A
SYSTEM
OF
INTELLECTUCAL PHILOSOPHY.
BY REV. ASA MAHAN,
FIRST PRESIDENT OF CLEVLAND UNIVERSITY
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"How charming is divine philosophy!
Not harsh, and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectared sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns."
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REVISED AND ENLARGED FROM THE SECOND EDITION.
[Retyped and reprinted by Rick Friedrich in May 1999.
10 Ladbrooke Road. Toronto Ont. Can. M9R 2A8
(416) 247-3942 rickfriedrich@hotmail.com
Permission requested for commertial use.]
NEW YORK:
A. S. BARNES & CO., 51 JOHN-STREET.
CINCINNATI:--H. W. DERBY.
1854.
Entered according to an Act of Congress, in the year 1854, by
ASA MAHAN,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for
the Southern District of the State of New York.
DEDICATORY PREFACE.
TO THE FIRST EDITION.
THE following Treatise presents the sum of a course of Lectures, which, for six or eight years past, I have been in the habit of delivering to successive classes, on the subject of Intellectual Philosophy. One thing I may say in relation to this subject, without boasting. No class have yet passed through this course, without becoming deeply interested in the science of Mental Philosophy; and, in their judgment, receiving great benefit from the truths developed, as well as from the method of development which was adopted. Hence the desire has been very generally expressed by those who have attended the course of instruction, as well as by others who have become acquainted with the general featrures of the system taught, to have it presented to the public in a form adapted to popular reading. In conformity to such suggestions, as well as to the permanent convictions of my own mind, the following Treatise has been prepared. In preparing it, it has been my aim to reject light from no source whatever from which it could be obtained, and at the same time to maintain the real prerogative of manly independence of thought. The individuals to whom I feel most indebted as a philosopher, are Coleridge, Cousin, and Kant~three luminaries of the first order in the sphere of philosophy. How far proper discriminations have been made in the study of their works, the reader will be able to judge. With these remarks, I would simply add, that
TO THE BELOVED AND HONORED PUPILS, WHO HAVE HITHERTO PASSED FROM UNDER MY INSTRUCTION AS A TEACHER OF MENTAL SCIENCE, THE FOLLOWING TREATISE IS NOW AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED, WITH THE EXPRESSION OF THE FOND HOPE, THAT IN ALL FUTURE CLASSES, WHICH IT MAY BE MY PRIVILEGE TO INSTRUCT, I MAY, IN THE LANGUAGE OF ANOTHER, "FIND THE SAME LOVE OF PHILOSOPHY, AND THE SAME INDULGENCE TO THE PROFESSOR."
PREFATORY NOTE
TO THE REVISED EDITION.
__________________
SINCE the publication of the first edtion of this work, the author has had the benefit resulting from successive years in teaching the same, and of a careful reading of other works upon the same subject. In this manner, he has been enabled to perceive defects that needed correction in the work, as first presented. The work is now given to the public, as the result of his mature reflections upon this fundamental science. Some of the most important chapters have been so entirely rewritten asn remodeled, as to render the present, in some important respects, a new work on Intellectual philosophy. I may notice, among others, the chapter on Sense, the examination of the true as distinguished from false systems of Philosophy, in the Miscellaneous Topics, and the development of the evidence of the being and perfection of God, in the last chapter. The author has always been fully persuaded of the correctness of his views in respect to external perception, but has felt a growing dissatisfaction with his manner of presenting the subject, in the chapter referred to. In the present edition, this subject, so fundamental to a right system of mental science, is so presented as to meet his ideas in most, if not all respects. One of the great wants of the age is a fundamental examination of false systems of Philosophy, as developed in Materialism, and in the various forms of Idealism, as distinguished from the true system. [Ed. note: See Mahan's later materpiece, History of Philosophy.] This he has attempted, and, as it appears to him, accomplished, in the chapter on Miscellaneous Topics. The improvements made, in presenting the topic last named, will be appreciated, we think, by all who carefully read the chapter in which they appear. It has been the aim of the author to give the public a work, on this great science, which should meet the fundamental philosophic wants of the age. As such an attempt, he commends his production to the careful study of all who would understand this science.
I close with a suggestion to teachers who may introduce this work to their pupils as a text-book. No system of questions is here proposed. Each topic has a heading, however, which gives the subject-matter therein developed. My own method of teaching has always been, to read to the class this heading, and then require the student to state, in his own words, the subject-matter contained in the topic referred to. Two benefits result to the pupil by this mode of teaching: 1. He is made to understand the subject much better than he can by any system of questions. 2. he acquires the important habit of first forming distinct conceptions of a subject before speaking, and then of clothing his thoughts in appropriate language. Much higher and more perfect forms of mental discipline are acquired by this mode of teaching, than by any other which we have ever tried.
CLEVELAND, OHIO, August 1854.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
Classification of the Sciences-~Object of Mental Philosophy~What is to be expected from such Investigations~Mental Philosophy, as a Science, possible~The Method in conformity to which Psychological Researches should be conducted~The above the only correct Psychological Method~Utility of this Science~State of Mind requisite to a successful prosecution of this Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
CHAPTER II.
CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS.
Mental Faculties indicated by the phenomena above classified~Object of Mental Philosophy~ Meaning of the words Mental Faculties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
CHAPTER III.
PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
Principle of Classification~Contingent and necessary Phenomena of Thought defined.
IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE.
Idea of Body contingent~Idea of Space necessary~Other characteristics of these two Ideas~Idea of Body relative~Idea of Space absolute~Idea of Body implies that of Limitation~Idea of Space implies the absence of Limitation~Idea of Body, a sensible representation~Idea of Space a pure rational conception.
IDEAS OF SUCCESSION, AND TIME, OR DURATION.
Idea of Succession contingent~The idea of Time necessary~Other Characteristics of these Ideas
IDEAS OF THE FINITE AND OF THE INFINITE.
Remarks of Locke~Characteristics of these Ideas~Idea of Finite contingent and relative; that of the Infinite necessary and absolute.
IDEAS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND PERSONAL IDENTITY.
Idea of Mental Phenomena contingent and relative~Idea of Personal Identity necessary~ Necessary ideas distinguished as conditional and unconditional.
IDEAS OF PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE.
Idea of substance explained~Idea of Phenomena contingent and relative~that of Substance necessary~Our Ideas of Substance not obscure, but clear and distict.
IDEAS OF EVENTS AND CAUSE.
The idea of Events contingent and relative; that of Cause necessary~Theory of Dr. Brown and others~Observations on Mr. Dugald Stewart.
IDEA OF POWER.
Conclusion of the present Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17-37
CHAPTER IV.
APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF IDEAS.
Logical order~Chronological order.
PRIMARY INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES PRE-SUPPOSED BY THE PRECEDINNG ANALYSIS.
These Faculties why called Primary~Also called Intuitive Faculties~Relation of Primitive Intuitive Faculties to each other~Importance of the Truths above elucidated~Classification of Intellectual Phenomena given by Kant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38-46
CHAPTER V.
CONSCIOUSNESS.
Consciousness Defined~Self-Consciousness conditioned on Reason, but not a function of Reason~Natural, or spontaneous, and philosophical, or reflective Conscousness~Process of classification and Generalization in Reflection, illustrated~Functions of Consciousness~Necessity of relying implicitly upon the testimony of Consciousness~Consciousness, a distinct function or faculty of the Intellect~Theory of Dr. Brown--Meaning of the term Consciousness as employed by Sir William Hamilton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47-59
CHAPTER VI.
SENSE.
To be distiguished from Sensation~Spontaneous and voluntary determination of Sense~Mental process in Perception~Objects of Perception~Common and Philosophic Doubts in respect to the comparative validity of the affirmations of Sense and Consciousness~The Province of Philosophy~Comparative validity of the affirmations of Sense and Consiousness~True theory of external Perception~Theory Verified~The above Theory verified as a truth of Science~Qualities of Matter: Primary qualities, Secundo-primary qualities, and Scondary qualities~What these qualities are in general~Representative and Presentative Knowledge~True thehory of Perception state and verified~False theory of external perception: The Scholastic Theory~Reasons for the Idealistic Theories~Objections to these Theories~Hypothises, that all our knowledge of Matter is derived through Sensation exclusively, the main source of error in Philosophy~Explanation given by Kant and the Transcendental School generally of the fact of Sense-perception~Is color a primary or secondary quality of Matter?~Conclusion of the present Exposition. . . . . . . . . . . . .60-107
CHAPTER VII.
SECONDARY FACULTIES.
UNDERSTANDING.
Notions Particular and General.
ELEMENTS OF WHICH NOTIONS ARE CONSTITUDED.
