggish advance toward Graveyard Hill. He signalled to Tyler, still south of town keeping Brooks' regiment pinned down, to come to the defense of Battery C. To the north, BatteryB trained its guns against the advancing Rebels, as did Battery D to the south, temporarily unconcerned with Fagan's exhausted regiments.
Suffering heavily in the cross-fire, Price's troops faltered twice, but on the third try forced their way up the barren slope, through the rifle pits and into the battery at the crest of the hill. The battle flag of the 9th Missouri, triumphantly waving from the battery, announced to the waiting generals that Graveyard Hill was theirs. Before retreating down the eastern slope, however, the defenders spiked one of their two guns and carried off the friction primer, making the other gun worthless as well.
Fagan, seeing Price's troops finally on the move, ordered his own brigade forward once more. Charging across yet another steep ravine, the Arkansans managed to carry the fifth and last line of rifle pits covering Battery D. Victorious but exhausted, the Rebels took cover once more in their enemy's former entrenchments.
Expecting next an attack against Fort Curtis, Prentiss ordered up reinforcements from the northn and southern extremes of his line. As the Midwesterners took their positions covering the western approaches to the town, the guns of Tyler, Fort Curtis and Battery B continued to pound the top of Graveyard Hill, where the troops of Parsons and McRae were now milling.
Shortly after its capture, Holmes rode in person to the top of Graveyard Hill and found everything in confusion. The nearly deaf general the proceeded to issue a series of vague and contradictory orders that only heightened the bedlam. He confronted the colonel of the 10th Missouri of Parsons' brigade and ordered him to take his men and charge "the fort." Holmes then sent a message to Price explaining that he was ordering Parsons to attack Battery D. It would seem, therefore, that the "fort" Holmes had in mind was the battery on Hindman's Hill. The colonel led his men in nearly the opposite direction, down the eastern slope of Graveyard Hill toward Forst Curtis. Other men of Parsons' command, thinking that the whole brigade was attacking, followed. Holmes, in frustration, decided to have McRae attack Hindman's Hill instead; he ordered that officer to collect his men and charge Battery D.
While McRae was perparing his attack, Price, unaware that Holmes had made a shambles of the chain of command, sent orders of his own for Parsons to charge Hindman's Hill. Orders were flying thick as the bullets that day, and Fagan tried to organize an advance of his own. Only a hand full of men responded, and when they were hit with short range fire it shattered.
Realizing that the battle was lost Holmes ordered a general withdraw at 10:30 a.m. The battle, ending with final shots by skirmishers at 2 p.m., cost the Union 57 killed, 146 wounded, and 36 missing. The Tyler had fired 413 rounds from its guns without a mishap. Holmes losses were 427 killed, 687 wounded, and 776 missing.
One Confederate soldiers who lost both arms on Graveyard Hill to a shell from Tyler said, "Since that day at Helena I tell the boys I would rather buck against a hoodoo than try to down old Glory on the Fourth of July."
The following is the report of Thomas H. Benton, Col. of the 29th Iowa Infantry at the time of the battle of Helena:
"HELENA, ARK., July 6, 1863.
COLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken in the engagement of the 4th instant by my regiment:
My men were drawn up in line of battle at daylight, and at 4.30 a.m., in pursuance of orders from Col. Samuel A. Rice, commanding 2nd Brigade, we marched across the bottom at double-quick to a position on the Sterling road. Upon reaching the point designated, I found that the enemy occupied the crest of the hills with their skirmishers, north of Battery A, commanding my position. I immediately sent forward two companies of skirmishers to dislodge and drive them back; but finding them too strongly posted, I continued to re-enforce the line until eight companies were deployed. In the meantime the enemy had placed a battery of two guns in position, with which they opened a brisk fire, and moved rapidly upon us, cheering and exulting as they advanced, being partially shielded from view by a fog, which covered the hills at that moment. Our skirmishers met them with a galling and incessant fire, under which they gradually fell back, resolutely contesting every inch of ground as they retired. Our skirmishers advanced steadily and cautiously, and, having gained the crest of the hills previously occupied by the enemy, compelled him to abandon his guns, which, after several ineffectual attempts, he subsequently recovered, and withdrew, leaving one caisson on the field. My men were under a severe fire for more than five hours, and it affords me the greatest pleasure to speak of both officers and men in terms of the highest commendation for their coolness and bravery during the entire action. I saw no flinching or wavering during the day.
It is proper to add that several of my officers and quite a number of my men, who were excused from duty in consequence of physical debility, left their quarters and joined their respective companies when the signal gun was fired.
Any invidious distinctions among the members of my command would not be admissible in this report, but I would not do justice to an accomplished officer should I fail to acknowledge the efficient services of LtCol. R. F. Patterson during the action, and the special obligations I am under for the thorough instruction previously given by him to both officers and men in the responsible duties and obligations of the soldier, the importance of which was so forcibly illustrated on the 4th instant. My regiment was promptly supported by the 36th Iowa Infantry, commanded by Col. Kittredge, and was relieved by him a short time before the enemy left the field.
The enemy's force in front of our line, so far as I have been able to ascertain from the most reliable information within my reach, was one brigade of five regiments of infantry, one battery, and two regiments of cavalry in reserve, under command of Col. McRae. I regret to have to report that during the engagement the loss in my regiment was seven killed and 24 wounded, some of them mortally (two of whom have since died), and many of them severely wounded, among the number some of my best and bravest men. The enemy's loss it is not possible to state definitely, as he succeeded in removing many of them from the field. We buried 14 of his dead, and found the graves of 17 more buried by himself, and brought one of his wounded from the field."
The march of General Steele's army from Helena to Little Rock took place between the 11th of August and 10th of September. The weather was excessively hot and dry. The White River was crossed at Clarendon, where a week's halt was made. From this place the column marched up the river as far as Duvall's Bluffs, at the crossing of the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad, where depots of supplies and hospitals were established. The Twenty-ninth was in the division commanded by General Samuel A. Rice, the brigade being under the command of Colonel Benton. Nothing worthy of note occurred until after the column left Duvall's Bluffs. From there to Brownsville, the country is a grand prairie, and at that season of the year entirely without water. Each man had to carry his own supply in his canteen. It was so hot that many were sun-struck on the march. There were not enough ambulances to carry those who gave out, so that they would load up, travel ahead, leave the sick by the roadside, and return for others. By repeating this operation, the men unable to walk were by turn conveyed in the ambulances and left to suffer in the broiling sun through the greater part of two days. The column halted a few days at Brownsville, but during that time General Rice's Division made a rapid march to Bayou Metoe, eighteen miles distant, to cover a movement of General Davidson's cavalry division in another direction. Both detachments, having skirmished sharply with the enemy, soon returned to the main army. General Price, commanding at Little Rock, Occupied a strong position four miles from the rebel capital, his right protected by the Arkansas, his left by an impenetrable cypress swamp. The roads leading to this position from the front pursued devious courses, and were in many places narrow causeways over bayous and through swamps. General Steele, therefore, turned from the direct road and struck the Arkansas about eight miles below Little Rock. Here a pontoon bridge was thrown across the river, and early on the morning of September 10th, Davidson's whole cavalry division with its artillery passed over and moved rapidly along the sandy shore and through the woods against the enemy. General Steele moved up on the north side of the stream, his artillery all the time assisting his left wing, on the south side, against which the enemy made only serious demonstrations. Davidson was resisted with more or less obstinacy all the way to the town, and the right wing marched in light fighting order, momentarily expecting to have a general engagement. The cavalry entered Little Rock at dark, Price having retreated in such haste as to leave the arsenal and much public property unharmed. His army was superior in numbers to that from which he fled. The Union army encamped around the city on the morning of the 11th, leaving the rebels to retreat quietly to Arkadelphia.
