perversion n  1 : the action of perverting : the condition of being perverted  2: a perverted form; esp : an aberrant sexual practice esp. when habitual and preferred to normal coitus  

aberrant n  1 : an aberrant natural group, individual, or structure  2 : a person whose behaviour departs substantially from the standard  

[Definitions taken from Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1981; most other definitions/dictionaries vary only in the exact wording but the meaning is relatively the same]  

          Intellectuals, philosophers, religious leaders and lawmakers have long debated the exact definition or parameters to evaluate sexual practices for 'perversions.' Even within these groups, much debate has occurred on how to define it. Many conservative religious groups (i.e., Catholic church and Evangelism) see sexual perversion as a cause and as a symptom of the decay of society's moral standards.  

          Often, conservative groups regard any sexual activity outside procreation as immoral and therefore a perversion. Many conservative Christian religions view the only moral and nonperverse sexual acts to be heterosexual genital intercourse between a married couple, in the bedroom and only for reproduction. Some groups even limit the positions allowable or nonperverse for such activity. In fact, Catholics' view contraception a sexual perversion (i.e., sex becomes a nonreproductive activity and therefore a perversion and immoral).   

          The argument against sexual practices for nonprocreative purposes (or the physiological argument) can be refuted easily. Some human conditions such as sterility, miscarriage, etc. will render sexual activities between couples incapable of procreation. Should sexual activity in such instances be considered perversions just because it could not result in procreation? A more liberal argument for the procreation idea might be that sexual activity must be capable of procreation under reasonable conditions in order to not be considered a perversion (Ruddick, p. 288). While this would allow sexual activity for pleasure, it would still imply that sexual activity between a couple when one is known to be sterile would be a perversion.   

          A frequent argument used to identify sexual practices as perversions (i.e., homosexuality) is that sexual activity outside procreation is unnatural (i.e., not practiced in nature, "Animals don't do that!") and therefore immoral and a perversion (Nagel, 1969). Nevertheless, what is the exact definition of "unnatural?" Conservative groups often view prostitution as a perversion. However, anthropologists have observed some species of primates engaging in form of prostitution. A female will accept food from a prospective male before allowing the male to mount her. There are other examples in nature that refute claims of the "unnaturalness" of many other sexual practices. So who are these people to say what is and is not natural, perverse or immoral when we have easily refuted their main argument.   

          Sexual perversion is an extremely difficult concept to define. It is often defined by an individual's own perceptions, experiences and morals of what should and should not be considered a perversion. To the person committing a sexual act, she or he would most likely not consider it a perversion but to an outside observer it could be perverted and immoral beyond belief. So what is a perversion? Two possible definitions that seem to parallel society's: first, deviation from the normal (however, what is the definition of normal?); and second, a descent from the ideal (what ideal and who determines it?) (Kupfer, p. 70). These seem to be dictionary type definition and far too open to subjective interpretation. The question remains, who determines what the parameters or limitations of normal, ideal or complete should be.   

          Two other possible definitions could be considered. The first has already been mentioned. It is the physiological definition (or biological). This is "natural" definition where a perversion is a sexual act that is not involved in or hinders procreation. Some authors (Ruddick, p. 287) have offered variations on this definition but it remains the same. The other is the psychological definition. This refers not to "non-reproductive" sex but to sexual activities that may be considered unnatural sexual "inclinations" (Nagel, p. 268). Any difference will be explored below.   

          So it seems that defining sexual perversion is somewhat complex and must be well considered to allow for certain circumstances (i.e., sterile couple). While having similar ideas, arguments and supporting points, Ruddick, Nagel and Kupfer ultimately disagree about how to define sexual perversion. Kupfer goes as far as to explain where both Nagel and Ruddick were wrong. We will examine Nagel and Ruddick as they support the psychological and physiological definitions (respectively). Kupfer will be considered on the side to support or refute statements. In the end, hopefully, an acceptable and defendable definition of perversion will be revealed. In all likelihood, it will be based mainly on the psychological approach but with qualifications made from other authors' contributions.   