Contingent Elements~Necessary Elements: Substance and Cause the fundamental elements of notions~Evolution of these Laws not Arbitrary~Time and Space.~I. Time and Space~Errors of Kant: 1. In respect to the relation of Phenomena and Noumena to Time and Space~2. Relation of the Ideas of Time and Space to Penomena~II. Identity and Diversity, Resemblance and Difference~III. The idea of a Whole , as including its Parts, or Parts in reference to the Whole. ~Kant's Anatomy of Pure Reason.~IV. The Category of Quantity~The Category of Quantity distinct from that previously considered~V. Of Quality~VI. Of Relation~VII. Of Modality~VIII. The Idea of Law~Conceptions as distinguished from Notions~A Fact often attending Perception~Mistake of Mr. Stewart~Notions and Conceptions characterized as complete or incomplete, true or false~Mistake of Coleridge in respect to the Undersanding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108-125
CHAPTER VIII.
FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT.
Abstraction~Abstract Notions, what, and how formed?~General Notions, how formed.
CLASSIFICATION.
Forms of Classification~Classification, in what sense arbitrary~Genera and Species.
GENERALIZATION.
Rules in respect to Generalization~The Term General sometimes used in a limited sense.
GENERAL TERMS.
Theory of the Realists~Theory of the Nominalists~Theory of the Conceptualists.
UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT DISTINGUISED.
Distiction between the Understanding and Judgment verified~Observations of Kant~Relations of the Understanding and Judgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .126-188
CHAPTER IX.
ASSOCIATION.
Term defined~Term Association, why preferred~The Associating Principle not without Law~Law of Association stated and defined~Existence of Law, when established~The present Hypotheses, when established as the Law of Association~A priori Argument~All the Phenomena referred to the commonly received Laws, can be explained on this Hypothesis~Phenomena exist which can be accounted for on this, and no other Hypothesis~Facts connected with particular Diseases~This Hypothesis established and illustrated, by reflecting upon the facts of Association~Argument summarily stated~ Explanatory Remarks~Reasons why different objects excite similar Feelings in our Minds~Application of the Principles above illustrated~Ground of the Mistake of Philosophers in respect to the Laws of Association~Action of the associating Principle in different Individuals~Influence of Habit~Standards of Taste and Fashion~Vicissitudes in respect to such Standards~Peculiarities of Genius associated with Judgment, or correct Taste~Influence of Writers and Speakers of splendid Genius, but incorrect Taste~Danger of vicious Associations~Unrighteous Prejudices, how justified~Giving Individuals a bad Name, spreading false Reports, &c.~Influence of the associating Principle in perpetuating existing mental Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139-161
CHAPTER X.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
Terms defined~States of Mind entering into and connected with these Processes~The above statement verified~Principle on which Objects are remembered with Ease and Distinctness~Deep and distinct Inpressions, on what conditioned~Diversity of Powers of Memory, as developed in different Individuals~Philosophic Memory~Local Memory~Artificial Memory.
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
A ready and retentive Memory~The vast diverse Power of Memory possessed by different Individuals~Improvement of Memory~Memory of the Aged~Duration of Memory . . . . . . . . . . .161-172
CHAPTER XI.
IMAGINATION.
Definitions of distinguished Philosophers~Objections to the above Definitions~Another definition proposed~Imagination and Fancy distinguished~Another Definition of the term Fancy.
IMAGINATION AND FANCY ELUCIDATED.
Preliminary Remarks~Elucidation.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATION.
REMARKS ON THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
Remarks of Coleridge.
CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATIONS, WHY NOT ALWAYS FICTIONS.
Sphere of the Imagination not confined to Poetry~Law of Taste relative to the Action of the Imagination.
IMAGINATION THE ORGAN OF IDEALS.
Idea defined~Ideal defined~Ideals, Particular and General~Ideals not confined to Ideas of the Beautiful, the Grand, and the Sublime~Ideals not fixed and changeless, like Ideas~Ideals the Foundation of Mental Progress~Ideals in the DIvine and Human Intelligence.
ACTION OF THE JUDGMENT RELATIVE TO THAT OF THE IMAGINATION.
Taste difined~Productions of the Imagination when not regulated by correct Judgment or good Taste.
PRODUCTIONS IN WHICH THE ACTION OF THE FANCY OR IMAGINATION IS MOST CONSICUOUS.
COMBINATIONS OF THOUGHT DENOMINATED WIT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THOSE RESULTING FROM THE PROPER ACTION OF THE IMAGINATION OR FANCY.
Bombast~Burlesque~Sarcasm.
PROPRIETY OF USING THE IMAGINATION AND FANCY IN WORKS OF FICTION.
False Idea in respect to the Influence of Familiarity with the popular Fictitious Writings of the Day~Imagination and Fancy~How improved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173-213
CHAPTER XII.
REASON.
Reason difined~Coleridge's Characteristics of Reason as distinguished from the Understanding.
Secondary Ideas of Reason~Idea of Right and Wrong.
Idea of Fitness.
Idea of the Useful, or the Good.
Relations of the Ideas of Right and Wrong and of the Useful to each other.
Ideas of Liberty and Necessity.
Ideas of the Beautiful and Sublime.
Idea of Harmony~Reflections.
Idea of Truth.
Idea of Law.
The Philosophic Idea.
First Truths, or Necessary Principles of Reason, as distinguished from Contingent Principles.
Idea of Science, Pure and Mixied.
Function of Reason denominated Conscience.
General Remarks pertaining to Reason.
RECAPITULATION, WITH ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS.
Intellectual Faculties enumerated~Influence of the above Distinctions~Errors of Kant~Classification of Mental Faculties.
Remarks upon the relations of Intuitions to one another.
Secondary Faculties.
Understanding~The Judgment~The Associating Principle~Imagination . . . . . . . . . . . . .270-282
CHAPTER XIV.
SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
General characteristics of all Objects of Knowledge, and of our Knowledge of the same~Distict Apprehension conditioned on Attention~Spontaneous Development of the Intelligence~Characteristics of this Spontaneity~Characteristics Illustrated.
Additional Remarks and Illustrations.
CHAPTER XV.
ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
The two Scools in Philosophy~Principles of Lock~Theory of Kant~Principles of Locke tested with referenc to Necessary Ideas~Principles of Lock fail in respect to Understanding-conceptions~Error of Kant~Position of Kant true in respect to Understanding -conceptions and Affirmations of the Judgment.
True Explanation.
Intuitions~Notions~The Judgment~Associating Principle and the Imagination~Scientific Movement.
Manner in which the General, Abstract, and Universal, are eliminated from the Concrete and Particular.
General Notions~Abstract Notions~Universal and Necessary Ideas~Error of Cousin. . . . . . . . . . .293-304
CHAPTER XVI.
LAWS OF INVESTIGATION.
Tesitmony.
CHAPTER XVII.
REASONING.
The Syllogism the universal from of Reasoning~The above Principle verified~Forms in which the Major Premise appears~Principles which lie at the Basis of all Conclusions from a Process of Reasoning~Remarks upon these Principles~Remarks on Aristotle's Dictum.
Different kinds of Reasoning.
Conception of Logic.
CHAPTER XVII.
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
The Bearing of the Philosophy of Locke upon Scienc, properly so called.
True and False Systems of Philosophy.
CHAPTER XIX.
THE INTELLEGENCE OF MAN, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT OF THE BRUTE.
CHAPTER XX.
MATTER AND SPIRIT.
Principle on which the Argument is based~The Soul, how revealed to itself~Principles applied~Common Objections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .423-426
CHAPTER XXI.
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
Preliminary Considerations~Principles on which the present Argument Rests~Direct Argument~Future Retributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .427-436
CHAPTER XXII.
THE IDEA OF GOD.
Preliminary Considerations.~God, the Unconditioned and Absolute Cause of all that exists Conditionally.~Possible Hypothesis on this subject~None but the Theistic Hypothesis can be true~The Theistic Hypothesis established as a truth of Science~Attributes necessarily implied in the idea of the Unconditioned~Attributes of the Unconditioned necessrily supposed in the facts of the Universe~Facts of Creation bearing upon our present inquiries~The Theistic Hypothesis intuitively certain from these Facts~Truth of this Hyposthesis more partcularly developed~Does Creation indicate the character of God as Infinite and Perfect~God, the Infinite and~This a First Truth of Reason~Reasons why these Elements have not yet been designated~Foundation of the Conviction that God is both Infinite and Perfect~Nature of the Arguments above adduced~Relation of the Idea of God above elucidated to all other Ideas of Him.~The idea of a System of Theology.~Postualte, Axioms, &c. in Theology~Kind of Proof pertaining to each particulatr Attribute~This science to be evolved in the light of the Works of God, Material and Mental, and of the Teachings of Inspiration~Theology, Natural and Revealed~Difference between Mystery and Absurdity in Theology~Absurdity defined~Mystery defined~Mystery and Absurdity defined in another form~Fundamental Characteristics of Real Revelation from God~Revealed Theology defined~Defects of Method in the common Systems of Theology~Use of the common Treaties on Natural Theology~Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437-476
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
Classification of the Sciences.
ALL substances may be classified under two general divisions, MATTER and MIND. This arrangement presents a twofold division of the sciences, to wit, Material and Mental.
Object of Mental Philosophy.
Mental Philosophy is the science of Mind, and of the human Mind in particular. Its object is a correct classification of the phenomena, for the purpose of a full and distinct development of the Powers, Susceptibilities, and Laws of the human Mind. This department of inquiry being completed, Mental Philosophy, as a science, then ascends to an investigation of the wide field of Moral Obligation, for the purpose of developing the extent, limits, and grounds of human responsibility.