The regiment lost in this engagement thirty-one killed and wounded. Namely:-Killed, Sergeant Isaac T. Lucas; Privates Edward Harl, John T. Cobb, James Conley, Andrew R. Jordan. Francis I. Husband, Lewis Schwartz. Wounded, Sergeant Hiram Atkinson; Corporals Jacob Briderstine, Henry Edinger, (mortally); Privates Moses Nixon, Daniel D. Johnson, Ansen F. Belden, (mortally) P. D. Evans, M. L. Spire, J. W. Rodgers, Emory Jones, (mortally), L. L. Witty, (mortally), R. T. Reeves, (mortally), P. H. Huffman, Leonard Mavity, John Morris, John T. Hindman, John W Picks, (mortally), J. W. Smith, W. R. Moler, Isaac Runyon, George W. Smith, John H. Lee, J. W Trent, John S. Burket
In November, the rebel General Marmaduke attacked Pine Bluff, some sixty miles below Little Rock, and was repulsed with heavy losses. General Rice was sent out with the brigade to which the Twenty-ninth belonged, and a brigade of the Second Division to intercept the rebel trooper. The command marched as far as Rockport, on the Washita, but did not find Marmaduke. This ended the active campaigning of the regiment for the year It remained at Little Rock during the winter of 1863-4, and till General Steele's column moved for the southwest on the morning of March 23rd.
In this campaign of hard marches through mud, and swamp and bayou; of heavy skirmishing day after day and night after night-skirmishing which more than once became severe enough to make it a battle to those engaged; of burdensome labor in building causeways and bridges; of stubborn fighting, of stupendous losses in material, of short rations much of the time, and no rations at all many days, the Twenty-ninth Iowa bore laborious, faithful, honorable part. The country through which General Steele proposed to himself to march had been marched through by rebel armies, and much of it overrun by the troopers of both armies. There were many square miles of it which did not contain subsistence for a crow. It was necessary that the Union commander should transport his supplies with his column. His train consisted of not less than four hundred wagons. Passing along an ordinary road in the ordinary way it was about four miles in length. April 2nd, the column reached the bayou of Terre Noir, on the road from Arkadelphia to Washington.
When the main body crossed the bayou, the train was two or three miles behind. Here was an opportunity to pounce upon the supplies by a sudden dash, which it was not to be supposed the rebel cavalry, who had been hovering near the column and watching the train with hawks' eyes, would let pass by. Shelby's brigade made a rush for their coveted prey about eleven o'clock in the morning. The Twenty-ninth with a section of artillery constituted the rear-guard for the day. They had met and repulsed this rebel brigade at Helena the year before, and they now fought, unsupported, against fearful odds till the Fiftieth Indiana came up, having marched four miles, to their assistance. This reinforcement did not arrive a moment too soon. The Twenty-ninth had repelled their assailants three times, but were now being roughly handled. The left wing was turned, and being confusedly rolled up along the line. General Rice rushed to the ground, and rallied the troops almost instantaneously, and they immediately charged with a shout, again driving off the enemy in confusion. Shortly afterwards, the rebel Cabell reinforced Shelby with his brigade of troopers, and another attack was made. Meantime, the Ninth Wisconsin reinforced the rearguard, and the rebels were again and again foiled of their object. The conflict continued, at short intervals, from eleven o'clock in the morning till after dark. The train would close up and move on whilst our troops were repelling an attack. Having done that, the march in the fighting order would be resumed, and continued till the next attack. About dusk, the rebels made an impetuous charge, seemingly determined to capture our artillery at all hazards. Our men stood stock still till the galloping horde came within thirty yards of the line, when they let drive from musketry and artillery such a fearful hail of lead and iron, that the charging troopers seemed to have dashed against a wall of rock. Then the Union troops rushed forward with a yell, to which the throats of the Indiana boys added fearful power, and drove the enemy in much admired disorder from the field. This last combat was fought at the junction of the Elkin's Ferry road, eight miles from where the Twenty-ninth repelled the first assault in the morning. The Union loss during the day was about sixty in killed and wounded, of whom the Twenty-ninth lost twenty-seven. The men who had been engaged marched into Okolona, after nine o'clock at night, with drums beating and. colors flying. Here they saw the train in park, not a wagon missing.
The regiment was under fire for three hours during the battle of Little Missouri, at Elkin's Ferry. The following is the report from Thomas H. Benton, Col. of the 29th Iowa Infantry:
"HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-NINTH Iowa INFANTRY, Camp on Little Missouri River, April 5, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 2nd instant I was assigned to the duty of guarding the rear of our supply train. My command, consisting of the 29th Iowa Infantry and one section of Captain Voegele's battery, was formed in the following order: One company immediately in rear of the train as an advance guard, followed by the battery; the main body of the regiment, consisting of seven companies, two companies as a rear guard, and a sergeant and eight men in the extreme rear. While passing a narrow, muddy defile, caused by a small stream one mile east of Terre Noir Creek, a body of Shelby's cavalry, supposed to be 1200 strong, made a sudden dash
upon our rear guards. The guards, supported by our left wing, rallied promptly, opened a brisk fire, and momentarily checked the advance of the enemy, which enabled us to pass the defile and deploy our forces on either side of the road. I ordered the battery into position and opened fire on the enemy, which instantly replied to with vigor and accuracy. After a brief and spirited contest, the enemy fell back. I then advanced to Terre Noir Creek, and after crossing it again opened fire with the battery and a volley from the rear guard. Believing that the enemy was endeavoring to flank us. I withdrew my forces rapidly to the high ground one mile in advance. Just before my advance reached the highest elevation the enemy again attacked our rear, but was held in check by our skirmishers until I succeeded in getting the battery into position and deploying the main body of my forces on the crown of the hill. At this point the enemy made a desperate charge, but after a hotly contested action of an hours' duration he was driven back in confusion, and evidently with considerable loss. During the engagement Brig Gen. S. A. Rice, with the 50th Indiana Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Wells commanding (whose conduct on the occasion deserves the highest commendation), arrived and assumed command. My command was now ordered to the front, and was subsequently halted and deployed twice as a reserve, but was not again engaged with the enemy. I am under special obligations to Maj. C. B. Shoemaker and Adjutant Joseph Lyman, of my command (Lieutenant Colonel Patterson was absent on sick leave), for their prompt and efficient co-operation from the commencement to the close of the series of engagements in which we took part. Great credit is also due to my line officers and men for the readiness with which they conformed to the embarrassing circumstances by which we were surrounded, and the unfaltering determination with which they resisted the approach of the enemy. Captain Voegele with his battery rendered us valuable services whenever opportunity offered. The total loss to my command was four enlisted men killed, four enlisted men missing, three officers and 16 enlisted men wounded; aggregate, 27."
It was in the front during the day of the 15th, on the evening of which the army entered Camden, having had an excited race with the rebels ever since the magnificent parade on Prairie D'Anne, on the 12th. The rest of the day on the 15th and all of the 16th was spent in a sever skirmish at Liberty Post Office, Arkansas. The regiment remained at Camden till the 26th, retreated with the army upon Little Rock, fought six hours at the severe engagement of Jenkins' Ferry, making there one of the finest bayonet charges of the war, capturing a section of artillery, and reached the capital on the 3rd of May. ving had an excited race with the rebels ever since the magnificent parade on Prairie D'Anne, on the 12th. The rest of the day on the 15th and all of the 16th was spent in a sever skirmish at Liberty Post Office, Arkansas. The regiment remained at Camden till the 26th, retreated with the army upon Little Rock, fought six hours at the severe engagement of Jenkins' Ferry, making there one of the finest bayonet charges of the war, capturing a section of artillery, and reached the capital on the 3rd of May. ving had an excited race with the rebels ever since the magnificent parade on Prairie D'Anne, on the 12th. The rest of the day on the 15th and all of the 16th was spent in a sever skirmish at Liberty Post Office, Arkansas. The regiment remained at Camden till the 26th, retreated with the army upon Little Rock, fought six hours at the severe engagement of Jenkins' Ferry, making there one of the finest bayoneat he did accomplish.
After the army reached Little Rock it was reorganized, the Twenty-ninth being assigned to the First Brigade of the First Division. Afterwards, however, it was assigned to the Second Brigade, Second Division, in which command it remained to the close of the year. Except during one month, from the latter part of July to the latter part of August, when it was at Lewisburg, on the Arkansas, fifty miles above Little Rock, the regiment remained at the latter place after the retreat from Camden, for nearly a year. In November, it was ordered to move to Pine Bluff, but the order was countermanded, and it was assigned to duty as "City Guard" of the post of Little Rock. And there it remained until February 8th, 1865, when it left for active operations in another field.