          Nagel's psychological definition is outlined by three general conditions that need to be met for the concept of sexual perversions to be feasible. First, some sexual practices may be seen as unnatural, but the differentiation between natural and unnatural is problematic. Nagel states that the practices must "be plausibly described in some sense unnatural." Next, particular practices, "such as shoe fetishism, bestiality, and sadism" are undeniably perversions if anything is to be described as such. Lastly, perversions will be "unnatural sexual inclinations rather than merely unnatural practices adopted not from inclination but for other reasons." Nagel specifies that a perversion is expressed in an "unnatural sexual preference." This would imply that persons that engage in unnatural sexual activities out of curiosity or pleasure would not be engaging in sexual perversion (Nagel, p.268).   

          While the first condition leaves the definition of unnatural relatively open, he provides the qualifier of plausibility. This, however, leaves it to the individual or group to define what is plausibly a perversion. Nagel's other two conditions may be seen as qualifying the first as he actually defines some activities as undeniable perversions. With this condition, Nagel puts forward some actual acts that could be considered perversion. However, with the first condition, he refrained from even providing some guidelines for considering plausibility. While the guidelines would not be all encompassing, they should provide some direction as what could be considered perversion.   

          Some excellent guidelines are the universal basic rights of a human being. These rights are guaranteed to all persons by the United Nations. Some of these rights include the right to expect others not to harm him or her, to seek uncoerced consent, to respect the dignity of the person and not to humiliate her or him. These rights are not all encompassing but provide some direction on the issue of perversion. As these rights are universal in nature, they can be easily used to provide some direction to the definition of perversion. If one were to use the right to not be harmed or uncoerced consent, this could be used to define rape as a perversion. The right of dignity and not to be humiliated could be seen as defining master/slave sexual activities as perversions. Sadomasochism would also be a perversion because a person has the right not to be harmed or humiliated. While there is nothing wrong with engaging in the latter two activities on a casual basis (rape is a perversion no matter what), when the third condition (inclination) is applied that the definition of perversion can be used.   

          The third condition is, in my mind, the most important part. For something to be a perversion, a person must engage in it because of an inclination in his or her character rather than out of curiosity or other transitory reason. A couple may engage in slave/master sexual activities occasionally to add variety to their sex life. This is hardly a perversion. They are simply trying to avoid falling into the pattern of predictable and the pitfalls that come with it. When the sexual activity becomes an inclination or obsession does the activity become a perversion. While inclination provides a good psychological feeling, a perversion would be more of an obsession on part of the individual. Still, either word provides a good definition.   

          Nagel also states that he believes "that the connection between sex and reproduction has no bearing on sexual perversion" (Nagel, p. 268). In this statement, he is refuting the physiological definition and the arguments of its' pundits. He argues that perversion is psychological, not physiological. By referring to a perversion as an "inclination" or obsession, Nagel has established his theory is indeed psychological. He uses examples not from the animal kingdom for support but from the plant kingdom where the weather and animals often limit "sexual" activity (Nagel, p. 269).   

          While this is contrary to the ideals of the Catholic Church, it is a reasonable belief and assumption. What is acceptable to one society, may be completely repugnant to another. With so much variation between cultures and such, it seems to reason that Nagel's statement would be the standard in many places around the world. Man is a creature of curiosity and intelligence. He is designed to question and explore new ideas. If this were not so, man would have never stood erect. Conservative types (i.e., devout Catholics) would claim that man was destined to walk erect but not engage in perversions. My response is �How do they know this? Prove it'.   