What is to be expected from such Investigations.
The field before us is of almost boundless extent. We are not, therefore, to expect that any one treatise will present all that may be known of the human Mind. All that I hope to accomplish, is to introduce the inquirer to the science, and give to his inquiries in respect to it, a right direction. His own investigations will then lead him to exhaustless treasures of wisdom and knowledge.
Mental Philosophy, as a Science, Possible.
Every substance in existence is known, and can be known by us, through and only through its respective phenomena. This, with us , is the changeless condition of knowledge in respect to all realities which lie around us in the universe. Every power or substance in existence is knowable to us, so far only as we can know its phenomena. The question, then, whether Mental Philosophy is possible to us, depends wholly upon this, whether the Mind, in the action of its varied powers and susceptibilities, is so revealed to itself, that it can know its own operations or phenomena? To this question, but one answer can be given. We are so constituted, that we have a knowledge of whatever passes in the interior of our minds. This power, or law of our Mental Faculties, explain the fact in whatever manner we please, is denominated Consciousness, which is a faithful witness of whatever passes within us. On the authority of Consciousness, all men do and must rely. Here Scepticism itself assumes the garb of positive faith: for in the language of Descartes, "let a man doubt everything else, he cannot doubt that he doubts;" and "he cannot doubt that he doubts" for this reason, that he cannot but rely, in some form or other, upon the testimony of his own Consciousness.
Not only are all things which pass within us given as phenomena of Consciousness, but we have also the power of retaining these phenomena under the eye of the mind, until we have fully resolved them into their original elements, and marked their characteristics. This power or exercise of the mind is denominated relflection, and is conditioned on the Will.
Mental Philosophy then becomes possible for the same reasons, and on the same conditions that physical science, or Natural Philosophy is possible. Facts equally undeniable, and equally distinct and palpable, are given as the foundation of both sciences. All that is required in either instance, is, that our researches be conducted upon right principles~that we introduce into our investigations nothing but actual facts,~that these facts be correctly arranged and classified,~and that none but legitimate conclusions be drawn from them.
The Method in conformity to which Psychological Researches should be conducted.
Having shown that Mental Philosophy, as a science, is possible, we will now contemplate the question in respect to the Method which should be adopted in conducting our investigations. Every philosopher commences his inquiries in conformity to a certain ideal of which he has conceived, and which he has assumed as involving the most perfect method in conformity to which such investigations can be conducted. A remark of Cousin on this point demands special attention. "As is the method of a philosopher, so will be his system; and the adoption of a method, decides the destiny of a philosophy." It becomes us, therefore, at the threshold of our inquiries, to stop, and with great care, determine the Method in conformity to which we are to investigate the powers, susceptibilities, and laws of the mysterious substance before us. The folowing Principles I would propose as involving and announcing the true Method to be adopted.
1. We should present to our own minds, with great distinctness, the question, what are the facts which lie at the basis of all our conclusions in respect to this science; facts upon which all legitimate conclusions do and must rest? They are, as all must admit, the facts which lie under the eye of Consciousness. But what are these facts? In other words, what are the sole and exclusive objects of Consciousness? Not, surely, as Cousin observes, the "external world, or its Creator~not the substance, nature, essence, of Faculties of the soul itself." They are the soul in its manifestations~in the exercise of its various Faculties. Upon these all our conclusions in regard to the nature of these Faculties, as well as upon the nature of the soul itself, and of all other objects are based. As the soul basis of physical science, we have the phenomena of perception. As the basis of Psychology, we have the phenomena of Consciousness, and these only. As we know the mind only through its phenomena, or manifestations, so all legitimate conclusions in respect to it must be revealed and affirmed by these manifestations. Hence I remark.
2. That in pursuing our investigations according to the true Psychological Method, we shall commence with no questions in respect to the natrue or essence of mind, whether it is material or immaterial, or in respect to its various powers, or functions, in respect to the origin of mental phenomena. All such questions are to be adjourned until we have observed and marked the characteristics, and classified the phenomena, or operations which now, in our present state of mental adevelopment, lie under the eye of Consciousness. The question, in regard to the origin of mental phenomena, involves, as its foundation and starting point, a knowledge of such phenomena as they now exist. Otherwise we are inquiring after the origin of that of the natrue of which we are profoundly ignorant. So also, if, before we have attained this knowledge, we study and attempt the resolution of questions pertaining to the nature or essence of the mind, or in respect to its Faculties, we violate the fundamental law of all correct philosophizing, to wit: that substances are known and are to be studied only through their phenomena. The true Psychological Method does not neglect any legitimate questions in respect to ontology, or the origin of mental phenomena. It simply adjourns these, till another preliminary department of inquiry has been completed.
In pursuing our inquiries in respect to mental phenomena and in respect to the characteristics of particular phenomena, two rules of fundamental importance present themselves,~to wit: Suppose or assume, as real, nothing which does not exist~and omit, or disregard, nothing which does exist.
3. The phenomena which lie under the eye of Consciousness clearly indicate a diversity of mental powers, or functions. In conformity to the true Psychological Method, a fundamental aim of the Mental Philosopher will be, to adopt those principles of classification by which these different powers or functions shall be distinctly revealed to the Mind. Two self-evident principles will guide him in determining the different powers or functions of the Mind. Phenomena in their fundamental characteristics alike, are to be attributed to one and the same Faculty. Phenomena, in their fundamental characteristics unlike, suppose a diversity of powers or functions. Hence the vast importance of classification with exclusive reference to fundamental characteristics.
4. Amid the endlessly diversified phenomena of Consciousness, there are, in the depths of the Mind, particular phenomena, which reveal the Laws which govern the action of the different mental powers. One of the principal aims of the Mental Philosopher, in conformity to a correct Psychological Method, will be, to fix upon, and develope those facts, or phenomena, by which the Laws of thought, feeling, and action, are revealed. No department of inquiry in the wide field of Mental science is of greater importance than this.
5. Having by careful reflection, and incomfromity to correct principles, ascertained, classified, and arranged the phenomena of the Mind, as they now lie under the eye of Consciousness, a correct Psychological Method would then lead us to move the important questions pertaining to the origin of these phenomena, to Ontology, and to the nature, extent, limits, and grounds of Moral Obligation. This completes the circle of investigations in the wide domain of Mental Science. Much will be done for Philosopphy, if this circle is completed according to the method above developed.
The Above the only correct Psychological Method.
A moment's reflection will convince us, that this is the philosophical, and I may add, the only philosophical Method. The powers of nature, external and internal, are known to us only in their manifestations, or through their respective phenomena. These manifestations must, of course, be known, or we must remain in total ignorance of the powers themselves.
This is the universal Method, the Method which lies at the basis of all real science pertaining to Matter or Mind. In pursuing our investigations in strickt conformity to the principles of this Method, we shall be conducted to no conjectural conclusions, but to certain knowlegde; provided we have marked with correctness existing phenomena, and have proceeded logically from facts thus given, to our conclusions. It puts us, to say the least, upon the right road to knowledge. If we "fall out by the way," the fault will be our own, and not that of the Method adopted.
If we arrive at correct conclusions, we shall, also, in the light of the Method pursued, understand and be able to assign the reasons for those conclusions, a most important attainment in the progress of mental development. If, on the other hand, we adopt any false conclusions, our Method itself presents the best means for their correction. No individual will long remain in the embrace of any important error, who has adopted a correct method of investigation, and who rigidly adheres to the principles of that method.
Utility of this Science.
But little need be said to impress the inquirer with a conviction of the importance of our investigations.
Mental Philosophy is the science of self-reflection. It teaches us to know ourselves, in our relations to God, and to the universe around us.
The importance of this science may likewise be seen, in the light of its relations to all other departments of human investigation. "Whatever be the object of inquiry," says Cousin, "God or the world, beings the most near or remote, you neither know or can know them, but upon on condition, namely, that you have the faculty of knowledge in general; and you neither possess nor can attain a knowledge of them except in proportion to your general faculty of knowledge. Whatever you attain a knowledge of, the highest or the lowest thing, your knowledge in the last reslt rests, both in respect to its extent and its legitimacy, upon the reach and validity of that faculty, by whatever name you call it, Spirit, Reason, Mind, Intelligence, Understanding." One of the first and great inquires of man, then, is the nature, extent and validity of this faculty. This is Intellectual Philosophy. This is Psychology, a science, which indeed is not the whole of Philosophy, but "must be allowed to be its foundation and starting point."
By developing the laws of human belief, and by habituating the mind to contemplate and investigate CAUSES through their respective phenomena, this science also furnishes a light, to guide our investigations in every other science, and presents the strongest possible motives to lead us onward.