Meantime, General J. J. Reynolds had relieved Steele of the command of the Department of Arkansas, and reorganized the army. The Twenty-ninth regiment was assigned to an organization styled the "Detached Brigade of the Seventh Army Corps," General E. A. Carr commanding. About the 1st of February, Carr received orders to proceed to New Orleans. But on account of the. want of transportation, the regiment with which we now have to do did not leave Little Rock until the 9th. After a tedious voyage, the regiment reached New Orleans, one wing on the 14th, the other two days afterwards. The united command was quartered in an old foundry, at Algiers, opposite the Crescent City. Preparations for the campaign of Mobile at once began. Colonel Benton was attached to the Second Brigade, Colonel H. M. Day, ninety-first Illinois, Third Division, Brigadier-General W. P. Benton, Thirteenth Corps, Major-General Gordon Granger. The 17th of March the army began the march on Mobile. It was one of the utmost toil and difficulty. The 20th, the regiment moved by rail to Lakeport, on Lake Pontchartrain, and there embarked for Mobile Point, Alabama. The vessel unfortunately ran aground, and the command, transferred to another, disembarked on the 23rd, and, without tents or baggage, went into bivouac about three miles to the rear of Fort Morgan. The sands of Navy Cove were no luxuries, but the oysters were, and of these luscious fishes the troops had unlimited quantities by simply catching them.
On March 24th one enlisted man was captured at Fish River, Alabama, and on the 25th, the army found itself under the guns of Spanish Fort, the investment of which was immediately commenced. It need only be stated here that, as in the labors of the severe march the Twenty-ninth Iowa bore its part with unflagging patience, so in the operations directly against the works of Mobile it added to the unsurpassed reputation of Iowa soldiery. It was behind none of its comrade regiments. Its losses in the campaign were twenty-two, one killed, seventeen wounded, one missing in action, and three captured.
The following reports are numerous accounts from different command levels of what the 29th would have gone through in the Mobile campaign. The following report was written by Canby, Major-General, Commanding, about operations agaist Mobile, Alabama:
"HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF WEST MISSISSIPPI, New Orleans, June 1, 1865.
SIR: I have the honor to submit for the consideration of the lieutenant-general commanding the army the following report of military operations in this division: Pending the advance of General Sherman from Atlanta and the invasion of Tennessee by Hood, the available force of the division was employed in cooperative movements to prevent the rebel force of Kirby Smith from crossing the Mississippi; in operations against a part of Hood's communications, and by demonstrations on the Gulf coast to prevent re-enforcements being sent to him from Alabama and Mississippi. This led to a dissemination of the disposable force at several points on the Gulf coast and along the course of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers as high up as Paducah, Ky. As soon as this pressure was removed by the decisive defeat of Hood by General Thomas these detachments were gathered up as rapidly as possible, and prepared for service in another direction. The service then contemplated was a movement from the Gulf coast in co-operation with one which General Sherman had advised, that Thomas had been directed to make, and the force available for this service was about 22,000 men of all arms.
On the 3rd of February I was advised from the Headquarters of the Army that my command would be materially re-enforced from the Army of the Cumberland; that my objective point would be Selma or Montgomery, including the capture of Mobile or not, as I might deem best. I was also advised by General Thomas that he would cooperate with a cavalry force. The force sent from the Army of the Cumberland consisted of the infantry divisions under the command of Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith and the cavalry division of Brigadier-General Knipe, and the whole force, considerably augmented by withdrawing from interior and garrison service as many troops as could safely be spared,was organized as follows:
Thirteenth Army Corps, Major-General Granger 18,500
Sixteenth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith 16,000
Colored Division Brigadier-General Hawkins 5,500
Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier-General Lucas 2,500
Engineer Brigade, Brigadier-General Bailey 1,500
Siege Train, Colonel Hays 1,200
Total effective 45,200
The cavalry force of the division, as well as that sent by General Thomas, was so much reduced by the hard work of the previous three months that only 2,500 were found to be fit for immediate service, and Major-General Grierson was left at New Orleans to repare, by substitutions and remounts, as large an additional force as possible. This amounted to 4,500 men, making the total force employed in the campaign a little less than 50,000. The unexampled severity of the season had rendered all the land routes absolutely impracticable and the transportation by water so tedious and dangerous that it was not until the middle of March that the force intended for the immediate operation against Mobile and its material was collected at or in immediate route to the designated points of rendezvous. It was then disposed as follows: The Union army at Mobile Point and Dauphin Island was composed of the:
Thirteenth Army Corps (two divisions and one brigade) 13,200
The Sixteenth Army Corps 16,000
Engineers, artillery, and cavalry scouts and escorts 3,000
Total 32,200
Under Steele at Pensacola:
Two brigades of C. C. Andrews division, Thirteenth Corps 5,200
Hawkins' division, colored infantry 5,500
Lucas' cavalry 2,500
Total 13,200
Arrangements had previously been made with the commanders of the Mississippi and Gulf Squadrons for efficient aid in transporting and conveying troops and supplies and covering the operations of the army by water, and especially with the commander of the Mississippi Squadron for an efficient co-operation in preventing the rebel force west of the Mississippi River from crossing in any organized or considerable force. Such precautions had also been taken for the security of the points which had been weakened by the withdrawal of troops as to relieve me from the apprehension of any serious disaster during the campaign. The general plan of operations embraced the reduction of the enemy's works on the east side of Mobile Bay, the opening of the Tensas and Alabama Rivers, turning the strong works erected for the defense of Mobile, and forcing the surrender or evacuation of the city; or if this was found to involve too great a delay, a direct movement upon Montgomery, shifting for the subsequent operations of the army the base of supplies from Mobile to Pensacola Bay, and using the railroad from Pensacola to Montgomery for that purpose. In carrying out the first part of this plan the main army, moving by land and water, was to establish itself on firm ground on the east side of Mobile Bay. Steele, with a sufficient force to meet any opposition that could be sent against him, was to move from Pensacola, threatening Montgomery and Selma, and covering the operations of the cavalry in disabling the railroads. This accomplished, he was to turn to the left and join the main force on Mobile Bay in season for the operations against Spanish Fort and Blakely. Minor operations for the purpose of distracting the enemy's attention were to be undertaken at the same time from Memphis, Vicksburg, Baton Rouge, and the west side of Mobile Bay, and it was expected that Wilson's raid would give full employment to Forrest's rebel cavalry.
On the 17th the general movement commenced. Bertram's brigade (Second Division, Thirteenth Army Corps), closely followed by the other divisions of that corps, under General Granger, moved by land, the route turning Bon Secours Bay, crossing the East Branch of Fish River as low down as practicable, and striking the North Branch at Dannelly's Mills. The -- Brigade of the Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, was landed at Cedar Point, on the west side of Mobile Bay, with instructions to occupy Mon Louis Island with as much display of force as possible. On the 18th as much of the Sixteenth Corps, under Smith, as could be provided with transportation was sent by water, through Bon Secours Bay and Fish River, to Dannelly's Mills, the point of concentration, to hold that point. In the movements by water the army transports were convoyed by the navy, and the lighter vessels of the squadron were used as transports. On the 18th the naval demonstrations were extended up the bay to the neighborhood of Spanish Fort. The favorable weather that attended the commencement of these movements was followed by a terrible storm of wind and rain that made the transportation by land and water so difficult and tedious that it was not until the evening of the 24th that the army was concentrated and its supplies renewed. On the morning of the 25th the Sixteenth Corps, followed by the Thirteenth Corps, except Bertram's brigade, moved by the direct road from Dannelly's Mills to Deer Park, a distance of eight miles, and halted for the night. Bertram's brigade moved at the same time by the Montrose road and halted at Rock Creek, on the left of the Sixteenth Corps.