          Nagel's example of eating to differentiate between his definitions of natural and unnatural (as to perversions) is an excellent analogy. He describes someone "[who likes] to eat paper, sand, wood, or cotton" as someone with unhealthy habits. Yet someone who preferred "having food forced down his throat through a funnel, or only if the meal were a living animal" could be considered gastronomically perverted (Nagel, p. 270). When this unusual behaviour (i.e., funnelling food) is combined with a "hunger" for that behaviour over what would be considered normal or the standard then the behaviour could be considered a perversion. By differentiating between "like" and "preference," Nagel has provided a better definition of an inclination. I may like chocolate sauce but do not prefer it on all my food. Similarly I may interested the DOM/sub culture but not necessarily with all sexual activities.   

          This analogy provides excellent imagery and helps define his idea of sexual perversion. If a person engages in some bizarre activity to the exclusion of standard behaviour (i.e., acrophobia), we would assume she or he was not mentally or psychologically balanced. Sometimes, the imbalance can be physiological in nature (i.e., a chemical imbalance). Nevertheless, these often affect mental capacity and therefore enter the psychological realm.   

          Nagel provides an excellent position from which to define perversion. The concept of it being an unnatural inclination places it with other unnatural inclinations such phobias that are part of the psych realm. His three conditions allow some interpretation of what is or is not a perversion but the inclination condition is the most important part of his argument.   

          In Ruddick's attempt to define better sex, one of her requirements is "natural" versus "perverted" sex. She defines natural sex as "[having the possibility to] serve the evolutionary and biological function of sexuality-namely, reproduction" (Ruddick, p. 287) She infers that natural sex requires genital intercourse and sexual perversion occurs when deviations from the above criteria occur. Ruddick admits that connecting sexual desire with reproduction is inadequate to define the concept of sexual perversion but it is essential to ultimately determining the definition. She even admits that perverse desires are as natural as nonperverse ones. At this point, it seems that Ruddick has admitted that a perversion is a desire or "inclination" rather than biological. This is contrary to her stated physiological definition and the first of several problems with argument. She claims everyone has perverse desires and that they are subordinate to "natural" desires.   

          At one point, Ruddick seems to contradict herself when she states Nagel drew the wrong conclusion about judging particular sex acts for perversion:   

The perversity of the sex acts does not depend upon whether they are intended to achieve reproduction. [ . . . ] The ground for classifying that desire as natural is that it is so organized that is could lead to reproduction in the normal physiological circumstances. The reproductive organization of sexual desires gives us a criterion of naturalness, but the virtue of which it is a criterion is the "naturalness" itself, not reproduction. (Ruddick, p. 288) 

          Ruddick also distances herself from the traditional definition of naturalness (supposed sexual practices of animals). She simply states (and rightly so) that "Animals are not �unnatural'" (Ruddick, p.288). While she admits that animals, too, could probably commit perversions, it would still affect the criterion of "unnaturalness." This is fortunate as it was demonstrated earlier that this argument actually provided some support for "unnatural," perverted acts as natural.   

          However, Ruddick's argument for physiological definition of perversion has a serious flaw in it. She has failed to differentiate what is considered a sexual activity that may be perverted. By this is meant not what sexual acts are considered perversions but the scope of time that is necessary for defining a perversion.   

          To clarify the scope of sexual acts, definitions are needed for the various segments of a sexual relationship between two people. These definitions are generalizations and not to be taken for concrete. They are defined as such for the purposes of discussion within this essay only. Due to the nature of sexual relations, some concepts will be difficult if not impossible to define accurately or differentiate from each other.   

          A sexual relationship is defined as multiple sexual encounters. This may involve one, more or no other persons. However, for relations with more than one person, it is with an established group at the same time. A sexual encounter is defined as any encounter that leads to and includes sexual activity. This may involve flirting, kissing, holding hands, etc. Sexual activity is somewhat more difficult to define, not so much for what it involves but for when it begins (differentiating it from the encounter). For our purposes will be activity that involves deliberate heightening of sexual desires (not necessarily mutual), making them known to the other person (not necessarily verbally) and acting upon them. Note that sexual activity does not require reciprocation as sometimes the partner may not be willing (i.e., rape) or it may be a solitary sexual activity (i.e., masturbation). Sexual activity will generally be aimed (but not exclusively) at the release of sexual tension (i.e., orgasm, ejaculation) and may involve any number of sexual acts. A sexual act is a single act during sexual activity. This could be any of the following: fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling, sexual massage, any type of intercourse (but in any single position), watching, handjobs, etc. This list is not exhaustive.   