Nor is its connection with morality and religion less important and influential. Indeed, here lies its chief importance. The development of the laws of evidence, will place a clear light, the ground of our assent to the Divine authority of Christianity, so far as external evidence is conserned. A development of the powers and susceptibilities of the mind itself, will lead us to a correct understanding of the bearing of the internal evidence of Christianity. A development of the grounds of moral obligation will lead us to perceive distinctly, and to feel deeply, our obligation to obey the moral precepts of Christianity. Every truth, every principle and precept of Christianity, supposes some one or more faculties or susceptibilities of the mind, to which they are addressed. A distinct knowledge of these faculties and susceptibilities, places those truths and principles in the clearest possible light before the mnd.
One other consideration will show clearly the important bearing which our present inquiries have upon religion. The study of Mind , according to the Method above announced, implies, as its foundation and starting point, careful investigation of mental phenomena. Amoung these phenomena ideas occupy a very important place, and among the most fundamental and important of all our ideas are the conceptions of the infinite and perfect, that is, of God, of eternity, of immortality, of moral obligation, and of future retributions. In developing the characteristics, origin and grounds of these ideas, we are determining our convictions in regard to many of the most important and fundamental truths of religion. We are moulding and forming convichtions which will, and must determine the meaning, which we shall attach to the most important portions of the sacred volume iteslf.
If we should appeal to facts, we should find the fullest verification of all that is said above. All the forms of corrupt Christianity which have appeared for the last eighteen centuries, all the false religions which have ever cursed the earth, all the forms of infidelity and scepticism, which the seathngs of human depravity have, in any age, thrown upon the surface of society, have had their foundation in systems of false Philosophy. No maxim is more fully verified, by universal observation than this. As is a man's Philosophy so is his Theology. The changeless laws of our being render us, in all departments of research and action, philosophic beings. In religion, we can no more be exempt from the influence of Philosophy, than in all other departments of investigation. Suppose we professedly, as some have done, repudiate all Philosophy, and approach the Sacred Volume, to be taught of God, irrespective of any philosophic speculations. What is this but the enunciation of a peculiar system of Philosophy~a system which, after all, will determine, in many essential respects, the meaning which we shall attach to the most important responses of the Sacred Oracles. God hath joined Philosophy and Religion together. We do violence to the nature which He has given us, when we attempt to put them asunder. False Philosophy is the mother of false religions. A correct Philosophy is the handmaid of true Religion.
In short, in every condition and relation in life, next to the wisdom, which, by direct inspiration, "cometh from above," is a correct and comprehensive knowledge of Mental Philosophy, important to man. To the citizen, this science is useful by giving him the reasons of the duties devolved upon him in all the relations of life. To the theologian, it will be of great use, by enabling him not only to understand correctly the truths and principles of Christianity, but also to present them in such a manner that he will "commend himself to every man's conscience in the sight of God." How true also is the sentiment advanced by the great philosopher of England, to wit, that no man is qualified to fill the sphere of and enlightened statesman, who has not thought much and profoundly upon the infinite, the just, the right, the true, and the good.
State of Mind requisite to a successful prosecution of this Science.
It remains to speak upon one topic more, the spirit requisite to a successful presecution of this science.
The first requisite that I mention is this, a deep conviction of the importantce of the science. We pursue nothing with energy which, to our minds, does not possess an importance demanding the exertion of our entire powers. If I could impress the inquirer with a due conviction of the importance of our present investigations, and could excite in him a purpose of corresponding inflexibility to master the science, I should not have any unpleasant apprehensions in respect to the result.
I mention, in connection with the above, another requisite, to wit, a love of the science for its own sake; that is, for itself, as well as an account of its relative value. That which strongly appeals, not only to our convictions of what is valuable, but to the sensibilities of our nature, we readily prusue with the most energry and untiring perseverance. But two things are requisite to excit in any mind this love for the science under consideration~a proper conviction of the importance of the science, and familiarity with its great truths and principles. We are naturally such philosophic beings, that almost nothing else delights us so much as philosophic truths and principles, when we once become aquainted with them.
Another essential requisite is the habit or spirit of self-reflection. All legitimate conclusions pertaining to this science rest upon the facts which lie under the eye of Consciousness. To know these facts, that eye must be fixed with long and intese gaze upon them, till their fundamental chareacteristics are distinctly revealed. Without the spirit of self-reflection the inquirer will make but poor progress in Mental Philosophy. With it, he will "go from strength to strength."
The inquirer who would make progress in this science, must also be deeply imbued with a teachable spirit. This is the true and only philosophic spirit. Under its influence the mind "cries after knowledge, and lifts up its voice for understanding." "It seeks for her as silver, and searches for her as for hid treasures." "Wisdom enters into the heart, and knowledge is pleasant to the soul." The love of truth, for her own sake, takes full possession of the mind. To "sit under her banners," and "dwell in the light of her countenance," all opinions, all systems and prepossessions, contrary to her teachings, are readliy sacrifieced. Facts are wieghed with the utmost care for the exclusive purpose of knowing their characteristics; and all conclusions, however contrary to all preformed theories, are readily admitted, which sustains to such facts the relation of logical antecedents or consequents. In this state of mind, the student will not fail to "understand righteousness, and judgement, and equity; yea, and every good path."
I mention as another indisputable requisite, untiring industry and perseverance. "There is no royal road to knowledge" of any kind; much less to a knowldge of ourselves. Before we attain that high eminence from which the goodly mountains, waving forest, verdant hills, luxuriant valleys, and majestic rivers of this "land of promise," this "land flowing with milk and honey," shall lie out with distictness beneath the enraptured vision; we shall find many a tiresome wilderness to pass, many a rugged steep to climb, and sometimes, perhaps, almost "through the palpable obscure," will we be compelled to "find out our uncouth way." But when that eminence has been attained, no one feels that he has "labored in vain, and spent his strength for nought." Every individual, who is not fully prepared for the toil of hard and tireless thinking, had better abandon this study before he commences it. Otherwise, in addition to all the wretchedness of ignorace, he will be subject to the more depressing influence of conscous unworthiness of the possession of the treasure of knowledge.
I will allude to but one requisite more~a deeply serious state of mind. In no other state are we prepared for deep communion with the mysteries, and for profound contemplations of the sublime and majestic creations of truth. To walk among her "clud-capped towers, gorgeous palaces and solemn temples," and to worship at her shrine, there is no place for triflers here. A trifler neither knows himself nor respects himself. He is, therefore wholly unprepared to inquire for, or appreciate when found, the most momentous of all the revelations of truth, those respecting the nature, character and relations of himself.
The individual who commences, and continues to prosecute, his inquiries pertaining to this science, in the spirit above described, will find in the end a full reward of his labors. The object of the author is not to think for the inquirer, but to enable him to think for himslef.
CHAPTER II.
CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS.
"All the facts," says Cousin, "which fall under the Consciousness of man, and consequently under the reflection of the philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental facts, which contain all others. These facts which, beyond doubt, are never in reality, solitary, and separate from each other, but which are essentially not the less distict, and which a careful analysis ought to distinguish without dividing, in the complex phenomena of intellectual life; these three facts are expressed in the words TO FEEL, TO THINK, TO ACT." Is this a full and correct classification of the phenomena of the human mind? Are these distinctions real? Are all mental phenomena included in these fundamental facts? These questions I answer in the affirmative for the following reasons:
1. No mental phenomena can be conceived of, which do not fall under one or the other of these facts. What mental operation can we conceive of, which is not a thought, feeling, or choice, purpose, or determination?
2. These classes of phenomena differ from one another, not in degree but in kind. How entirely distinct, for example, is thought, in every degree and modification, from feeling, on the one hand, and mental determination, on the other. Feelings, also, of every kind and modification, stand at an equal remove from thoughts and mental acts or determinations. So of the class last mentioned. Choice in every degree or form makes, in its fundamental chararcteristics, no approach whatever to thoughts or feelings.
3. All men recognize the states of mind designated by the above expressions, as actually existing in human Consciousness, and as clearly distinguisheable from each other. When I affirm to the peasant, or to the philosopher, at one time, that I think so and so; at another that I have particular feelings; and at another still, that I have resolved, or determined upon a particular course of conduct; both alike readily apprehend my meaning, and understand me as referring to states of mind perfectly distinct.
4. In all known languages there are terms employed to designate these three classes of phenomena; terms, each of which is appled to one class exclusively, and never to either of the others. Thus, the term thought is never applied to any mental phenomena but those designated by the words to think. We never use it to designated feelings, or mental determinations of any kind. The terms sensation or emotion are never applied to any but phenomena of feeling. In a similar manner we never apply the terms purpose, willing, dermining, &c., to the phenomena of feeling, but exclusively to those designated by the words to act. The existence of such terms undeniably evince, that the different classes of phenomena, under consideration, are recognized by universal Consciousness, not only as existing, but as entirely distinct from one another.
5. As a final reason I would adduce an argument presented in the work, recently published, on the Will. "The clearness and particularity with which the universal Intelligence has marked the disticiton under consideration, is strikingly indicated by the fact, that there are qualifiying terms in common use, which are applied to each to these classes of phenomena. There are terms, however, which are never applied but to one class. Thus we speak of clear thoughts, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of irrepressible feelings and desires, but never of irrepressible thoughts or resolutions. We also speak of inflexible determinations, but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect distictness, then, must the universal Consciousness have marked thoughts, feelings, and determinations, as phenomena entirely distict from one another~phenomena differeing not in degree but in kind."