On the 26th the Sixteenth Corps moved upon the same road to the South Branch of Bayou Minette, halting at Cyrus Sibley's Mills, and threatening both Spanish Fort and Blakely. Granger, with Veatch's and Benton's divisions, of the Thirteenth Corps, moved directly for Spanish Fort, crossing the two branches of D'Oive's Creek, and establishing himself on the southeast front of Spanish Fort, and communicating by pickets with the left of the Sixteenth Corps.' Bertram moved up the bay road and halted at the lower crossing of D'Olive's Creek. In these movements no serious opposition was encountered. The rebel force, under General Liddell, was posted to resist the advance, but, being disconcerted by the flanking movements of the
Sixteenth Corps, fell back into Blakely and Spanish Fort and destroyed the lower bridge on Bayou Minette, cutting off their own communication between the two places except by water. On the 27th Garrard's division (Sixteenth Corps) was established in an intrenched camp to cover the right and rear of the army. Smith, with the others, McArthur's and Carr's divisions of his corps was turned to the left to close in upon the enemy's intrenchments. Granger's corps was advanced, Veatch's and Benton's divisions moving directly forward, and Bertram's brigade swinging around to the left and completing the close investment of Spanish Fort by land. In this order Carr's division occupied the extreme right, his right flank resting on Bay Minette, below the bridge, succeeded in order by McArthur's division, of the Sixteenth Corps, Benton's and Veatch's divisions and Bertram's brigade, of the Thirteenth Cops--this last with its left flank resting on the impracticable marsh that bordered D'Olive's Creek. These movements were sharply contested by the rebels at every point, and the number of casualties was considerable, particularly in the Sixteenth Corps, the right of which was exposed to an enfilading fire from the rebel gun-boats and from Batteries Huger and Tracy. On moving from Dannelly's Mills, the temporary depot at that place was broken up, and the supplies and material, except the bridge over Fish River (left for the use of the cavalry that was to come up by land, and guarded by a gun-boat and an infantry battalion), and transferred to the supply vessels. The engineer trains and material were ordered up from Mobile Point, and the whole, under convoy of the navy, were awaiting the completion of the investment for the establishment of a new depot. This was established at Starke's Landing, five miles below Spanish Fort. Wharves were built, roads opened, and the supply of the army secured. As a part of the Sixteenth Corps (the part of its land transportation and the general supply trains) were yet to come up, the corps commanders were instructed to push their works forward as rapidly as was consistent with due care for their men, to take advantage of every opportunity that promised successful and decisive results, but not to attempt an assault without that assurance.
The details of the 28th and 29th are without special interest except the establishment of a battery of eight 30-pounder Parrotts and two Whitworth guns on the bluff of Bay Minette to counteract the effect of the enfilading fire from the rebel gun-boats and batteries. This was opened with effect on the morning of the 30th, driving off the gun-boats and so far reducing the fire of the batteries (Huger and Tracy) that it gave us no further serious annoyance. Steele, in accordance with his instructions, had moved from Pensacola Bay on the 19th with his infantry and the main body of his cavalry, having previously sent a part of this force by Blackwater Bay to Creigler's Mills and thence by land to strike the Mobile and Montgomery Railroad above the junction at Pollard. The same storms that had impeded the operations of the forces on Mobile Bay delayed the march of Steele's command, but on the 25th the cavalry under Lucas drove the enemy from his intrenchments at Cotton Creek, and later in the day encountered the force of General Clanton in line of battle at Bluff Springs. It was immediately charged, routed, and dispersed with a loss to the enemy of many killed and wounded, 120 prisoners (1 general and 18 other commissioned officers), and 1 flag. Our loss was 2 killed and 4 wounded. On the morning of the 25th General Andrews was sent to Pollard to cover Spurling's operations. That officer reached Pollard in the afternoon of the same day, having completely accomplished his mission. He cut the telegraph and railroad between Evergreen and Greenville before daylight on the morning of the 24th, capturing the up and down trains (2 locomotives and 14 cars loaded with stores) and 100 officers and men on their way to Mobile. At Sparta he destroyed six more cars and the depot, with a large amount of supplies. Between Sparta and Pollard twenty prisoners were captured in skirmishes, and he reached the latter with his captures without the loss of a man. The whole command was then turned in the direction of Mobile Bay, and after much labor, in consequence of the condition of the roads, Steele reached Weatherford on the 29th and reported his position and wants. He was instructed to move directly upon Holyoke, renew his supplies, and take up the investment of Blakely.
On the 30th Veatch's division (Thirteenth Corps) was Withdrawn from the line of investment (its place temporarily supplied by Marshall's brigade, of McArthur's division, Sixteenth Corps) and sent to Holyoke to convey supplies for Steele and hold that position until the junction was effected. Pressed by the condition of the roads and the want of subsistence, Steele marched on the afternoon of the 31st to Stockton, where partial supplies were obtained, and on the morning of the 1st of April continued his march, Spurling's cavalry being in advance. Before reaching the forks of the road leading to Holyoke the latter encountered a strong force of cavalry and infantry, which was immediately charged and driven, with a loss to the enemy of 1 flag and 75 prisoners. The remainder of the cavalry under Lucas and the colored division were moved up rapidly to the support of Spurling, and the enemy was forced to abandon his strong position at O. Sibley's, and was driven into his works at Blakely by the cavalry.
Early in the morning of the 2nd a strong attack was made on the positions we had gained on the previous evening, but was handsomely repulsed by the colored troops, and Andrews' division having now come up, our hold upon it was established. As Steele had already been instructed that his command was to be employed in the investment of Blakely, he considered it advisable to hold the ground that he had gained and report his position and prospects. He was directed to go on with the investment. Veatch was ordered in from Holyoke to report to him, and Garrard to support him if it should be necessary. On the 3d Garrard was ordered in to complete the investment on the left, and Lucas' and Johnson's cavalry brigades were charged with the duty of covering the rear of the army. On the 4th the lower bridge on Bayou Minette was re-established, opening a direct communication between the two wings, and by the afternoon of the 5th Spanish Fort and Blakely were both included in the same general line of investment. In the meantime the works against Spanish Fort had been diligently pushed forward, although sharply contested by the enemy at all points; the trenches and parallels widened and emplacements ordered on the 3d, prepared for the troops in preparation for an assault; siege guns and material were brought up from the rear, and batteries established in every effective position. On the 4th of April there were in position against Spanish Fort thirty-eight siege guns (including six 20-pounder rifles and sixteen mortars) and thirty-seven field guns, and against Batteries Huger and Tracy eight 30-pounder Parrott and two Whitworth guns. The fire was opened from all these at 5 and continued until 7 p.m. As the enfilading batteries were not yet ready, and the difficulties of the roads were such that the supply of ammunition could not be kept up, the fire of the batteries was reduced on the 5th, 6th, and 7th, but the other work was steadily carried on. I had anticipated that the investment of Spanish Fort by water would have been effected by the navy, but the shoal water and obstructions on Blakely Bar prevented this. Every exertion was therefore made to secure the control of Blakely River by the army and complete the isolation of the fort. For this purpose batteries for heavy guns were prepared on the east side of Bay Minette north of the bayou, and preparations made for a boat expedition to cut the tread way between Spanish Fort and Fort Tracy, the final bombardment and assault to be preceded by the destruction of the tread way to cut off the escape of the garrison. The assistance required from the navy was promptly tendered by the admiral, but the launches were at Ship Island and Pensacola, and, although sent for, could not be got up in season. Disappointed in this expectation and at the suggestion of A. J. Smith, and on account of the progress made on his right, the time for the bombardment was anticipated and ordered for 5.30 p.m. of the 8th. At this time there were in position against Spanish Fort fifty-three siege guns (including ten 20-pounder rifles and sixteen mortars) and thirty-seven field pieces. Of these, ten siege rifles and five siege howitzers on our left center enfiladed the enemy's left and center, and five siege howitzers close in on our extreme right enfiladed his center. The Bay Minette battery against Huger and Tracy consisted of two 100-pounder and four 30-pounder rifles. One of the batteries, No.--, against Spanish Fort was armed with navy guns and manned by officers and sailors of the squadron, volunteers for this service. The fire of these guns was opened at the appointed time and continued until dark, the troops being in the trenches and prepared to improve any advantage that might be gained. Under cover of the bombardment two companies of the Eighth Iowa, supported by the remainder of the regiment and closely followed by the other regiments of Geddes' brigade, of Carr's division, effected a lodgment on the left of the enemy's line and gained a position from which about 200 yards of his intrenchments could be enfiladed with a musketry fire. This was soon taken, and with it about 200 prisoners, and the captured guns turned upon the enemy.