          Returning to Ruddick and her concept of sexual activity and perversion, applying the definitions may provide some interesting results. Given the above definitions of various scopes of "sexual activity," how would one apply her definition of perversion. Does it apply to the sexual encounter? Probably not as we could most likely assume she has not include activities that lead up to sexual activity. This leads us to sexual activity and sexual acts. Which does she mean to apply the physiological definition to? If we assume sexual activity then if the activity involved intercourse that could result in procreation then it would not be perverse. So if one participated in group sex, this would not be a perversion by this definition. A bisexual encounter would not be a perversion where homosexual activity would. Why is this when both involve sexual activity with the same sex? By Ruddick's definition, bisexual activity is not a perversion because there it could result in procreation whereas homosexual activity would not.   

          If one took her definition to the extreme (procreation is not the intent, but must be a possible end effect), one could argue that no sexual activity could be defined as a perversion. Why? The lack of defining terms that was noted earlier could allow one to presuppose any sort of condition that could lead to procreation. An example would be two male homosexuals having a sexual encounter together and immediately moving on to have sexual encounters with separate women that are not part of their sexual relationship (Thompson, -). If taken as a whole, it would appear that the homosexual activity was not a perversion. Yet with the established scope of sexual activity within this essay, the homosexual activity could be considered a separate sexual activity for the heterosexual activity and therefore a perversion. This is most likely Ruddick's intent.   

          Ruddick's argument can further be torn down if we suppose the perversion could apply to the sex act. If so applied, then the sexual activity they are a part of could be considered a perversion. If we look closely at various sex acts, disparity can be seen. Oral sex acts provide a good contrast. Cunnilingus could be considered a nonperverted act as it serves to lubricate the vagina and get the female in a state of arousal. This arousal has the physiological effect of improving the chances of procreation. However, if fellatio is examined, a different case could be build. While it could be argued that it too serves to improve lubrication, it does not significantly when compared with the woman. Often the man's arousal will lead to ejaculation which either will be swallowed by the female or allowed to spurt out. In either case, procreation is in no way a possibility unless the remote chance of some semen getting into the woman's vagina it considered. This probability of procreation is this case is extremely low and for the purposes of this essay will be considered nonexistent. If this is the case, then fellatio could be considered a perversion.   

          Ruddick's argument also breaks down when one considers any nonpenetrative sex act. This could involve mutual or single fondling, rubbing of genitalia together, handjobs, etc. By Ruddick's definition, any nonpenetrative act would be a perversion. This would also include masturbation or any act that caused male ejaculation without penetration of a female's vagina. So if nonpenetrative sex acts are perversion, this would imply any such act performed for enjoyment or mutual pleasure would be a perversion. When examined carefully, Ruddick states that natural sex requires genital intercourse. So if the individual sex acts considered then they are perversions.   

          Regardless of the scope intented by Ruddick, a new difficulty presents problems for her definition. It involves the start and end of sexual activity and acts depending on the scope used and how rigidly you are defining the acts and activity. By this is meant if a couple engage in sexual activity that could be considered perverse, fall asleep, wake up and engage in sexual activity that is nonperverse, are the sexual activities two separate instances (and therefore perverse ad nonperverse respectively) or are they one sexual activity? Where are the boundaries? For sexual acts, the boundaries are more defined but still present some problems. If a female was performing fellatio on a man (a perversion) and then the couple moves into a 69 without the woman interrupting her act, has a new act begun although she has not stopped her sex act? If it is a new act, is it still perverse given that the man's actions could be considered nonperverse?   