Mental Faculties indicated by the phenomena above classified.
The three fold classification of mental phenomena, above established and elucidated, clearly indicate a tri-unity of mental faculties and susceptibilities equally distinct from one another. These faculties and susceptibilities we designate by the terms Intellect or Intelligence, Sensibility or Sensitivity, and Will. To the Intellect we refer all the phenomena of thought, of every kind, degree, and modification. To the Sensibility we refer all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, and affections. To the Will we refer all mental determinations, such as volitions, choices, purposes, &c.
Object of Mental Philosophy.
The object of Mental Philosophy is a full development of the phenomena, characteristics, laws and mutal relationships and dependencies of these different faculties.
Meaning of the words Mental Faculties.
When I speak of a diversity of Mental Faculties, I would by no means be understood as treaching the strange dogma, that the mind is made up of parts which may be separated from one another. Mind is not composed of a diversity of substances. It is one substance, incapable of division. Yet this simple substance, remaining, as it does, always one and dentical, is capable of a diversity of functions, or operations, entirely distict from one another. This diversity of capabilities of this one substance, we designate by the words Mental Faculties. As the functions of thought, feeling, and willing, are entirely distict form each other, so we speak of the powers of thought, feeling, and willing, to wit, the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will, as distict faculties of the Mind.
The remarks made above respecting the Mind itself, will, at once, appear equally applicable to each of the Mental Faculties which have been enumerated. As we speak of the Intelligence, for example, as a Faculty of the Mind entirely distict form those of the Sensibility and Will, without supposing that the Mind is not strictly one substance, so we may speak of the different Powers, or Faculties of the Intelligence itself, without implying that that Faculty, whether applied to the whole Mind, or to any of the departments of the Mind, implies a diversity of functions of the same power, or substance, and not a diversity of substances, or parts.
CHAPTER III.
PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
WE are now prepared to enter directely upon the great inquiry to to be pursued in the Treatise,-~the Phenomena, Faculties, and Laws of the human Intelligence. As all that we know, or can know, of this, as well as of every other department of the Mind, is revealed to us through the phenomena which lie uneder the eye of Consciousness, the first inquiries which now present themselves are, What are the phenomena of thought thus revealed? What are their fundamental characteristics? In conformity to what principles shall they be classified and arranged?
Principle of Classification.
There is one principle, in conformity to which all intellectual phenomena may be properly classified, and in the light of which, the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena may be very distictly presented. I refer to the modes in which all objects of thought are conceived of by the Intelligence. Of these modes, there are two entirely distinct and separate, the one from the other. Every object of thought is conceived of as existing either contingently or of necessity, that is, that object is conceived of as existing, with the possibility of conceiving of its non-existence, or it is conceived of as existing, with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence. If we have any conceptions of an object at all, we must conceive of it as falling under one or the other of these relations. The principle of classification, therefore, is fundamental, and of universal application.
Contingent and necessary Phenomena of Thought defined.
Every thought, conception, cognition, or idea, then, by whatever we may choose to designate it, all the phenomena of the Intelligence, may be classed, as contingent, or necessary. A conception is contingent, when its object may be conceived of as existing with the possibility of conceieving of its non-existence.
An idea is necessary when its object is conceived of as existing with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence.
All the phenomena of the Intelligence must, as shown above, fall under one or the other of these relations. It remains now, to iluustrate the principle of classification here adopted, by a reference to an adequate number of particular phenomena, as the basis of important distinctions pertaining to the different functions or powers of the Intelligence. In the notice which we shall take of particular phenomena, other important characteristics, aside from those under consideration, will be developed, while these will be kept prominently in mind, as the grounds of classification.
IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE.
We will commence our analysis with consideration of two prominent ideas, those of body and space. We are to contemplate them as they now lie in the Intelligence, in its resent state of development. That these ideas are in all minds, which have attained to any considerable degree of development, there can be doubt. The question is, what are their fundamental characteristics?
Idea of Body contingent.
We will begin with the idea of body. Take any one body we please, the book, for an example, which lies bofore us. While we conceive of this body, as existing, we can also with perfect readiness, conceive its non-existence, and that the time may come, when it will cease to exist. The power which brought it into being, may also annihilate it. The same holds true of all bodies, of every kind. All objects around us, the world itself, and the entire universe we contemplate as existing with the possibility of, at the same time, conceiving of their non-existence. They do exist. They may cease to be. They may be annihilated. There is no difficulty of conceiving of these propositions as true. Nor is there any perceived contradiction between them. The idea of body then is contingent. We always conceive of the object of that idea as existing, with the possibility of, at the same time, conceiving of its non-existence.
Idea of Space necessary.
We now turn to a consideration of the idea of space. We can, as shown above, readily conceive of the annihilation of all bodies, of the universe itself. But when we have conceived of this, can we conceive that space, in which the universe exists, may be annihilated? We cannot. We conceive of space as a reality, as really existing. Can we conceive of it as not being? We cannot. No intelligent being can form such a conception. Of this everyone is perfectly conscious. When we have conceived of the annihilation of this, and of all other bodies, of the entire universe itself, let any one attempt to conceive of the annihilation of space, in which we necessarly conceive of all these objects as existing, and he will find the formation of such a conception, an absolute impossibility. The idea of space then is necessary. We conceive of the object of that idea as existing, with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence.
Other characteristics of these two Ideas.
It now remains to mark other characteristics of these important ideas. The following may be presented as the most fundamental.
Idea of Body relative.
When we conceive of a body as existing, we necessarily conceive, as the condition of its existence, of the existence of something else, to wit, space in which body does and must exist. If body is, space must be, as the condition of its existence. The idea of body, therefore, is relative, that is, the existence of the object of that idea necessarily supposes, as the condition of its existence, the existence of something else.
Idea of Space absolute.
When, on the other hand, we conceive of space, we conceive, as the condition of its existence, of no other reality. Space must be, whether anything else exists or not. The idea of space then is unconditioned, or absolute. The reality of the object of that idea, supposes, as the condition of its existence of nothing else.
Idea of Body implies that of Limitation.
We always, also, conceive of body as limited. Under this condition, we not only conceive of all particular bodies, but of the universe itself. The idea of body then always implies that of limitation. In other words body is finite.
Idea of Space implies the absence of Limitation.
Space, on the other hand, we always necessarily conceive of as without limits. Its idea implies the absence of all limitation. In other words, space is infinite.
Idea of Body, a sensible representation.
Once more, when we form a conception of some body, we can readily conceive of something else, by which the former can be represented. The human countenance, for example, can be represented on canvass. The idea of body then, is a sensible representation.
Idea of Space as pure rational conception.
When, on the other hand, we have formed the idea of space we find, and can conceive of, no existence with which the former can be compared. It bears no resemblace whatever to any other object which we know, or of which we can form any conception. The idea of space has no more resemblance to any other thought, or mental phenomena whatever. The idea of space is a pure rational conception.
The following then may be stated, as the most important characteristics of these two ideas.
1. The idea of body is contingent. That of space is necessary.
2. The idea of body is relative. That of space is unconditioned and absolute.
3. The idea of body implies that of limitation. Or, body is finite. The idea of space implies the absence of all limitation. In other words, space is infinite.
4. The idea of body is is a sensible representation. That of space is a pure rational conception.
IDEAS OF SUCCESSION, AND TIME, OR DURATION.
These ideas are in all intelligent minds. No individual, whose Intelligence has been developed at all, will fail to understand you, when you speak of one event, as having happened; of another, as having succeeded it, and of the fact that that succession took place in some definite period of time. We will now mark the characteristic of these ideas.
Idea of Succession contingent.
You can conceive of some one event as having happened, and of another as having succeeded it. In other words, you have the idea of succession. Can you not conceive, that neither of these events occurred? Every individual can readily form such a conception. The same holds true of all events, of all succession of every kind, and in all time. The idea of succession, like that of body, is contingent.
The Idea of Time necessary.
But when we have conceived of the total cessation of succession, we find it absolutely impossible to conceive that there is no time, or duration, in which succession may take place. We can no more conceive of the annihilation of time, than we can of that of space. The idea of time, then, like that of space, is necessary.
Other Characteristics of these Ideas.
When we conceive of succession, we necessarily affirm, as the condtion of its existence, the reality of something else, that is, of time, in which succession takes place. The idea of succession, like that of body, is relative.
On the other hand, when we affirm the reality of time, we suppose, as the condtion of its existence, the existence of nothing else. Time is, and must be, whether anything else exists of not. The idea of time, then, is unconditioned and absolute.
Once more; whenever we can conceive of succession, we necessaritly conceive of time before, and after it. The idea of succession, therefore, implies of that limitation, or succession is limited, finite.
The idea of time, however, implies the absence of all limitation. Duration never began; nor will it ever cease to be. In other words, time is infinite. The following are the most important and fundamental characteristics of these two ideas.