Night had now fully set in, but Smith was instructed to put his whole force to the work and press it on to completion. A brigade from Veatch's division, then in reserve near Blakely, was ordered by telegraph to report to him, and Granger was advised by telegraph of Smith's progress and instructed to direct the fire and operations on his part so as not to come in conflict with the force at work within the enemy's lines. This work, led by Colonel Geddes and superintended by Generals Carr and Smith, was pushed on diligently and persistently, and soon after midnight all of the works were in our possession. The brigade from Veatch's division was not needed and was sent back by Smith. The immediate fruits of this success were the capture of these strong forts, two miles of intrenchments with all the armament, material, and supplies, 4 flags, and more than 600 prisoners. The major part of the garrison escaped by the tread way to Fort Tracy, and thence to Blakely and Mobile. In this they were materially aided by the darkness and our imperfect knowledge of the interior of their works. In these last operations the force engaged consisted of one brigade (Bertram's) and one division (Benton's) of the Thirteenth Corps, two divisions (McArthur's and Carr's)of the Sixteeth Corps, with their field batteries; the First Indiana Heavy Artillery, except one company; two companies of the Sixth Michigan Heavy Artillery, and one battery from the navy. From the 6th to the morning of the 9th operations had been steadily carried on against Blakely, meeting with a stubborn resistance from all points of the rebel lines, and particularly on our extreme right,, which suffered severely from an enfilading fire from the rebel/gun-boat's stationed in the mouth of Raft River. With some difficulty in getting up the guns a battery of four 30-pounder rifles was established in a commanding position by the afternoon of the 8th, and in a few minutes after opening its fire drove off the gun-boats severely damaged. Early on the morning of the 9th, and soon after the fall of Spanish Fort was assured, Smith was ordered to move the First and Third Divisions of his corps to the left of the line at Blakely, Garrard's front, and take measures for the assault of that place. Granger was at the same time instructed to leave Bertram's brigade in charge of the captured works and the prisoners and send Benton's division to Steele's front to take part in any operations that might be undertaken. The battery on Bay Minette, No.--, was re- enforced by four 30-pounder Parrotts, and opened fire on Blakely Landing and the Tensas River (the water communication between Mobile and Blakely). The fire of the battery, No. --, on our extreme right, was also turned on Blakely Landing, and Mack's battery, six 20-pounder rifles, was put in position on the Pensacola road and opened an effective fire on the rebel batteries. Orders had also been given to transfer to the Blakely lines as rapidly as possible the siege guns (twenty-eight) and mortars (sixteen) that would be required if the place resisted an assault. In anticipation an additional bridge had been laid down on Bayou Minette, but the impracticable character of the swamp on both sides of the bayou made the approaches to it so difficult that it proved to be of but little service. In consequence, the divisions of the Thirteenth and Sixteenth Corps did not reach their positions as early as I had anticipated. While waiting their arrival I passed to the right of the line and found that the prospects of a successful assault were promising. The colored division had already gained and held some important advantages on its front; Andrews' and Veatch's divisions were well up with their work, and the resistance of the enemy was less spirited than on previous days. Soon after 4 o'clock Smith had completed his arrangements and telegraphed to me that his two divisions were up and in position. Garrard had notified Steele that he would be ready to advance at 5.30 p.m., and Benton's division was reported to be crossing the bridge near the left of Steele's front. Steele was then instructed to time his movements with those on the left, to advance his line strongly supported, and if possible carry the enemy's works. A little later Benton, who had not yet reached his position, was instructed to turn at once to the left and follow up and support these movements. The line at this time was nearly four miles in length, and the disposition of the troops was as follows: Hawkins' division of colored troops on the right; Andrews' division Thirteenth Corps (two brigades), on the right center; Veatch's division, Thirteenth Corps, on the left center, and Garrard's division, Sixteenth Corps, on the left; one division of the Thirteenth and two of the Sixteenth Corps in support on the right and left. The enemy's line had a development of two miles and a half. It consisted of nine strong redoubts connected by rifle.pits and palisades, and was covered in front by slashings and abatis, and in some places by outworks of telegraph wire and by torpedoes or subterra shells. The advance was made at the appointed time, and was as nearly simultaneous as it could possibly be from the length of the line and the obstructed character of the ground. With a gallantry to which there were no exceptions the troops pressed forward under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, passing over exploding torpedoes, net-works, and abatis, and assaulted and carried the enemy's works in about twenty minutes, each division carrying the works in its front. The immediate results of this victory were -- flags, all the armament, material, and supplies, and 3,700 prisoners, of whom 3 were generals and 197 commissioned officers of lower grades. The development of our lines at Blakely was four miles; at Spanish Fort three miles and a half; the intervening distance three miles, and from the depot at Starke's Landing to the left at Spanish Fort, four miles. The inner line of communication was about seventeen and the outer line twenty-two miles in length. The country embraced in these lines was broken and rolling, intersected by streams and ravines with abrupt banks, and obstructed by large tracts of impracticable marsh. During the siege operations more than 2,500 yards of parallel and 1,500 of sap were opened, twenty-six batteries for heavy guns were constructed, traverses and shot-proof shelters provided for the troops, wharves and bridges were built, roads opened, and the supplies, guns, and siege material transported from four to twenty miles. In these labors the troops were so constantly employed night and day that the regular reliefs could not always be observed, and in more than one instance the officers and non-commissioned officers kept watch while the guards of the trenches slept. The zeal and alacrity, readiness of expedient and device with which all difficulties were encountered and overcome, and the cheerful spirit with which they were borne are not less worthy of commendation than the gallantry uniformly exhibited in combat. In this credit the troops whose duties did not bring them into actual collision with the enemy are equally entitled to share. Batteries Huger and Tracy still held out, and until they were reduced Blakely River could not be opened for the navy and for the army transports. In anticipation of this contingency Spurling's cavalry had already been sent up the river to collect boats to pass troops over to the island to cut off communication between the forts and Mobile. Lucas with his cavalry had also been sent to Claiborne with a battery of rifled guns to block the navigation of the Alabama River and cut off the retreat from Mobile by that route. On his march to Claiborne he struck and dispersed the Fifteenth Confederate Cavalry, capturing 2 flags, 2 officers, and 72 enlisted men.
On the 10th additional batteries for heavy guns bearing on Huger and Tracy were established on the east shore of Bay Minette, and a beat expedition for a night attack on Tracy was organized, but at 10 o'clock of that night both works were abandoned by their garrisons and their magazines blown up. Before daylight of the 11th the preconcerted signal indicating the commencement of the evacuation of Mobile was given from the marsh in front of that city. Arrangements were at once made to bring up to Blakely the supplies for the force to be sent to Montgomery and for the occupation of Mobile. On the afternoon and night of the 11th Granger, with the First and Third Divisions of the corps, marched to Starke's Landing, where he embarked, and on the morning of the 12th, under convoy of the navy, crossed to the west side of the bay, landed at Catfish Point, five miles below Mobile, and occupied the city at noon of that day. The losses sustained during the campaign were:
K Killed.
W Wounded.
C Captured or missing.
---------------------------Officers.----------- ---Enlisted Men.---------
___________________K___W____C_____K____W____C
Thirteenth Corps.........0...........26........1.........68........474......26
Sixteenth Corps..........3...........26.........0........65........436........7
Steeles command........6...........15.........0........25........270........0
Cavary Brigade...........1............5..........0.........8..........24.........2
1st Ind. Artillery..........0............1..........0.........1..........18.........0
Total...........................10..........73.........1.......167......1,222.....35
Grand total 1,508"
The following report was written by Gordon G. Ranger, Major-General, Commanding, about operations agaist Mobile, Alabama:
"HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Mobile, Ala., April 24, 1865.