          Ruddick dooms her argument when she qualifies the naturalness criterion of being capable of procreation: " "Natural" sexual desire is for heterosexual genital activity, not for reproduction" (Ruddick, p. 287). With this statement she has declared any sexual activity that does not involve heterosexual genital intercourse is to be considered a perversion. Nearly all the sexual activities and acts discussed earlier that could have been nonperverse are now the opposite. The only possible exception would be the group sexual activities that involved the specified sexual activity only. This is almost identical to the physiological definition used by conservative groups except that sexual activity is permissible for the purposes of pleasure. It could also be interpreted as allowing variation in the intercourse position used. Ruddick has proven her definition in not much better than the conservatives.   

          Ruddick's arguments fail due to her generalizations and unspecified scope. What may be considered as a perversion as an individual sex act would not be considered a perversion if the sexual activity or encounter are considered and involved heterosexual genital intercourse. Her arguments have been shown subject to interesting contradictions and contrast what is and is not a perversion. The lack of a defined scope make it impossible to justify the physiological definition. Ruddick needs to define what she means by sexual activity before she could argue adequately and defend her physiological position on perversion. Given that Ruddick's argument has been refuted, clearly the physiological approach is inadequate to define sexual perversions although some of its' arguments may prove useful in assembling a better definition.   

          Kupfer believes that both Nagel and Ruddick are wrong about the nature of sexual perversions. He approaches perversion from a social perspective by defining it as "[producing] dispositions and habits which cut off opportunity for future growth and enjoyment and undermine basic habits which are good" (Kupfer, p. 70). Kupfer leaves his definition open too much subjective interpretation. Depending on the point of view, this could be interpreted as any sexual activity beyond procreation is a perversion. He argues:   

The perverse cannot be understood independent of the ideal. Ideal sexuality, moreover, is logically bound to ideal being. Sexual actions, relationships, and tendencies are perverse, then, insofar as they depart in indeterminate ways from the sexual ideal or good, but what makes good good is its relation to the good of the person him [or her] self. Sexual activities are therefore perverting because they pervert the whole self and such perversion restricts and destroys the capacity for good life (Kupfer, p.71). 

Kupfer could be implying that not only is sexual activity for nonprocreative purposes perverse but any sexual activity is perverse. Without sexual activity human beings would cease to exist because no procreation would be possible. If Kupfer's definition is correct then it would logically extend to procreation and consider procreation a perversion. If so life should be considered a perversion and therefore our very existence would be a perversion. Kupfer most likely did not intend this interpretation but still it is valid.   

          Given that Kupfer's argument can be taken to be ultimately again the nature of life itself, any arguments or comparisons he makes to Nagel or Ruddick would be highly suspect. His definition, refuted as it is, provides little input into a more acceptable definition of perversion.   

          Since Ruddick has been refuted due to her generalities and lack of a defined sexual activity and Kupfer could be interpreted as viewing life as a perversion, it would appear the psychological definition might be the best choice. With all this, the psychological definition of perversion has survived and could be taken as a good definition. However, this is only possible if some guidelines to the first condition are provided on which to base evaluation. As suggested, universal basic human rights provide an excellent base for these guidelines. It should be noted that the guidelines should hardly be restrictive nor exhaustive. However, if a sexual act does not violate a person's fundamental human rights, it should probably not be considered a perversion for other reasons. Other guidelines must consider a person's rights before implementing them.   

Bibliography  

Kupfer, Joseph. "Sexual Perversion and the Good." The Personalist 59 (Jan 1978): 70-77.  

Nagel, Thomas. "Sexual Perversion." Philosophy and Sex, 3rd ed. Edited by Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston. New York: Prometheus Books, 1994, pp. 268-279.  

Ruddick, Sara. "Better Sex." Philosophy and Sex, 3rd ed. Edited by Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston. New York: Prometheus Books, 1994, pp. 280-299.  

Thompson, H. Ed III. "After Class Discussions on Perversion and Sara Ruddick" Philosophy 224.3 - Philosophy of Sexuality. University of Saskatchewan, 30 Nov 1995.  

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