1. The idea of succession is contingent. That of time is necessary.
2. The idea of succession is conditioned, or relative. That of time is unconditioned and absolute.
3. The idea of succession always implies that of limitation. Or succession is finite. The idea of time, on the other hand, implies that of the absence of all limitation. In other words, duration is infinite.
IDEAS OF THE FINITE AND OF THE INFINITE.
Body and space, succession and duration, are given to us, as we have seen, with the following characteristics: Body and succession are limitable; time and space are illimitable. In other words, the former are finite, the latter are infinite. "Now the ideas of the finite and the infinite," as remarked by Cousin, "may be detached form the ideas of body and succession, time and space, provided we keep in mind the subjects from which they are abstracted."
These ideas then are in the mind. They are also distinct, the one from the other. Consequently the one cannot be derived from the other. The multiplication of the finite cannot give the infinite. Nor by dividing the infinite do we find the finite. Being correlative terms, the one necessarily supposes and suggests the other. The one cannot possibly exist in the mind without the other. Yet as above remarked, the one is perfectly distinct from the other.
Nor is one of these ideas less distinct than the other. When I speak of the inifinite, every one as readily and distinctly apprehends my meaning, as when I speak of the finite. The following propostions, for example~body is limitable; space is illimitable~are equally intelligible to all minds, the one as the other.
There are other forms in which these ideas appear in the Mind, in all of which they sustain, to each other, the same relations, and possess the same characteristics. When the Mind conceives of power, wisdom or goodness, as imperfect, or limitable, or finite, it necesssarily conceives of something which is and always was.
If an idividual still affirms that he has, in reality, no idea of the infinite, we have only to ask him, whether he understands the import of the words he employs, when he makes such an affirmation? whether he is not conscious of speaking of something, which, in thought, he himself clearly distinguishes from all that is limitable, or limited? These questions, he will readily answer in the affirmative. In this answer he clearly contradicts the affirmation under consideration. For, if he really, as he affirms, has no idea of the infinite, he would not know the meaning of the terms he uses, nor could he in thought clearly distinguish the infinite, from all that is limitable, or finite.
If also we have no real or positive idea of the infinite, we can have none of time and space, for they are positive ideas, and their objects are given in the Intelligence, as positively or absolutely infinite.
Remarks of Locke.
Four remarks of Locke, pertaining to the idea of the Infinite, demand a passing notice.
His first remark is, that it is an "endlessly growing idea." On the other hand, the idea of the Infinite is always fixed. Being a simple idea, it must, when once generated in the mind, remain there, at all times, one and identical. It may become more and more vivid. In the respect under consideration, howerver, this idea undergoes no modification whatever. Whoever found, since the ideas of infinite space and duration were developed in his Mind, that these have undergone the least modification, as far as growth is concerned?
Again: Locke maintains that the idea of the Infinite is obscure. Still it exists, and as a phenomenon of Consciousness, falls, most legitimately, under the cognizance of the philosopher. But in what sense is this idea obscure? To those faculties of the Intelligence which pertain to the finite, it must for ever remain obscure. To that faculty, however, which apprehends truths necessary and absolute, it is as plain as any other idea whatever.
According to Locke, also, the idea of the infinite is merely a negative idea. "We have," he says, "no positive idea of Infinity." This is directly contradicted by the testimony of universal Consciousness. Who is not conscious that his ideas of God, of space, and time, all of which are given in the Intelligence as infinite, are just as positive as any of our conceptions whatever. We might also, with the same propriety, maintain that our conceptions of the finite are negative, as that our ideas of the infinite are. Being correlative ideas, if one is assumed as positive, the other will be relatively negative of course. In themselves, however, both are alike positive and equally so.
Once more: "Number," says Locke, "affords the clearest idea of the infinite." This is to reduce the infinite to the finite; for number, however large, is always limited~that is, finite. The multiplication of the finite may call into exercise the faculty which apprehends the infinite, and thus render our ideas of the latter more distinct and vivid (as all acts of attention do) than it otherwise would be. In no other sense, however, can such repetitions give us the Infinite.
Characteristics of these Ideas.
Having establised the fact, that the idea of the infinite, as well as the finite, is in the mind, it now remains to mark their respective characteristics.
Idea of the Finite contingent and relative; that of the Infinite necessary and absolute.
Whatever substance we conceive of as finite, we cannot but regard as existing contingently. We cannot regard it as in its own nature, a necessary existence. Hence, for all that we conceive of as finite, we natrually and necessarily inquire after a cause. We do not ask the question, had it a cause? but what caused it? An idea of the finite, therefore, is contingent, and consequently relative.
On the other hand, whatever we regard as infinite we necessarily apprehend as uncaused~that is, as existing by necessity. When we trace back any chain of causes and effects, for the purpose of finding a first cause, at each successive link we always inquire for its antecedent, till we arrive at the Infinite. Here we pause; here our inquiries cease; here we recognize ourselves at once, as in the presence of an existence which is not contingent, but necessary and absolute. The idea of the Infinite, therefore, is necessary and absolute.
IDEAS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA, AND OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.
Every individual believes, that he is now the same being that he was yesterday, and will be to-morrow. Numberless and ever varying phenomena are constantly passing under the eye of Consciousness. Many are recalled of which we were formerly conscious; yet they are all referred to the same individaul subject. Every phenomena of thought, feeling, and willing, of which we are now conscious, which we recall as having, in some former period, been conscious of, or which we expect to put forth in some future time, is given in the Intelligence in this exclusive form~I think, I feel, I will; I did think, I did feel, I did will, so and so. The same holds equally true of all similar phenomena which we contemplate, as about to occur in future time. Whatever the phenomena may be, the same identical I is given as its subject. This is what is meant by personal identity. It is the unity of our being, of the I or self, as opposed to the pluarlity and ever changing phenomena of Consciousness. Having shown that the idea of mental phenomena and of personal identity are in the Mind, we will consider their characteristics.
Idea of Mental Phenomena contingent and relative.
You have a Consciousness of some thought, feeling, or act of Will. You remember similar phenomena of which you were formerly conscious. You conceive of them as now being, or as having been actual realities. Can you not conceive of them as not being, or as never having taken place? You can. Can you conceive of such phenomena as existing or having existed, without refering them to some subject? In other words, can you conceive of some thought, feeling, or volition as now existing, or as having existed in former times, without referring it to some subject, some being which thinks, feels, or wills? You cannot. All the phenomena of Consciousness are contingent and relative.
Idea of Personal Identity necessary.
How is it with the idea of personal identity? You are now conscious of some thought, or feeling, or act of Will. You recall others, of a similar nature, of which you have been formerly conscious. This you refer to one and the same subject, the I of Consciousness, as it is sometimes called. This reference you and all mankind alike must make. This reference mankind universally make in all the transactions of life. Under its influence we hold ourselves and others bound to fulfill contracts made years ago. Under its influence, the virtuous are commended and rewarded, and the vicious blamed and punished for actions long since performed. Under its influence we anticipate the retributions of eternal justice in a future state for the deeds done in the body. Is it possible to avoid making this reference? It is not. You cannot possibly conceive of a thought, for example, without referring it to some subject which thinks. You cannot be conscious of any mental phenomenon, or recall any others of which you were not formerly conscious, without referring them to one and the same subject, yourself. The idea of personal identity, then, is necessary.
Necessary ideas distinguished as conditional and unconditional.
Here an important distiction between necessary ideas demands special attention. When we contemplate the ideas of space and duration, for example, we find that the objects of these ideas must exist, whether anything else exists or not. Those ideas, therefore, are not only necessary, but unconditioned and absolute. On the other hand, the ideas of personal identity, and of subjstance and cause, which we shall hearafter consider, are not, in this sense necessary. They are only conditionally necessary. Phenomena being given, substance must be. An event being given, the supposition of a cause is necessary. Phenomena and events not being given, we do not affirm the existence of substances or causes. The penomena of Consciousness not being given, we do not affirm the reality or identity of the self, the subject of thses phenomena. Such ideas are conditionally necessary, and not like those of space and time, not only necessary, but unconditioned and absolute.
IDEAS OF PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE.
Idea of substance explained.
If the observations which have been made upon the idea of personal identity, have been distinctly understood, the characteristics of the idea of substance will be readily apprehended. All the phenomena of Consciousness and Memory are, as we have seen, by a necessary law of our being, referred to one and the same subject. The phenomena are accidents, perpetually changing. The subject, however, remains the same. Now, in the language of Cousin, "Being, one and identical, opposed to variable accidents, to transitory pheneomena, is substance." But thus far we have only pesonal substance. The same principle, however, applies equally to all external substances. Through the medium of our senses, such objects are given to us as being possessed of a great variety of qualities, and as existing in a great variety of states. The qualities and states, which are perpetually varying, we necessarily refer to one and the same subject a subject which remains one and identical, amid the endlessly diversified phenomena which it exhibits. This is substance.
Idea of phenomena contingent and relative~that of Substance necessary.
Now as it is with our ideas of phenomena of Consciousness and personal identity, so it is with our ideas of external phenomena and external substance. The former is contingent and relative; the latter is necessary. When any phenomena appears, we can readily conceive that it had not appeared. Its appearance also we can admit, only on the supposition of something else, to wit, substance, to which this appearance is necessarily referred. Our ideas of phenomena, therefore, are contingent and relative.