COLONEL: I have the honor to forward the following report of operations during the interval from the 17th of March last to the 12th of the present month, inclusive:
Under orders from headquarters Army and Division of West Mississippi to move my command to Dannelly's Mills, on Fish River, the camps of the First Division, on Dauphin Island, and of the Third Division and First Brigade of the Second, on Mobile Point, were broken up March 17, the Third Division, Brigadier- General Benton commanding, and First Brigade of the Second, Colonel Bertram, marching on that day from Navy Cove, the First Division, Brigadier-General Veatch, crossing on the same day in transports from Fort Gaines, and marching from Navy Cove on the next. The command moved by the Fort Morgan and Blakely telegraph road, with ten days' subsistence, five days' forage, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man, four days' subsistence and fifty rounds of ammunition on the persons of the men, and with a train of 321 regimental, battery, and general supply wagons. Foust's battery of four guns, Company F, First Missouri Light Artillery, by special assignment, moved with Colonel Bertram's brigade, making, with the batteries of First and Third Divisions, five batteries in all with the column. The march was exceedingly difficult, the roads from Portage Creek to within a mile or two of the East Fork of Fish River being of the worst possible description—the heavy rains of the 20th and 21st converting the country into a boggy swamp, over which it was not possible to move wagons and artillery but by the most persevering efforts of all officers and men combined. Too much credit cannot be given these for their labors. Dannelly's Mills was reached by the brigade of Colonel Bertram, in advance, on the 22nd, General Benton's division arriving and going into camp the 23rd, and General
Veatch's division on the 24th, with all wagon trains and artillery in park, the command, except one brigade, crossing the river and camping upon its north side, the right resting upon it and in rear of the Sixteenth Army Corps. As the supply train of General Veatch's division was approaching Dannelly's Mills on the 24th the advance wagons were struck by a small party of guerrillas, the rear guard (a brigade) being at the time working the main body of the train over a bad piece of road. No wagons or stores were destroyed or injured. Eight teamsters and 14 animals, however, were captured. On the 25th the First and Third Divisions marched to Deer Park, distant eight miles, the Sixteenth Army Corps marching in advance, Bertram's brigade moving on the left by the bay road to Rock Creek. On the 26th these two divisions moved as a separate column toward Spanish Fort, bridging and crossing the two forks of D'Olive's Creek, and striking the skirmish line of the enemy thrown out from the fort about noon. Somewhat later in the day junction was made on the left with Bertram's brigade, which had moved up from Rock Creek by the bay road. On the road connecting with this brigade torpedoes had been planted by the enemy, from the explosion of which some slight casualties occurred. With trifling loss the skirmish line was placed within one mile of the enemy's works. Early on the 27th the Sixteenth Army Corps moved in on the right by the road leading from Origen Sibley's, and a general advance was ordered. My front was the division of Brigadier-General Veatch in center, General Benton's division on the right, connecting with the command of Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith, and Colonel Bertram's brigade on the left, swinging around to rest on the Blakely River, with a double line of battle formation and a strong advanced skirmish line. In advancing the main line was halted in the edge of the woods, up to which and for 1,000 yards in his front the enemy had felled all standing timber, and the skirmish line thrown forward under cover of the fallen trees until 500 yards from the works. Fort Alexis was the work of the enemy in my left front, the middle bastion being opposite my center, and the Red Fort on my right, from which and from the rifle-pits were kept up against my lines a well-directed fire of musketry and artillery, with a loss to my command of seventy-seven killed and wounded that day. During the night and next day batteries were thrown up and lines of approaches established, the enemy opening some small mortars and sustaining his musketry and artillery fire. On the 30th Brigadier-General Veatch's division was withdrawn and ordered with supplies to Major-General Steele, its place in the line being supplied by Colonel Marshall's brigade, of McArthur's division, Sixteenth Army Corps, which being afterward returned to its command, the gap in the line was filled by extending General Benton's left. In this front and on Colonel Bertram's left mortar batteries were established, two 8-inch mortars in each battery, and in the work thrown up by Seventh Massachusetts Battery, on my right center, were placed four 8- inch howitzers. These mortars and howitzers were part of siege train belonging to First Indiana Heavy Artillery, and from the positions taken were served with effect. The howitzers were, however, withdrawn, the parapet of battery being too thin to withstand the heavy fire they provoked. On the 2nd Mack's battery (Eighteenth New York Artillery), of six 20-pounder Parrotts, was assigned position in advance of the line of batteries on my left center 700 yards from the enemy's works. Foust's battery ( F, First Missouri Light Artillery), which had done excellent service on Colonel Bertram's right, was withdrawn, being out of ammunition, and four guns from the Seventh Massachusetts Battery put in its place. Batteries for four 10-inch mortars, in charge of detachments of Sixth Michigan Heavy Artillery, and for the four 8-inch howitzers, were placed in the left and center of Colonel Bertram's front on the line of rifle-pits for the reserve of the skirmish line, and for two 30-pounder Parrotts, in the line of batteries on my right center, to the left of the battery first occupied by the Seventh Massachusetts Light Artillery. Four guns of the Fourth Massachusetts Artillery replaced in the Seventh Massachusetts Battery the guns which had been put into Foust's battery, the balance of the Fourth Massachusetts being withdrawn to camp. On the 4th all these batteries, with the 8-inch mortars and light guns of
Benton's division, Twenty-first and Twenty-sixth New York Artillery, opened fire, continuing a bombardment, under the orders of the major-general commanding, from 5 o'clock to 7 p.m., at the rate of three minutes' interval for each gun, and during the night at thirty minutes' interval, the enemy not replying except from his water battery. On the 5th, in honor of national victories, 100 shotted guns were fired along the line. On the 6th the two 8-inch mortars in the front, originally occupied by Veatch, were withdrawn and placed on the right of the line, to the left of the light batteries of Benton's division, and on the next day five 8-inch howitzers, manned by the artillerists of Foust's battery, with two 30-pounder Parrotts of First Indiana HeavyArtillery, were put in position in a ten-gun battery 200 yards in advance of the line of batteries on my right. The two 8-inch mortars on Bertram's line were removed to a position in advance of the light batteries off my right center, and placed in battery 500 yards from the enemy's works. On the 8th, by order of the major-general commanding, all batteries and light batteries on my line opened fire at 5.30 p.m., continuing it for one our, under cover of which the left of the enemy's line was carried by the troops of Major-General Smith by assault. During the night the enemy evacuated his position, withdrawing by his left and escaping across the marsh to transports in the vicinity of Batteries Tracy and Huger, abandoning all his artillery, ordnance stores, and supplies. In these operations 6,450 yards in length of parallel and 4,050 yards of sap were constructed by the troops of my command, my approaches at the time of the evacuation being at an average distance along the entire line of 250 yards from the forts in my front. Colonel Bertram's brigade was placed in charge of the captured works. On the 9th General Benton's division moved to Blakely, where upon the same day the lines of the enemy were carried handsomely by assault, Major-General Steele commanding the forces. Two brigades of the Second Division, Brig. Gen. C. C. Andrews, and the Second Brigade, of Veatch's Division, made part of the assaulting column. Of the splendid behavior of the troops I was a witness.
On the 10th my command was held in readiness to march, with five days' rations, and on the 11th at sunset the First and Third Divisions were ordered to Starke's Landing, on the east shore of Mobile Bay, thence to embark on transports and land below the city of Mobile, on the west shore. This landing was effected without opposition at 10.30a.m. on the 12th, Starke's Landing having been reached at 2 o'clock that morning, and the troops embarked on transports before daylight. The command landed at Catfish Point, five miles below Mobile, toward which they at once marched. At noon of that day the city was surrendered by the mayor to the land and naval forces of the United States, having been evacuated by the military forces of the enemy the night previous. Copies of the correspondence relating to the surrender are inclosed. My headquarters were the same day established in Mobile and measures taken, under the efficient management of Brig. Gen. George L. Andrews, provost- marshal-general of the army, to restore quiet and order to the city. On the 13th General Benton's division was moved to Whistler, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and General Veatch's division assigned to the outer works and as garrison to the city.
The occupation of Mobile concludes the operations which I have the honor to report. By the capture of this city 150 cannon, many stand of small-arms, an abundance of quartermaster's, commissary, and ordnance stores, with over 20,000 bales of cotton and 25,000 barrels of resin and turpentine and several steam vessels and sailing craft, fell into our hands. The specific reports of captures, including prisoners, herewith forwarded are respectfully referred to. During the operations the casualties in my command, not including Second and Third Brigades of Second
Division, were 43 killed and 282 wounded. I have the honor to forward the official reports of Brigadier-General Veatch, of First Division; Brigadier-General Benton, of Third Division, and Colonel Bertram, of First Brigade, of Second Division, respectfully referring to such reports for cases of special mention claiming the attention of the commanding general. I have the honor to forward also the official report of the Second and Third Brigades of the Second Division, which troops were detached from my command and marched from Pensacola with the forces of Major- General Steele. To him, there fore, I must leave the recognition of their services. Their gallantry and that of Brig. Gen. C. C. Andrews, commanding, was conspicuous in the assault at Blakely. The official reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Palfrey, chief engineer, and Captain Williamson, ordnance officer, are also forwarded and respectfully referred to. The service is indebted to Brig. Gen. James C. Veatch, Brig. Gen. William P. Benton, and Col. Henry Bertram for whatever may be worthy of commendation in the conduct of their troops in the march and on the field. Deserving as these officers are, no higher praise than this could, in my judgment, be awarded them. To the officers and men, to name whom would be to name my entire command, the greatest acknowledgments are due. Continually on the march, in the trenches or upon fatigue, from the time of leaving Navy Cove to the taking of Mobile, they have deserved by their services every honor and reward that is to be attached to duty well and faithfully done. To the members of my staff--Lieutenant-Colonel Palfrey, assistant inspector-general and engineer; Lieutenant-Colonel Shipley, chief quartermaster; Major Emery, assistant adjutant-general; Surgeon White, medical director; Captain Fox, chief of artillery; Captain Williamson, ordnance officer; Captain Cobb, chief commissary, and Major Avery and Captain Sargent, my aides-de- camp--I am under great obligations. Their services, which unless mentioned in this place will remain without acknowledgment, deserve thus much at my hands."
The following report was written by W. P. BENTON, Brigadier-General, Commanding, about operations agaist Mobile, Alabama:
"HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Mobile, Ala., April 12, 1865.
MAJOR: Pursuant to the direction of the major-general commanding Thirteenth Army Corps, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the forces under my command since leaving Fort Morgan, Ala., to the date hereof: On the 17th of March my command, consisting of the Third Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, to which was temporarily attached the First Brigade, Second Division (same corps), commanded by Col. Henry Bertram, marched at daylight from Fort Morgan and Navy Cove, and led the advance of the Thirteenth Army Corps to the North Fork of Fish River, a distance of forty miles. Our route was up the peninsular to Bayou Portage, thence northerly to Dannelly's Mills, on the river above named. Until we reached Bayou Portage the command encountered no obstacles to its progress, but here it entered upon a treacherous crust, beneath which no bottom was discoverable. Here began a toilsome march, in which the command was compelled to corduroy the road the greater part of the way. Animals found no firm footing but the corduroy, and wagons and artillery elsewhere moved not over the roads, but through them, if they moved at all which was often only when the animals were taken off and men substituted. In the midst of this, an incessant and deluging rain, commencing when the command was duly mired and lasting eighteen hours, would have made the roads impassable but for the indomitable perseverance of all, officers and men, and their unconquerable determination to open the way for those coming after them. Admitting no impossibilities, the command continued slowly to move forward, some corduroying in advance, others relieving the animals and bringing up the wagons and artillery, and all cheerfully doing what was allotted to facilitate our progress or render our advance possible. Such united effort, such herculean tasks so effectually performed, and such cheerful endurance of incessant toil, fatigue, and exposure has rarely been equaled and never excelled. Nor was the work suspended by darkness. On either side of the road is a pitch-pine forest, or turpentine orchard, which had been duly tapped, and the trees being lighted furnished long lines of illumination, by the light of which the work was continued during the night by a portion of the command. Having extended the command several miles along the road, corduroying and bridging, Colonel Bertram's brigade, being in advance, at length reached the East Fork of Fish River. I ordered him to push on to Dannelly's Mills with his brigade, and there communicate with Major-General Canby, which he did; and I closely followed, with the Third Division, arriving at the latter place on the 23rd of March. Two brigades crossed the river and encamped in line of battle on the right of the Sixteenth Army Corps. My First Brigade encamped on the south side of the river. At this point Colonel Bertram, pursuant to orders from the corps commander, ceased to report to me. March 25, at 3 p.m., my division moved with the army toward Spanish Fort, and encamped the evening of the 26th near the enemy's works, in line of battle, and threw up temporary defenses. On the morning of the 27th, pursuant to orders from the corps commander, I moved my division forward in column of brigades, right in front, the brigades being in column of regiments. I held the right of the Thirteenth Army Corps, connecting with Brigadier-General Veatch, First Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, on my left, and with the Sixteenth Army Corps on my right. Arriving near the enemy's works I found Brigadier-General Slack's brigade, of the First Division, fortifying their line in a portion of my front. I moved my division forward through Brigadier-General Slack's brigade, and passing his works, deployed my division in plain view and within half a mile of the enemy's works. Colonel Grier, commanding First Brigade, by my direction deployed a regiment as skirmishers, who found the enemy's skirmishers immediately in my front, and promptly drove them to the cover of their rifle-pits, near their works. My batteries were advanced to commanding positions upon spurs extending toward the enemy, and were, I believe, the first to open fire upon him. By my orders they kept up a steady and well-directed fire during the day, and at 2 p.m. were advanced to the positions they afterward held during the entire siege. My division was also advanced to within a few hundred yards of the works to the position held by its main line until the evacuation, and nearer, I believe, than any other troops approached that day, and with comparatively very few casualties. My line as finally established was by inversion of brigades. My division promptly covered its front by works of considerable strength, my skirmish line was advanced during the night, and my batteries strengthened.
The history of the operations of my command from this time until the evacuation of the enemy shows a sleepless vigilance, a routine of incessant toil in the trenches night and day, a gradual and sure approach to the enemy's works by means of the pick and spade, the digging of saps and parallels, the construction of batteries, making of gabions and fascines, bringing up and mounting of siege guns, and all the labor incident to the operations of a siege. The First Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, on my left, having been ordered to Blakely, that portion of the line was temporary occupied by a brigade from the Sixteenth Army Corps, but on the 5th of April that brigade was also relieved from that part of the line, and by direction of the corps commander my line was extended so as to cover the former front of both the First and my own division. This was done by transferring my Third Brigade to my left. In addition to this two regiments were detached for engineer duty, one regiment was placed on duty at the rear by order of the corps commander, and another reported to Brigadier-General Bailey, at Starke's Landing, and remained detached until the evacuation. This extension of my line and consequent increase of the engineer operations and guard duty of my division, together with the aforesaid reduction in the numbers for that duty, rendered the duty of the officers and men incessant night and day. The saps and parallels in my front were, however, vigorously pressed forward. The pick and the spade always accompanied the picket, and the skirmish line was nightly contracted by its nearer approach to the enemy's works, until at the time of the evacuation but a few steps intervened between his rifle-pits and those of my pickets. The most difficult ground for engineer operations on any part of the enemy's line was in front of my division, and my working parties were less protected from the enemy's fire. Yet, notwithstanding all the obstacles to overcome, and the want of sufficient tools at the commencement, my works were as far advanced and as near completion, I believe, as upon any part of our line. In addition to the ordinary engineer operations of my division and the protection of my own batteries, a four-gun battery for the Seventh Massachusetts Battery, a two-gun battery for a 30-pounder Parrotts, and a ten-gun battery of 30-pounder Parrotts, siege howitzers, and mortars were constructed by the labor of my division. Late in the afternoon of the 31st of March the enemy, covered by the smoke of the burning brush in front of our lines, made a sortie and succeeded in capturing 1 officer and 22 enlisted men of the Seventh Regiment Vermont VeteranVolunteers, and occupied for a short time one of my advanced rifle- pits, but soon after dark the line was retaken at the point of the bayonet, and afterward held by our men. The night of the 8th of April, anticipating some good results from the severe bombardment of the enemy's works for two hours before dark, I ordered the number of my skirmishers doubled, and about 12 midnight Colonel Day, commanding Second Brigade, sent information that the works were being evacuated.