On the other hand, the idea of substance, relatively to phenomena, is necessary. Phenomena being given, substance must be. It is impossible for us to conceive of the former without the latter.
Our ideas of Substance not obscure, but clear and distict.
According to Locke, "we have no clear idea of substance in general." This idea also, he represents, as "of little use in philosophy." In reply, it may be said, that our idea of substance is just as clear and important, as those of time and space, and personal identity. Of this every one is conscious. The same function of the Intelligence which aprehends one of these ideas, apprehends them all. Take away the power to apprehend one, and the power to apprehend every other of these ideas is annihilated. Philosophy itself also becomes an impossibility. How could we reason philosophically about ourselves, in the absence of the idea of personal identity. Equally impossible would it be, to reason about objects external to us, in the absence of the idea of substance. This as kindred ideas, instead of being "of little use in philosophy," are, in reality, the foundation of all our explanations of phenomena, external and internal.
We often hear individuals, in expatiating upon the great ignorance of man, affirming, that all we "know of realities in and around us, is their phenomena. Of the substances themselves, we know nothing." In reply to such rhapsodies, it may be said, that our knowledge of every substance of every kind, is just as clear, distinct, and extensive, as our knowledge of its phenomena. In phenomena, substances stand revealed, the substance being as its phenomena. In the phenomena of thought, for example, we know ourselves, as thinking beings, or substances, our powers being as the thoughts which they generate. Our knowledge of the powers of thought, is just as distinct as that of thought itself. The same holds true, in respect to all substances, material, and mental.
IDEAS OF EVENTS AND CAUSE.
The universe within and around us, presents the constant spectacle of endlessly diversified and ever changing phenomena. Some of these are constantly conjoined, in the relation of "immediate and invariable antecedence and consequence." The connection between others is only occasional. In reference to events of the former class, the mind judges, that the relaton between them is not only that of antecedence and consequence, but of cause and effect. In reference to every event, however, whether its antecedent is perceived or not, we judge that it had a cause. This judgment is universal, extending to all events, actual and conceivable. It is absolutely impossible for us to conceive of an event without a cause. Let any one make the effort to form such a conception, and he will find that he has attempted an impossibility.
Here it should be noticed, that we do not affirm that every effect has a cause. That would be mere tautology. It would be equivalent to the affirmation, that whatever is produced by a cause, is produced by a cause. All this might be true, and the proposition, every event has a cause, be false, notwithstanding.
The idea of Events contingent and relative; that of Cause necessary.
The relation between the idea of an event, and that of a cause, may be readily pointed out. Whenever the mind witnesses, or is conscious of, the occurrence of an event, it apprehends that event as contingent and relative. It might or might not have happened. There is no impossibility in making these different suppositions. The occurrence of an event also necessarily supposes something else, to wit, a cause. On the other hand, no evernt uncaused can possibly be conceived to have taken place. The idea of an event, then, is contingent and relative. The idea of cause is necessary, conditionally so, as shown above.
Theory of Dr. Brown and others.
The speculations of certain philosophers respecting the subject under consideration, here demand our attention. The relation of cause and effect, according to Dr. Brown and others, is nothing more than that of "immediate and invariable antecedence and consequence." A cause, says Dr. B. is nothing else than "an immediate and invariable antecedent." According to this philosopher, in no instance whatever is there any reason, in the nature of any particular cause, why it should produce one event rather than another. Succession, mere antecedence and consequence immediate and invariable, without any reason in the nature of the antecedent and consequent why this order of succession should arise, rather than another, is all that exists in any instance. In regard to this theory, it is enough to say that no man does or can believe it. Let any man, for example, behold a piece of wood and a metallic substance put together into a heated furnace. The wood is immediately consumed, and the metal changed from a solid to a fluid state. Can he avoid the conviction, that there is, in the nature of these two substances a reason, why, that when acted upon by the same cause, one is comsumed, and the other changed from a solid to a fluid state? When the Almighty said, "Let there be light, and there was light," who dares believe that there was not, in the nature of that fiat, a reason, why, as its consequent, light rather than any other substance, should appear? When two pounds weight are place on one side of a balance, and five on the other, who does not believe, that aside from the particular sequence which follows here, there is, in the circumstances supposed, a reason why one particular sequence should follow, rather than any other? In the succession of day and night, also, we have an order of sequence immediate and invariable. Is this equivalent to the declaration, that day cause night, or night causes the day? It would be so, if the theory under consideration was true. For all the conditions of that theory are here fulfilled. We have an order of sequence immediate and invariable.
As further illustration, let us, for a moment, consider the theory of "pre-established harmony" between the action of the Soul and Body, proclaimed by Leibnitz. According to this author, Matter and Mind do, and can exert no influence upon each other, whatever. I will, for example, a motion of my arm, or of any other part of the body, and the motion follows. Still my volitions have no influence in causing or controlling that motion. So in all other instances. God, forseeing the states of our minds, has so constituted our bodies, that the action of the latter shall always be in perfect harmony with that of the former, though wholly uninflenced by it. In this theory, the relation of cause and effect, as announced by the theory of Dr. Brown, is perfectly fulfilled. Between the states of our minds, and the corresponding action of our bodies, we have an order of sequence immediate and invariable. But who does not regard the Liebnitzian theory as announcing a relation totally distict and opposite to what is universally believed to exist between our minds and bodies? When we say, that the motion of the body is in immediate and perfect harmony with that of the mind, we say one thing. When we say, that the action of the mind causes that of the body, we introduce, in the judgment of all men, an entirely different idea. Sequence immediate and invariable is all that we perceive to exist between any antecedent and consequent; but it is, by no means, all that we believe, yea know to exist.
Observations on Mr. Dugald Stewart.
The following remarks of Mr. Steward also demand a passing observation:
"It seems now to be pretty generally agreed among philosophers, that there is no instance in which we are able to perceive a necessary connection between two successive events, or to comprehend in what manner the one preceeds from the other, as its cause. From experience, indeed, we learn, that there are many events, which are constantly conjoined, so that one invariably follows the other: but it is possible, for anything we know to the contrary, that this connection, though a constant one, as far as our observation has reached, may not be a necessary connection; nay, it is possible, that there may be no necessary connections among any of the phenomena we see; and if there are any such connections existing, we may rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them."
Again:
"When it is said, that every change in nature indicates the operation of a cause, the word cause expresses something which is supposed to be necessarily connected with the change, and without which it could not have happened. This may be called the metaphysical meaning of the word; and such causes may be called metaphysical or efficient causes. In natural philosophy, however, when we speak of one thing being the cause of another, all that we mean is, that the two are constantly conjoined, so that when we see the one, we may expect the other. These conjunctions we learn from experience alone; and, without an acquaintence with them, we could not accommodate out conduct to the established course of nature."
These remarks certainly cannot hold in regard to the primary qualities of matter, as, for example, solidity considered as the antecedent, and resistacne as the consequent. Is it possible to conceive of the existence of an object which is extended and solid, which is at the same time destitute of the power of resistance?
Here I would drop the suggestion, whether it is possible to conceive of any substance as existing, which is destitute of power; and whether our ideas of substance and of power are not, in fact, identical? For my own part, I find it impossible to conceive of substances which are not actual causes or real powers.
IDEA OF POWER
The idea of Power, is that of causation in its quiescent state, or as the permanent attribute of a subject irrespective of its action, at any particular moment. When particular effects are attributed to particular causes, while the nature of the substances containing such causes remain unchanged, the mind considers the power to repeat such effects under the same circumstances, as the permanent attributes of those substances. This is the idea of power, as it exists in all minds. All substances, in their active state, are Causes~in their quiescent state, are Powers. Powers are of two kinds, active and passive. The latter are commonly called susceptibilities. As the existence of powers and causes is indicated by their respective phenomena, so the nature of such powers and causes is indicated by the characteristics of their respective phenomena.
The idea of Power, sustaining, as it does, the same relation to phenomena, that of cause and substance do, is, of course, like those ideas, universal and necessary.
Conclusion of the present Analysis.
Here our analysis of intellectual phenomena will close, for the present. It might have been extended to almost any length. Enough has been said, however, to indicate the principle of classification adopted, and to show its universal applicability, as well as to lay the foundation for the important distictions, &c., in respect to the intellectual powers, an elucidation of which will be commenced in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER IV.
APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING ANAYSIS.
LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF IDEAS.
IN applying the results of the preceding analysis, one of the first questions which arises, respects the relations of intellectual phenomena, contingent and necessary to each other. With regard to this question, I would remark, that there are two, and only two important relations wich such phenomena sustain to each other~the relation of logical and chronological antecedence and consequence. The latter relates to the order of acquisition, or to the question, Which, in the order of time, is first developed, in the Intelligence. The former relates to their order in a logical point of view, that is, to the question, Which sustains to the other, in the process of ratiocination, the relation of logical antecedent.
Logical order.