I immediately sent Lieutenant Starck, of my staff, to notify the corps commander, and myself repaired to the front, where information met me that Captain Shepherd, Company F, Ninety-first Illinois Volunteers, had entered Fort Alexis with a portion of his skirmishers, which information was also sent to the corps commander. Pursuant to orders I established my headquarters in Fort Alexis until morning and placed guards over the guns and magazines. Colonel Day fixes the time at which Captain Shepherd entered Fort Aexis at 11:45 p.m. of the 8th instant. Major Boydston, Thirty-third Iowa Volunteers, in charge of my skirmish line in front of Spanish Fort, at about the same time entered it and placed a guard over the magazines and reported his occupation to the commander of the Third Brigade, who reports that half an hour after he had possession of the fort he allowed his tired guards to be relieved by guards from the command of Colonel Bertram. Having received orders on the morning of the 9th to withdraw my artillery and move to Blakely, it was promptly done, and the command marched via O. Sibley's Mills, a distance of eight miles, to Blakely, where, while forming in support of the right of Major-General Steele's lines, the successful assault of his troops relieved my command of all their anticipated operations thereat. After a rest of two days, at dusk of the 11th instant my division was, pursuant to orders, on the road, and at midnight arrived at Starke's Landing. Colonel Grier's brigade had moved to Spanish Fort in the afternoon and here rejoined the division. As rapidly as possible the division embarked on transports and landed about 10 o'clock next morning at Magnolia Race-Course, west side of Mobile Bay, five miles from Mobile, and together with Brigadier-General Veatch's division marched to the outer works of Mobile and there encamped. Having thus, within less than a month after taking at Fort Morgan the advance of the army operating against Mobile, participated in all the labor and all the glorious successes of that army, which have resulted in the peaceful occupation of its objective point, a city which fell not until Richmond itself had fallen, and the great armies of Lee and Johnston surrendered, we quietly encamped within its defenses. The reports of my brigade commanders are herewith respectfully forwarded. The casualties which have occurred in my division during the time covered by this report are as follows:
Killed........ 16
Wounded..116
Captured...27
Missing.....1
Total.........160
When all did so well it almost seems invidious to particularize, still I cannot close this report without recommending the promotion of Bvt. Brig. Gen. D. P. Grief, Col. H. M. Day, Ninety-first Illinois Volunteers, and Col. Conrad Krez, Twenty-seventh Wisconsin Volunteers, commanding First, Second, and Third Brigades, respectively. To my entire staff I am gratefully indebted for prompt and valuable assistance. They all did well. Lieut. Col. Robert F. Patterson, Twenty-ninth Iowa Volunteers, inspector-general and chief of staff, won the admiration of the entire command by his sleepless vigilance and soldierly bearing. I respectfully recommend his promotion to the rank of brigadier-general. He has fully earned it, and it is an appointment fit to be made. Lieut. Col. C. A. Smith, Thirty-fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, provost-marshal; Surg. Benjamin Durham, chief medical officer; Capt. John I). Rouse, Seventy-seventh Illinois Volunteers, acting assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. W. H. York, Twentieth Wisconsin, acting assistant quartermaster; Capt. D. K. Hall, commissary of subsistence; Lieut. J. M. Shields, acting ordnance officer, and Lieut. F.E. Starck, Twentieth Iowa Volunteers, and Lieut. John A. Prindle, Seventh Vermont Veteran Volunteers, aides-de-camp, have my thanks; and I respectfully recommend Capt. John D. Rouse, acting assistant adjutant-general, and Capt. Armpit Cannon, Ninety- seventh U.S. Colored Infantry, acting engineer, for promotion, for rare efficiency and gallant bearing under fire."
The following report was written by H. M. DAY, Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade about operations agaist Mobile, Alabama:
"HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., THIRD DIV., 13TH ARMY CORPS, Near Blakely, Ala., April 10, 1865.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this brigade since leaving Navy Cove, Ala.:
In compliance with orders from division headquarters the brigade left Navy Cove on the morning of the 17th of March, 1865, and, after a march rendered slow and toilsome by the bad condition of the roads, went into camp on the 23rd on the right bank of the North Branch of Fish River, where it remained until the First Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, and the supply train came up. The brigade broke camp and moved forward again on the 25th, and, having marched a distance of about fifteen miles, went into camp about a mile and a half from Spanish Fort, Ala., on the evening of the 26th. On the morning of the 27th, the order of battle being formed, the brigade in column of battalions occupied the center of division. The formation of the brigade was as follows: In advance the Ninety-first Illinois, followed by the Twenty-ninth Iowa, after which the Fiftieth Indiana Volunteers, and in the rear the Seventh Vermont Veteran Volunteers. The brigade moved forward to within about 600 yards of Fort Alexis, where in easy range of the rebel batteries it maintained its position during the whole day under a heavy fire. The skirmish line advanced to within 350 yards of the rebel works. In the course of the afternoon a detail from the brigade constructed a temporary breast-work in front of the Twenty-first New York Battery, which occupied a position on the right. Immediately after dark the Fiftieth Indiana and the Seventh Vermont having been moved to the rear about 200 yards, the Ninety- first Illinois and Twenty-ninth Iowa began to dig trenches and construct breast-works a little in advance of the ground occupied during the day, and before morning formed a sufficient protection from the enemy's sharpshooters, who had greatly annoyed us. Early in the morning of the 28th they were relieved by the Seventh and Twenty-ninth, who strengthened the works during the day. On the night of the 28th our skirmishers advanced to within 250 yards of the rebel works and dug rifle-pits. From this time until the 30th of March the trenches were occupied alternately by the regiments of the brigade, and the skirmish line was advanced to within 100 yards of the fort. On the 30th the Twenty-ninth Iowa was temporarily detached and placed on picket duty, and on the 1st of April the Seventh Vermont was also detached and placed on engineer duty, thus leaving only two regiments under my immediate command.
On the afternoon of the 1st of April the enemy made a charge on our rifle-pits occupied by the skirmishers and succeeded in capturing Capt. R. B. Stearns, Company K, Seventh Vermont, and 21 of his men. The enemy lost a number in killed and wounded. At night the rifle.pits lost during the day were retaken and held by our men. The time between this and the 8th of April was chiefly spent in strengthening works already begun, and building others not immediately connected with the brigade. On the evening of the 8th, in obedience to orders from division headquarters, the advance and reserve skirmishers were doubled, and at about 11.45 o'clock Captain Shepherd, Company F, Ninety-first Illinois, hearing a shouting toward the right, and our guns cease firing, pushed forward over the rebel works with a portion of the skirmishers from the Ninety-first Illinois and Fiftieth Indiana and found that the enemy had evacuated. The works in front of our lines were shortly after occupied by the Ninety-first Illinois Volunteers. The works contained two 64-pounder columbiads, two 12-pounder and one 10-pounder rifled guns, which, in obedience to orders, were turned over on the morning of the 9th to a detachment of the First Brigade, Second Division, Thirteenth Army Corps. At about 1 o'clock on the 9th, the Twenty-ninth Iowa and Seventh Vermont having rejoined the command, the brigade left Spanish Fort, and, arriving at its present camp in the evening, formed on the right of General Hawkins' division, but a successful assault made by the troops of Major-General Steele's command rendered it unnecessary to go into action. I take pleasure in testifying to the prompt and cheerful manner in which both officers and men of my command discharged their duties, and am proud to say that I have no instance of misbehavior on the part of either to record."
April 12th, the regiment entered Mobile, and the next day left the city with the division under orders to proceed to Mount Vernon Arsenal, forty miles above Mobile on the Tombigbee River. A few miles from Mobile, the command encountered a body of rebels with whom a running fight took place, the last in which the regiment engaged, and one of the last combats of the war, a hard skirmish at Wistler or Eight-Mile Creek Bridge, Alabama. Colonel Benton took command of the Arsenal on the 22nd, his regiment forming the garrison. The public property had been scattered over the country. He restored much of it, and by great pains and labor again made Mount Vernon Arsenal a thing of beauty. The regiment remained there till the 12th of May, when it returned to Mobile.
Thence, the 1st of June, part of the regiment sailed for Texas, and arrived at Brazos Santiago the 9th, where the rest of the regiment soon joined it. Major-General Sheridan having assumed command of the Military Division, decided that the regiment was entitled to be mustered out under the order of the War Department discharging those troops who had entered the service before October 1, 1862. Though the regiment had not formally entered the service till two months after that time, it was the fault of the government in not sending out a mustering. officer. So Sheridan sensibly and justly decided. Accordingly the command sailed to New Orleans in the latter part of July, and was there honorably discharged the service the 10th of the following month, and ordered to Davenport, Iowa, for final payment and disbandment.
The command reached Davenport the 19th, and then numbered seven hundred and sixty-five, officers and enlisted men, but of these only four hundred and fifteen were originally attached to the Twenty-ninth. The others were recruits of the Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third regiments, who had been assigned to Colonel Benton's command when those regiments came home. In due time, the Twenty-ninth was resolved into its original elements. The returned soldiers, now citizens, sought their homes in the far west, and were everywhere along the journey and at their own hearth-stones met with heartiest welcome.
The Twenty-ninth regiment was unfortunate in being so long kept in the Department of Arkansas, where the military operations were not on the grand scale exhibited on other parts of the theater of war. But it was one of the best disciplined and bravest regiments. It was first trained by Captain S. D. Nichols, of the Fourth Iowa, afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel, long commanding that regiment, and one of the most accomplished of the Union's, Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson was not surpassed, perhaps, as a skillful commander by any other field officers. He drilled and disciplined the regiment almost to the degree of perfection. Colonel Benton, already spoken of as not among the dashing soldiers, had a fine influence over his troops. He was brave, just-minded, intelligent. The staff and line officers labored zealously to become accomplished in the profession of arms, and succeeded as the regiment's histoy shows. And hence the regiment, at Helena, at Terre Noir, at Jenkins' Ferry, at Mobile-on, and on every occasion when it was called upon to meet the enemy in battle or skirmich, the 29th Iowa Infantry responded with an alacrity, a degree of soldierly skill, and of courage, which would have caused credit to be given to any command of any army the world ever saw.