In regard to the order last mentioned, I would remark that one idea is the logical antecedent of another, when the latter necessarily supposes the former, that is, when the reality of the object of the latter can be admitted, only on the admission, of that of the object of the former. The ideas of events and cause being given in the Intelligence, for example, we find that we can admit the reality of an event on one supposition only, to wit, that of a cause which produced the event. We say, therefore, that the idea of cause is the logical antecedent of that of events.
Now, if we contemplate ideas in this view, it wll be perceived at once, that necessary ideas are, in all instances, the logical antecedents of contingent ones. What was shown above to be true of the ideas of events and cause, is self evidently true of the ideas of body and space, succession and time, the finite and the infinite, and phenomena external and internal, and substance and personal identity. Every contingent idea is relative, necessarily supposing, as its logical antecedent, some necessary idea.
Chronological order.
Contingent ideas, on the other hand, are the chronological antecedents of necessary ideas, that is, in the order of actual development in the intelligence, the former precedes the latter. Two conciderations will render this proposition demonstrably evident.
1. Necessary ideas are given in the Intelligence, only as the logical antecedents of contingent ones. Space, for example, is known to us, only as that in which bodies or substances exist. In no other light can we possibly know or conceive of it. Now that which is and can be known to us, only as the place of some other thing, cannot have been known to us prior to that thing; otherwise, the former might be known and conceived of, irrespective of the latter. The same holds true of the ideas of succession and time, phenomena and substance, events and causes. The latter class of ideas can be conceived of, only as the logical antecedents of the former. The former therefore must have orginated in the Intelligence, prior to the latter.
2. While necessary ideas can be defined, only as the logical antecedents of contingent ones, the latter can be defined without any reference to the former~a fact which could not be true, if the latter were not the chronological antecedents of the former. Cause, for example, can be defined, only as that which produces events. An event, as any one can perceive by consulting his dictionary, can be, and is defined without any reference to the idea of cause. Contingent ideas therefore are the chronological antecedents of necessary ones.
PRIMARY INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES PRE-SUPPOSED BY THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
The preceding analysis has fully prepared us to proceed legitimately and safely to another very important inquiry~the Primary Intellectual Faculties pre-supposed in that analysis. As stated in the Introduction, the being and characteristics of every power or substance in existence, are indicated to us by its respective phenomena. The perception of such phenomena, being itself a phenomenon of the mind which perceives, supposes, in the mind, corresponding powers of perception. When the Intelligence apprehends a fact, or truth of any kind, such act implies, in the Intelligence, corresponding powers of apprehension. Now truths perceived by the Intelligence are, as we have seen, of two kinds, contingent and necessary. The perception of such truths indicates a corresponding distiction of intellectual functions, or powers. The faculty or faculties which perceive, and affirm the reality of contingent phenomena, are clearly distinguishable from that which affirms the reality of truths necessary and universal.
But contingent phenomena perceived by the Intelligence are distinguishable, with equal clearness, as objective and subjective, that is, part pertain to the Mind itself, and part to external material substances. These facts most obviously demand a two-fold division of the Intellectual faculties which pertain to contingent phenomena, as objective and subjective. The analysis completed in the last Chapter, presents to our contemplation three distinct faculties of the Intelligence:
1. That which perceives the phenomena of the mind itself, the faculty which gives us subjective phenomena. This function of the Intelligence is denominated Consciousness.
2. That faculty which perceives the phenomena of external material substances, or which gives us objective phenomena. This function of the Intelligence is denominated Sense.
3. That faculty which apprehends truths necessary and universal. This intellectual function, or faculty, is denominated Reason.
These Faculties why called Primary.
Consciousness, Sense, and Reason, are called the primary faculties of the Intelligence, for two considerations:
1. Because, that with them, all our knowledge commences.
2. All our complex cognitions are composed of elements given by these faculties. All the phenomena of the Intelligence are either simple or complex. All simple ideas are found to be the direct intuitions of one or of the other of the faculties. All complex ideas are found, on a careful analysis to be composed of elements previously given by these faculties. The truth of this last remark will be fully confirmed in the precess of our subsequent investigations.
Also called Intuitive Faculties.
The faculties above named are also sometimes denominated Intuitive Faculites. The reason is, that each alike, pertains to its objects, by direct intuition. Consciousness, for example, by direct intuition, and not through any medium, apprehends the phenomena of the mind. The same is true of the faculty of Sense in respect to the phenomena of external material substances. The action of Reason is conditioned on the prior action of Sense and Consciousness. It is not through any medium, but by direct intuition, however, that Reason affirms truths universal, necessary, and absoluto. Like the former, therefore, it may, with equal propriety, be denominated a faculty of intuition. These faculties, as we shall see hereafter, give us the elements of all our knowledge.
RELATION OF PRIMITIVE INTUITIVE FACULTIES TO EACH OTHER
We are now prepared also for another very important inquiry — the appropriate spheres of the primary faculties relatively to each other. This inquiry can now be met in very few words. Sense, and Consciousness, give us phenomena external and internal. Reason gives us the logical antecedents of phenomena thus perceived and affirmed. This is its appropriate and exclusive sphere relatively to the other faculties. It cannot enter the domain of either Sense or Consciousness, and judge of the validity of its affirmations. The same holds true of each of these last-mentioned faculties, relatively to the domain of the other, and that of Reason too. Each faculty has its own exclusive sphere in which it is wholly independent of either or both of the others, and independent in this sense, that the validity of its affirmations cannot be tested at the bar of either of the others. Its response, when questioned, in respect to what it has affirmed is, " What I have written, I have written." When Sense, for example, has made an affirmation pertaining to the phenomena of an external material substance, all that Consciousness can do, pertaining to the subject, is, to give that affirmation as it is, together with its characteristics.
Of the validity, of the affirmation, it can say nothing. Reason can give the logical antecedent of that affirmation, and that is all. With its validity it has no more to do, than Consciousness has. The same will hereafter be shown to be true of Reason, in respect to every other function of the Intelligence.
IMPORTANCE OF THE TRUTHS ABOVE ELUCIDATED.
If the truth of the conclusions above stated be admitted, they will be found to be of fundamental importance in philosophy. They will put an end at once to the wild speculations of many philosophers of the Super-sensual school, both in thins country and, in Europe. hero lies, for example, the great error of' Kant, the father of modern Transcendentalism. He first gives us a most profound, and correct analysis of intellectual phenomena, together with a statement equally correct, of the faculties pre-supposed by those phenomena. He then arraigns all the other faculties at the bar of Reason, there to test the validity of their affirmations. It is no matter of surprise at all, that the result of the trial should be thus announced by the philosopher himself who instituted it, a trial, the entire results of which, as we shall hereafter see, and a moment's reflection must convince us, must and can rest upon nothing else than groundless assumptions, and not at all upon the real affirmations of the Intelligence. "We have therefore intended to say," says Kant, in giving the results of his philosophy, "that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomenon — that the things which we invisage [form conceptions and judgments of] are not that in themselves for which we take them; neither are their relationships in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we do away with our subject, or even only the subjective quality of the senses in general, every quality, all relationships of objects in space and time, nay, even space and time themselves would , and cannot exist as phenomena in themselves, but only in us. It remains utterly unknown to us what may be the nature of the objects in themselves, separate from all the receptivity of our sensibility. We know noting our manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us and which need not belong to every being, although to every man. With this we have only to do." The above extract contains the following strange paralogisms, contradictions and absurdities:
1. That our Intelligence takes, that is, affirms things not to be, what the same Intelligence takes, that is, affirms them to be. Kant first employs the Intelligence to find out what things are. He then employs the same Intelligence to demonstrate, that. these very things are not what the Intelligence had previously affirmed them to be. As if a merchant should profess, that by his yard-stick, he had demonstrated, that he had a thousand yards of cloth, and then, that, by the same yard-stick, lie had as fully demonstrated the fact, that he had no real cloth at all, and that neither the yard-stick nor the cloth were, in themselves, what the yard-stick had shown them to be.
2. That, while our Intelligence represents nothing whatever as it is in itself, this same Intelligence does correctly represent "our manner of perceiving objects" — a most palpable contradiction, surely. For if our Intelligence does not represent timings as they are, it surely will not represent our "our manner of perceiving" as it is.
3. Kant affirms, that all that we have to do with objects, is '' according to our manner of perceiving them,'' that is, as they are given, in our Intelligence, lie then teaches us, that these objects are not as our Intelligence affirms them to be. This, certainly, is doing with objects far otherwise than "according to our manner of perceiving them."
Now all these absurdities and contradictions which Kant gives as the results of' his philosophy, and which constitute its distinguishing peculiarities, would have been prevented, together with the tide of skepticism, which, through that philosophy, has desolated so large a portion of Europe, had that great philosopher, after demonstrating the reality of Reason, as a faculty of the Intelligence, raised, and correctly answered, the inquiry pertaining to the true sphere of that faculty relatively to other functions of the Intelligence. Philosophers of the Super-sensual school have run wild with Reason, just as those of the Sensual school did with Sensation and Reflection.
The possession of Reason is the great distinguishing characteristic of humanity, that characteristic which separates man at an infinite remove from the lower orders of creation around him, and places.